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Deepwater Horizon WorkSafeBC Analysis, Screen Shot 2022-08-10 at 12.03.38,…
Deepwater Horizon WorkSafeBC Analysis
People
TransOcean Deepwater horizon employees
Employees were experienced with over 50 successful exploratory wells
Over the 30 years of operation there are 0 recorded lost time injuries
Majority of employees onboard the Deepwater Horizon had been working on the rig since commissioning
BP Management
BP Manager onboard at time of incident was inexperienced and covering for another 'BP man'
BP had a negative safety culture with a priority of money over safe operations
The visiting BP and Transocean executives onboard during negative pressure test had been employed in their current positions for less than 5 years
BP had a vigorous training program with all employees/ contractors completing the necessary requirements annually.
Employees
Sleep
Stress
Illnesses
Further Investigation Required
Fatigue
There are reports that the crew were short handed requiring employees to work longer hours and cover excessive shifts
Further Investigation Required
Management
Organisational/ System Factors
Resourcing
Delay of required maintenance due to close proximity with temporary abandoment
temporary abandonment means all hands on deck to finish the job at hand, maintenance can be completed after the job is finished
Contractors employed by BP to complete the Macondo well had a longstanding relationship
Mistakes made by contractors were overlooked to prioritise 'friendship'
Organisation of Work
Transocean has a perfect safety record holding a number of safety related awards for the deepwater area in the Gulf of Mexico
BP had a tarnished safety record due to a number of recent incidents involving their oil rigs
Policy
BP had a policy implemented for the temporary abandonment requirements and adequately satisfied all legislative requirements
The Transocean maintenance policy was found to be basic and allowed critical systems to fail without the notification of the crew
Procedures
The cement job was not evaluated using a proven evaluation technique as per BPs temporary abandonment procedure
The well control response procedure failed to regain control of the well during the blowout
Management Decisions
The decisions made by management was focused on saving time and money due to the increased expendature
Job Design
Rosters
All employees on the Deepwater Horizon work a 12-hour day or night shift for three weeks straight
Once the three week stint is completed they are entitled to three weeks off.
Workload
The Captain of the Deepwater Horizon and Head of Operations were responsible for the operations of the vessel as well as managing the visiting executives for the 24 hour period.
The Operations controllers in the drill shack had an increased workload due to the discrepancies in the negative pressure test and trying to find a solution in front of executives
Increased workload due to the temporary abandonment process of the Macondo Well
Supervison
The head BP man on board the Deepwater Horizon at the time of incident was reliving a coworker who had to complete training
This was the BP mans first time on the Deepwater Horizon
Information Transfer
Communication
After the first explosion, all internal phones on the Deepwater Horizon stopped working preventing information transfer
All internal forms of communication post explosion were disabled
All crew members on the Deepwater Horizon carried handheld UHF radios, however during the post explosion evacuation, these were not utilised
Communication from Halberton (the concrete contractor) was minimal and the increased risk of cement failure was never communicated
Communication between the mud loggers and the operational crew broke-down leading to the crews not identifying the flow of hydrocarbons
Handovers
The Negative Pressure test occurred during handover preventing accurate information transfer from day shift to night shift
Workplaces
Workplace Factors
Emergency Generators located on lower deck, the opposite side of the control room
Only access to rig is by helicopter or marine vessel
Emergency BOP is only located in the control room
When the well blew out, the drill shack was immediately destroyed leaving the drill pipe uncontrolled
Equipment Design
Design of Mud Gas Separator only allows a small amount of flow, not meant for emergency bypass with full flow
Allowed uncontrolled release of Hydrocarbons onto the drill deck
Fire and Gas prevention system filed to alert crew until moments before first explosion
Work Environment
Remote, located in the middle of the Gulf of Mexico
Long 12 hour shift for 3 weeks continuous
Poor communication with the Florida Coast Guard
Oil Drilling
Loud
Dirty
Physical
Employees form a close friendship, almost as external family
Floating oil rig 20 stories above the ocean
Life Cycle
Operating and Maintenance
Throughout the lifecycle of the Deepwater Horizon it received 5 citations for non-conformance
Four in 2002
One in 2003
There were an estimated 3000 man hours of maintenance outstanding on the Deepwater Horizon
The Deepwater Horizon was contracted by BP for the entirety of its operational life
Construction
The Deepwater Horizon was built in South Korea by Hyundai Heavy Industries at the Ulsan Shipyard
Concept Phase
The Deepwater Horizon was a fifth generation, dynamically-positioned semi-submersible drilling unit
Commissioning
The Deepwater Horizon was commissioned in 2001
Decommissioning
The Deeepwater Horizon sunk to the bottom of the ocean and has never been salvaged.
Design Failures
The Annulus Cement barrier did not isolate the hydrocarbons in the well
Shoe track barriers did not isolate the Hydrocarbons
This allowed the casing hanger seal to fail due to excessive pressure
Annulus Gas Alarm System did not alert operations to gas escape prior to first explosion
This meant that the Hydrocarbon influx was not identified until it had reached the riser and was already at the rig.
The Fire and Gas system did not prevent the ignition of escaping Hydrocarbons
Emergency power generators failed due to lack of maintenance and testing
The annulus preventer failed to activate and close off the well and break the drill pipe.
The Mud Gas Separator unit was not designed for such a high flow of mud and could not remove the trapped hydrocarbons allowing them to enter the Deepwater Horizon
The BOP emergency activation system failed to seal the well
