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Whose actions are in question? - Coggle Diagram
Whose actions are in question?
Judicial role
Judicial review
power of the supreme court
no, advisory opinions. federal court opinions must count with FINALITY
Plaut v. spendthrift farm conclusion: congress cannot reopen a final judgment. Period.
SC rulings have the same weight as constitution
Decide with finality (Plaut)
review state and federal statute for compliance with constitution (hunter lessee expand federal judicial review to states)
appellate review
Congress can limit courts
exception clause: congress can take supreme court jurisdiction away (McCardle and Klein)
us v. Klein case suggests that there are some doctrinal limits on this power, cannot pas a statute that determines the outcome of a case
recommends a narrow reading of the statute when congress exercises this power, take away what they say and nothing more
Commodities futures v. schor: Creation of article 1 courts, Overturned? by Stern v. marshall?
Justice Oconnor develops a balancing test, 1. the dgree to which the art 1 court looks and acts like an Art 3 court 2. whether the agency court is adjudicating public or private rights 3. the reasons why congress established the agency court
Conclude: does not violate the constitution and can waive the right to art 3 court, but going to that art 1 court is always voluntary, federal courts retain the power to review the facts and to decide all legal questions, and to enforce the art 1 court decision or not
Dissent: justice brennan: the full judicial power should stay with article 3 courts Rules over standards
Ex parte McCardle, but it does not affect jurisdiction that was previously exercise
Congress can control substantive law that courts apply and burdens of proof (Klein and Seattle Audubon
Limits on Congress court powers
Congress power limited by: cannot violate some other provision of const
Implied limit that congress cannot destroy the essential role of fed courts
Congress has the sole power to try impeachments (Nixon v. US)
steps required for judicial review
Justiciability
Standing (warth v. seldin) and (Lujan v. Defenders of wildlife) (Mass v. EPA takes a different turn on standing)
fairly traceable to the actions of the defendant
capable of being redressed by the courts
actual or imminent injury that is concrete and particularized, Cannot raise a claim for another or generalized grievance ( Lujan)
but congress can allow a 3rd party claim by statute (singleton v. wulff)
P is an organization?
atleast 1 person must have standing
the interest litigated must relate to the reasons why people are members
the remedy must be meaningful even in the absence of the injured member (organizational standing
Political questions (baker v. carr not political question) Case by case analysis
6 factor test
do judicially manageable standards exist for deciding the issue (is it inherently subject only to discretionary political decision making)
unusual need for adherence to prior political decision (foreign affairs)
need for prior policy decision that is not for judges
inevitabilty of expressing lack of respect for other branches
avoid embarrassment of conflicting pronouncements of diff branch
functionalist application: doesnt create a category instead looks at factors
is there a textual commitment of the issue to another branch?
