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Law 1b, Criticism. horseplay defence - If D believed consent was present,…

- - - - Aitkens - not threat to punch
      - Lynch - not to property
    - - Hasan - threat to D, their family, or someone they care for
      - Shayler - can be responsible for strangers they are reasnably responsible for
    - - Graham test - did D reasonably believe in the circumstances of the threat, was the belief good cause for fear, was their response one that might have been expected of a sober person of reasonable firmness
    - - Cole - threat must be specific to the crime
      - Valderrama-Vega - need not be the sole cause, just the main one
    - - Hasan - must be before D can go to the cops
    - - Sharp
      - Ali - D knew joining a gang would be violent
      - Shepherd - gang not overtly violent so duress fine
  - - - Willer - situation posed a serious threat, forcing the crime
      - Conway - passenger shot week before, driver drove dangerously believing it could happen again - subjective
      - Quayle - must be an imminent danger of physical injury, not just avoiding pain
      - Pommel - same stages as threat, inc Graham test
- - - - causing
      - apprehension
        
        Lamb - to expect
        
        Logdon - does not matter if D was joking
      - immediate
        
        Smith v Woking Police Chief - within a reasonable period
      - violence
        
        Ireland - silence is violence
      - Constanza - words can be assault
      - Savage - words can prevent an act from being an assault
      - Santana Bermudez - omission is sufficient (failure to disclose)
      - DPP v K indirect act is sufficient
    - - Cunningham recklessness - there is a risk that D's conduct will AR and D realises this
      - Mohan intent desires to AR
  - - - Collins v Wilcock - any touch however slight, if it goes beyond the accepted everyday norms
    - - Latter v Braddell
    - - Cunningham recklessness - there is a risk that D's conduct will AR and D realises this
      - Mohan intent desires to AR
  - - - factual White but for
      - legal Smith more than de minimus
    - - Donovan - any hurt or injury that interferes with the health or comfort of the victim, need not be permanent but must be more than merely transient or trifling
      - Chan Fook - psychiatric injury counts
      - Smith - cutting of hair counts
    - - Roberts - no need to intend or be reckless to harm, only assault/battery
      - Mohan intent aim purpose or desire
      - Cunningham subjective recklessness - risk that D's conduct will cause asssaut/battery
  - - - Savage - had D intended or recognised the risk of some harm
      - Mohan - aim purpose or desire
      - Cunningham risk that D will cause some harm and D realises this
  - - - Eisenhower - blood pooling under skin not a wound
      - Smith - internal skin bleeding out is wound
      - Smith - grievous is really serious
      - Burstow - severe depression/psychiatric injury is GBH
      - Dica - biological violence is GBH (HIV)
- - - - Statutory Duty :
      - Contractual Duty (Pittwood)
      - Special Relationship (Gibson and Proctor)
      - Duty Imposed by Official Position (Dytham)
      - Created a Dangerous Situation (Santana Bermudez)
      - Voluntary Acceptance of Duty for Another (Stone and Dobinson)
  - - - Case of Kimsey
      - 'more than de minimus link' between D's actions and the outcome
    - - Case of White
      - 'but for' test - would outcome have occurred, if not for D's conduct
    - - Thin Skull Rule (Blaue)
      - Medical Intervention won't break chain unless original injury no longer relevant (R v Jordan + R v Cheshire)
      - Act of Third Party (R v Paggett)
      - Acts of Victim (R v Roberts)
- - - - doctors separating twins not unlawful Re A
    - - Murder allowed to be committed by soldiers at war (R v Clegg) cannot be a citizen R v Page*
    - - (No foetuses or braindead people (Malcherek Steel + R v Inglis)
    - - Mohan: 'Aim purpose or desire'
      - Express Malice. intent to kill
      - Implied Malice. intent to GBH Vickers
      - Woolin Virtual Certainty Test: 1. the consequence must be virtually certain 2. the defendant must have foreseen that it was virtually certain
    - - but for White
      - legal Smith more than de minimus link
      - no intervening acts
  - - - death resulted from LOC
      - qualifying trigger
        
        fear of serious violence against themselves or another identified person
        
        constituted circumstances of an extremely grave nature
        
        caused D to have a justifiable sense of being wronged Zebedee
        
        thing said/done of an extremely grave nature
        
        both
        
        not
        
        provocation
        
        revenge
        
        Ibrams v Gregory
        
        infidelity
        
        R v Clinton
      - a reasonable person of the same age/sex/circumstance would have had a similar reaction
      - there can be a delay between the trigger and the death Dawes, Ahluwalia
      - s54 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 but no defence if there has been deliberation
    - - abnormality of mental functioning
        
        so different from the average that the reasonable man would call it abnormal Byrne
        
        jury will now need expert medical advice as this is a medical term
      - recognised medical condition
        
        being drunk doesn't count Dietschman
        
        battered woman syndrome Ahluwalia
        
        sexual psychopathy Bryne
        
        depression Gittens
        
        Paranoia Martin
        
        anything from WHO list
        
        alcoholism does count Wood
      - impaired substantially
        
        D's ability to understand the nature of their conduct
        
        D's ability to form a rational judgement
        
        D's ability to exercise self-control
        
        Golds substantial is important or weighty
      - s2 Homicide Act 1957 - amended by CAJA 2009
      - which explains D's act or omission
        
        causes D to carry out that conduct
        
        was a significant contributory factor
        
        need not be the main cause
      - if yes - sentence is reduced to voluntary manslaughter and a mandatory life sentence is avoided, but life can still be given
  - - - unlawful act
        
