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Section C - Interpretation - Coggle Diagram
Section C - Interpretation
The Influence of German History on Nazi Foreign Policy
For
The Nazis drew on ideas of 19th century ideas of Pan-Germanism
Such as uniting German-speaking peoples in one country.
They wanted to establish an Aryan empire and they looked to emulate the First and Second Reich. They had clear aggressive intent.
Hitler, however, wanted living space in Europe, rather than colonies in Africa, different to the Second Reich
The First World War and the Treaty of Versailles (June 1919) were used by the Nazis to justify their foreign policy
The ‘diktat’ of Versailles or ‘the stab in the back’ was a constant theme of Nazi propaganda and found a ready audience among the German people as Versailles was almost universally criticised.
Hitler was unique in his foreign policy goals. His aim of Lebensraum (living space) had a racial element to it and he did not want to return to Germany’s pre-war borders. He wanted an empire and to make Germany a world power. He was not like other German statesmen
Against
Both the First and Second Empire had a series of carefully crafted alliances with other nations.
Hitler too stressed his desire for peace and cooperation in the early years of Nazi rule. He could not act too aggressively from 1933-35 and German history might have indicated that an aggressive policy was not the best option.
Much of what the Nazis said about Versailles was untrue as history was re-written by the Nazis.
Germany could not fight on in 1919 and his criticism of the ‘November Criminals’ was unfair.
Some of the harshest aspects of the treaty had been revised (reparations were effectively cancelled in the Lausanne Conference of 1932) and there was some sympathy amongst other European powers towards German grievances
Some see Hitler as just another in a long line of German statesmen. The historian Fritz Fisher has drawn connections between German aims in the First and Second World Wars for example. Attempts were also made by Weimar politicians to revise Versailles.
The reasons for the invasion of Poland
For
Poland was a product of the WWI peace settlement and Hitler wanted land in the east. It was allied to France and its territorial integrity was guaranteed by Britain in March 1939 Chamberlain’s Polish guarantee). Strategically it was isolated and vulnerable. Hitler looked down on the Poles and wanted Polish territory to achieve ‘living space’.
After the destruction of what remained of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, Poland was the obvious next target. Hitler wanted access to unite East and West Prussia and claim Danzig, a German city in the Polish corridor. He was ready to test his forces in battle by 1939.
The Nazi Soviet Pact of August 1939 made an attack on Poland inevitable. Hitler was now reassured he would not have to fight the Russians or face a war on two fronts
Against
Poland was the first country Hitler made an alliance with in 1934. Why would he sign a non-aggression pact if he intended to invade just five years later
There is evidence to suggest that Hitler wanted Poland as an ally against the Soviet Union and high level discussions took place between 1935 and 1937. The Nazis were simply asking for road and rail connections to East Prussia at this point
Hitler did not believe Britain and France would honour their commitment to the Poles. He did not want to fight a general European war and wanted a short, sharp war of conquest. He misjudged the situation. The Poles had been given confidence by the British ‘blank cheque’ of March 1939.
Contribution of other nations
For
Hitler was intent on war at all costs and this would have happened whatever other countries did. Some historians like Hugh Trevor-Roper or William Shirer see Hitler as having a clear master plan as outlined in Mein Kampf – this is sometimes called an ‘intentionalist’ viewpoint.
Hitler was amoral when dealing with other countries. He signed alliances and treaties but had no intention of keeping his word. This is true of the pact with Poland of 1934, the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935, the Munich Agreement of 1938 and the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 (a.k.a. the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact). Other countries were duped (tricked) by Hitler
The policy of appeasement encouraged Hitler to gamble (the remilitarisation of the Rhineland in March 1936) and to become ever bolder. He considered the democratic politicians in Britain and France to be ‘little worms’ and thought they would never stand up to him
It was Hitler who precipitated crisis after crisis during 1938 and 1939. Moreover, it is difficult to see what else Britain and France could have done. Public opinion was against war and Britain had started rearming by 1936. The policy of appeasement gave Britain vital breathing space to prepare for the war of 1939 (more spitfires were produced between 1938 and 1939 and the radar system was extended).
Against
Britain’s policy of appeasement encouraged Hitler. Chamberlain sold out the Czechs in the Munich agreement of September 1938 and gave a ‘blank cheque’ to Poland in the guarantee of March 1939. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 is another good example
France was weak in the inter war period – politically (11 governments from 1932-35), economically and militarily. It could not stand up to Germany and was very defensive e.g. the Maginot line
The League of Nations was also ineffectual e.g. it failed to stop Italy in Abyssinia in 1935
Other powers stood back from events (the U.S.A.) or made deals with Hitler to protect their own interests e.g. the Nazi Soviet Pact of August 1939 (Russia was distrusted by the western democracies who could have done more to secure an anti-Nazi alliance).
The deteriorating world economy of the 1930s should be seen as a crucial reason for the destabilisation of international relations. This helped the rise of dictators.
Some historians (Richard Overy) have argued that Hitler’s foreign policy was also affected by domestic circumstances. Blitzkrieg was an economic as well as a military strategy and rearmament helped to boost the economy. ‘Functionalist’ or ‘structuralist’ historians look to other factors to explain Hitler’s action
Hitlers ideas and his role in shaping Foreign Policy
For
Hitler talked about overturning Versailles and Lebensraum in Mein Kampf (1925), years before he came to power.
The Zweite Buch (1928) and the Hossbach memorandum (1937) offer more evidence of his aggressive intentions. He played a central role in shaping foreign policy.
Hitler built up the army from the moment he came to power. Rearmament was made public in 1935 (flouting Versailles) and the Four Year Plan of 1936 was designed to put Germany’s economy on a war footing.
Hitler invaded what was left of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. This made a mockery of his claim to unite Germans and was the action of an imperialist. Hitler was in full control and felt strong enough to purge the army in 1938.
Against
In 1924 Hitler had no idea he would be in power only nine years later. Mein Kampf is not a programme or blueprint for aggression
AJP Taylor saw it simply as the daydreaming of a failed revolutionary. Hitler kept many non-Nazi foreign policy officials in post until 1936 – evidence against a master plan?
Hitler was an opportunist (AJP Taylor again). He wasn’t always prepared militarily and the actions of local Nazis in the 1930s often provoked German action e.g. the Anschluss (union) with Austria in March 1938 which appeared to be a hastily improvised operation.
Hitler seemed to prefer short Blitzkrieg wars (lightning wars) against smaller powers. He did not intend a general European war in September 1939 and was shocked that Britain and France declared war on 3rd September 1939