how to try impeachment falls into this category (nixon v. US)
today it appears we are down to a 2 part test (classes 5-9
manageable standards test
lack judicially discoverable
Chevron Deference
= should the court state the governing legal standard or let some other branch have authority? (Chevron v. NRDC)
If congress lays out a legal standard, then the court should apply it and apply some judicial review when it comes to agency regulation
but If congress does not lay out a standard then political question
Ripeness and mootness
is it likely to occur again
Ripeness requires Abbott labs v. Gardner (anticipatory challenges)
Effect on P behavior (most important) on the day the restriction takes effect does the P have to change its behavior>
Purely legal nature of challenge, can it be resolved abstractly or does it require factual developments
Finality (cannot be a proposed rule being challenged)
Hardship to the P of denying immediate review
Mootness requires:(de funis v. odegaard)
it is no longer a case
facts change to a pending case that the court can no longer provide a remedy
not moot if injury is likely to recur
Not moot if D voluntarily ceases behavior in question
Case and Controversy
no advisory opinions, court cannot look at hypothetical scenarios, needs a case (Muskrat v. United states)
Subject matter jurisdiction/diversity/appellant review
Federalism
Powers of the the fed
enhancing authority of the necessary & proper Clause
Rational basis, means vs ends, does congress have a rational basis for using this means to achieve a specific end (gonzales v. raich) normally yes
Power to enforce the 13, 14, and 15 amd
enumerated powers to tax and spend for general welfare. regulate interstate commerce, as well as commerce with tribes and foreign nations
Interstate commerce
Lopez test
instrumentalities of interstate commerce (trains, planes, automobiles
economic activity that substantially affects, where 1) economic activity 2) substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating the activity will be sustained
could congress have a rational basis for concluding that the action, in AGGREGTE, has an effect on interstate commerce (Heart of Atlanta and Katzenbach v. McClung)
economic includes production, distribution and consumption Gonzalez v. raich
cannot compel someone to participate in interstate commerce NFIB v. Sebelius
use of channels of interstate commerce
issues relating to foreign affairs: treaties war (see separation of powers)
how we mediate conflicts
courts look at formal limits, political safeguards, charactering things as local or national, direct or indirect, commerce or not commerce
respecting states as sovereigns
10th amendment, limits ability to coerce or commandeer (forcing the state to pass or not pass certain laws) NY v. United states
11th amendment, limited the ability to bring suits against the state in federal court
Spending/taxing power congress can use spending and taxing power to influence the states
spending power Dole test
Must be unambiguous about conditions so that states make knowing choices
Are the conditions reasonably related to the federal interest on the underlying project
Does the constitution provide an independent bar
Is the financial inducement so coercive that it passes to point which pressure turns to compulsion
congress must be regulating for the general welfare
taxing power
General power to go beyond taxes that relate to enumerated powers
Taxing to regulate, If it has the form of a tax and isn’t tied to other regulations (does it look like a penalty?) then uphold it even if Congress had regulatory goals
test:
burdensome
Presence of scienter requirement
Process of enforcement
if not move to commandeering
General Police power
Dormant commerce clause
Unreasonable burdens on flow of interstate commerce (balancing test between burden and local benefit) South carolina state highway v. barnwell and southern pacific v. arizona
look out for Market participation by state gov, a state can discriminate in some ways if a participant (states can play favorites when they are buying or selling good) and not regulating
discrimination on out of state commerce (virtually per se invalid) baldwin v. GAF seelig and Dean Milk v. madison
Privilege & immunities clause
only applies to a natural person
is there a fundamental P&I clause issue, if so
is there a substantial reason for the discrimination and the discrimination has a substantia relationship to the states goals
Modern approach to DDC Carbone v. city of clarkstown
general police power unless limited by the constitution or valid federal statute
preemption (Gade v. National Solid Waste Management Association)
even if a state law does not violate the CC, DCC, or P&I clause it may be nullified if congress passes a law that preempts it because of supremacy clause Arizona v. US
court determines federal law is constitutional and if preemption exists
expressed preemption- language in statute that preempts state
implied preemption- through its structure
conflict preemption- compliance with both is impossible or state law stands as an obstacle to compliance with the federal law
field preemption- legislation is so expansive it is inferred to occupy the field, or expresses the field it occupies (do they serve the same regulatory interest)
Supremacy clause
federal law is supreme and the states cannot act in a way that would over throw a federal law Mccolluch v. maryland
Separation of powers
Formalism
defining legislative and executive power and insisting that they stay within article 1 and 2
problems
history
modern needs
problems of text and structure that don't always line up
Black in Youngstown= textualism 1. no statute authorized the seizure and congress appears to deliverately have withheld authority 2. nothing in art 2 authorizes the seizure without a declaration of war 3. seizure is policy making (legislative) 4. only congress can legislate not the pres.