        Must be an unlawful act (not an omission) / civil wrong is inadequate (Cases: Lamb, Church, Lowe
      - dangerous
        
        Objective test (Larkin) - would a sober + reasonable person in D's position realise the risk of some harm
        
        The risk need only be of some harm - not serious and not mere fear (Bristow)
        
        Mitchell - No need to foresee specific type of harm
      - caused the death
        
        Usual rules of causation apply
      - MR for the unlawful act
        
        Newbury and Jones - D must have MR for unlawful act but not necessary to prove that D foresaw any harm from the act
    - - duty of care
        
        Robinson - novel situation? if so, apply Caparo v Dickman test
        
        Caparo v Dickman Test: 1. foreseeability 2. proximity 3.fair to impose
        
        Adomako - D must owe V a duty of care
        
        Pitwood contractual
        
        Dytham holder of public office - cop or medic
        
        Santana Bermudez created situation
        
        Gibson and Proctor special relationship - parents
        
        Stone and Dobinson voluntarily took on duty of care
        
        Wacker duty does exist between criminal conspirers but V cannot claim, the state must claim for them
      - breach
        
        Adomako - can be by act or omission
      - causation
      - bad enough
        
        risk
        
        Misra - must be a risk of death from D's conduct
        
        gross
        
        Bateman - D's conduct must have been so bad that it endangers others
- - - - ivey
        
        What was the D's actual state of knowledge/belief as to the facts surrounding their actions?
        
        were their actions dishonest by the standard of reasonable people
      - not dishonest if D believes they have the legal right to deprive
      - not dishonest if D believes they would have consented
      - not dishonest if D believes they cannot be discovered by taking reasonable steps
    - - any assumption of the rights of the owner (Morris)
      - it is possible to steal a gift (Hinks)
      - the owners consent is irrelevant (Gomez)
    - - money
      - real
      - personal
      - things in action
      - intangible
      - not confidential information (Oxford v Moss)
      - goods in dustbin are not abandoned (WIlliams v Phillips)
      - it is possible to steal your own property if under someone else's control (Turner)
    - - possession
      - control
      - proprietary right
      - proprietary control
      - if given for a particular purpose money must be used for it (Davidge v Bunnett)
    - - breaking (DPP v J)
      - risky investment (Fernandez)
      - must dispose of not just treat as own (Mitchell)
      - borrowing can be theft if all goodness or practical value is gone (Lloyd)
  - - - if there's no theft, there's no robbery (Roberts)
    - - Jury decides whether acts were force, using ordinary meaning of the word (Dawson and James)
    - - Theft has to be held to be a continuing act (Hale)
      - Using force to escape can still be at time of theft (Lockley)
    - - Force must be used in order to steal, force used for alternate purpose does not become robbery if D later decides to steal
    - - MR for theft plus an intention to use force to steal
    - - Force can be against any person, not necessarily the victim of the theft (Clouden)
  - - - entering
      - a building or part of a building
      - as a trespasser
      - knowingly or recklessly as to being so
      - with the intent to
        
        steal
        
        commit GBH
        
        or property damage
    - - entering
      - a building or part of a building
      - as a trespasser
      - knowingly or recklessly as to being so
      - and committing
        
        theft
        
        or GBH
- - - - Clarke - powers of reasoning must be impaired, absentmindedness or confusion not enough
    - - Sullivan - can be permanent, transient, or intermittent
      - Quick - failure to take insulin automatism not insanity - external
      - Kemp - physical cause affecting brain fine
      - Hennessy - mental state caused by diabetes insanity
    - - does not know what they're doing Sullivan, Quick, Kemp
      - wrong means illegal M'Naghten
      - Windle - knowing an action is illegal means no insanity
  - - - R v T - dissociative state caused by external factor (rape) sufficient
      - Quick - insulin caused effects
    - - self induced can be a defence to basic intent crimes if not due to intoxication and where D did not realise the risk associated with their conduct Bailey
  - - - specific intent
        
        if so intoxicated they cannot form MR - crime will be reduced to basic intent version thereof (e.g. murder to manslaughter or s18 to s20)
        
        burden of proof on prosecution
        
        Sheehan and Moore couldn't remember murder due to drinking, replaced with manslaughter
        
        Gallagher if MR formed before intoxication cannot use defence
      - basic intent
        
        intoxication is no defence as becoming intoxicated is reckless Majewski
        
        Lipman killed girlfriend on LSD - no defence for unlawful act manslaughter
    - - D must be acquitted as long as they did not form the MR before becoming intoxicated
      - Hardie - Valium for anxiety, had no idea would make him violent and burn flat
      - Kingston - abused V whilst spiked, still could form intent