functionalism
concerns about aggrandizement, too much erosion of one branch's power
Jackson in youngstown=
zone of twilight
president acting contrary to congress=unconstitutional unless president has unilateral power to act regardless of what congress thinks
President + congress= constitutional unless entire Gov cannot do this
Balancing or assessing the factors and circumstances that relate to a specific conflicts between congress and the president
frankfurt in youngstown= history, has the president acted in this way in the past and was it accepted
Rehnquist in Dames & Moore and Morrison
turns Jackson's 3 categories into a spectrum
the risk that functionalism decends into ad hoc decisionmaking
Role of SC, how much to limit or control congress and the president, how much to mediate conflicts between congress and the president
Control of the administrative state... relate back to youngstown opinion
Delegation
Limits on Congressional authority to delegate Legis power (non delegation doctrine
intelligible principle (Ghundy)
current supreme court may want to pull back power to delegate more
Yakus v. US test: CLEAR AND INTELLIGIBLE PRINCIPLE (give power with limits on how the power should be used) JW hamption v. US
older rule= fill in the details
legislative vetos- are unconstitutional, when affecting the rights of people and the AG legislation is required and that requires Bicameralism and presentment (Immigration v. Chadha)
the executive power v. power sharing
removal (no removal clause but pres. has executive power) (Seila law)
quasi legislative and judicial exceptions (humphreys) multimember expert agencies that don't weild substantial executive power (single person is almost always wielding executive power hence at will removal
inferior officers- limited duties with no policy creation powers are exempt from president removal power (d0 they answer to someone else?) (morrison and Edmond test)
seila law test (myers and humphreys) president has power to remove minus two exceptions
appointment
Officers=President has the power to appoint, but senate must consent
if officer, have to be appointed correctly, have power to make decisions without oversight and with finality
Inferior officers= congress can create and appoint these positions, no limits other than court created limits that impair the presidents abilities to due his duties
regular gov employees
immunity from judicial process
Legislators
absolute immunity from damages claims for anything they do while acting as a legislator (extend to employees)
state and local legislators receive similar federal common law absolute immunity from federal damages claims
can only be a be arrested for actual crimes, not speech or debate
immunity from injunctive relief (cannot get an injunction tell them to vote a certain way)
Remedies for misconduct are limited to prosecution, expulsion, reelection
president (US v. nixon)
Presumptive privilege
if info requested doesnt concern national security or other concerned area, then it can be overridden by specific need for those docs in a
criminal case
president has a presumptive privilege against being compelled to produce documents (importance of confidentiality to effective performance of job)
decision if privilege exists is a judicial decision
Privilege is qualified not absolute (depends on the information, national security)
Subpoenas
Subpoenas in state criminal cases (trump v. Vance) state was allowed to engage in criminal investigation of president and a subpoena for presidents personal documents was not much more of a burden, but the SC to this day has refused to stay lower courts orders requiring disclosure
Congressional subpoenas (trump v. Mazars)- Personal documents were not protected by executive privilege but congressional subpoenas implicate separation of power concerns, analysis these factors:
narrow the scope of possible conflict between the branches, courts should insist on a subpoena no broader than necessary to support congress's objective
courts should be attentive to the nature of the evidence offered by congress to establish that a subpoena advances a valid Leg purpose (detailed legislative purpose)
legislative purpose warrants the significant step of involving the pres and his papers
assess the burdens imposed on the president carefully (careful scrutiny)
Subpoenas in civil cases, NOT A CRIMINAL CASE, restricts the scope of discovery, and large concern of the burden placed on the executive branch (Cheney v. USDC)
Prosecution
Civil lawsuits?
no for lawsuits related to office job duties
actions before office, can be sued while in office, but look at the burdens placed on the president
Criminal prosecution- we don't know if the pres. can be prosecuted after leaving office
Impeachment
process is mainly up to the house and senate because this isn't a judicial process, it is a political process (political question)
Judges
it is possible to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief against a judge in some circumstances (misconduct)
if misbehavior, can prosecute, impeach, vote against them
have absolute immunity from suits for damages relating to their judicial functions