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✖ (book 3, 4) Clausewitz: On War - Coggle Diagram

- - - - Lists the different dangers experienced by a general
        
        notes that the danger poses as the war's 'friction'
    - - 28 points on What is War
        
        2) War is defined as "an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfill our will." Violence serves as a means and imposes the will.
        
        23) War is serious and has to be taken so.
        
        24) War is "not merely a political act" but a "real political instrument"; war is a "mere continuation of policy by other means."
        
        25) Taking diverse forms due to differences in ends and means, wars vary in intensity.
        
        it is disputed that this is inaccurate translation, and that he said 'with other means'
        https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/everything-you-know-about-clausewitz-is-wrong/
        
        26) Even if the political motive is disguised, all wars are political acts.
        
        27) The only way to understand war is to understand it as a political move. War should be considered as it is, not as how it could be.
        
        3) When confronted with an opponent who holds back, the most extreme violence will win. Clausewitz describes war as an act of violence that "knows no bounds," therefore it tends toward extremes since neither side holds back.
        
        5) In a war, the highest level of exertion is the result of the total of available means and the strength of the will.
        
        4) A battle's ultimate aim is disarming the enemy. This leads to a new extreme: the fight must continue until the enemy is completely disarmed, to prevent him from doing the same.
        
        6) However, the first five are said by Clausewitz to be an abstract concept of war not correlated to reality. Those rules may govern conflict, but when we get from ideas to actuality, everything takes on a different form.
        
        7) War is never fought in a vacuum.The adversaries are familiar with one another and can create views about one another based on their actions.
        
        28) The war's trinity: The instinct (people), play of probabilities and chance 'military', and it being a political instrument (government)
        
        8) Wars do not come to an end with a single solution. A single decisive blow is impossible to achieve because forces are never completely concentrated or annihilated.
        
        9) A defeat is never total, so it is neither final nor absolute. Instead, it can be seen as a short-term setback.
        
        10) Actions are determined by laws of probability in reality. Parties in war act based on what they observe the enemy to be, which is impacted by laws of probability.
        
        20) The abundance of element of chance in war warrants its inclusion, thus helping to examine war as a zero-sum game
        
        21) Of all branches of human activity, war is "the most like a game of cards," because it relies on the balance of uncertain information and probability.
        
        11) From a political perspective, war's objective is the 'original motive of war' and dictates how much force to be used and the aim of military.
        
        12) What will cause military action to be suspended?
        
        13) Even if both sides boast equal force, it will not result in a suspension as both parties warring will always continue progressing.
        
        17) When defense is stronger than attack, action is suspended in war.
        
        18) Another reason: Imperfect knowledge -- No commander can know the full circumstances of war, he can 'only fully know his position'
        
        14) Most of the time spent warring is inaction. Therefore, war never is uninterruptedly continuous.
        
        19) Wars move away from being absolute or ideal the more there is time spent being inactive.
        
        15) Polarity: the aim of one warring faction is to annihilate another -- therefore, the relation to specific sides have polarity, not sides themselves.
        
        16) Polarity does not describe attack and defense since they are two different strategies. Both sides do not attack, one attacks and one defends.
        
        1) Clausewitz advances from the simple to the complex by defining "single elements" of his subjects, while highlighting the shape of the whole war.
        
        22) The human elements must be considered: courage, determination, etc.
    - - The trinity of war
        
        1) "military power, which must be destroyed"
        2) "the country, which must be conquered"
        3) "the will of the enemy, which must be subdued":
        
        HOWEVER, these are abstract conceptions since the ends of real war is influenced by various other factors, like how much of force has been invested in war.
        
        ∴ Clausewitz goes on to describe the methods of increasing probability of enemy's defeat without disarming them completely
      - Considering the means
        
        According to Clausewitz, there is only one: fight, or combat
        
        Combat does not need destruction to be its first and only intention
        
        About preserving one's own force, Clausewitz asserts the only means of achieving political aims is through combat
        
        This, being the ''supreme law'' governing warfare's conduct, ensure that the pursuit of war ends with destroying enemy forces.
    - - Considering factors for 'military genius' to lead
        
        Clausewitz argues there are other qualities other than intellect to serve as an indicator
        
        Courage
        
        to face the danger of war
        
        Resolution
        
        also known as coup d'oeil, it is about taking decisions in a timely fashion, and being able to visualize situations/
        
        Presence of Mind
        
        keeping calm, aware, and reacting fast to changes.
    - - Another point of ''friction'' is bodily exertion
        
        This factor serves as the combination of many factors, like hunger, tiredness, extreme cold, etc. Therefore, it must be given attention.
    - - Information here means "the knowledge we have of the enemy and his country'
        
        this serves to be "the foundation for all our ideas and actions"
        
        However, this lacks verification and trustwortiness, so the officers in charge of judgement must possess "a certain power of discrimination" to stand against contradictory and unreliable information.
    - - The difficulties presented in war, when grounded in reality, is what Clauswitz calls ''friction''.
        
        The resistance to the plans of the military leader: this comes from the difference between 'war on paper' and real war. This might make whatever that seems easy in war difficult.
    - - Is there an ''oil'' to reduce the friction?
        
        Experience might be the way to reduce friction, as learned generals will be able to handle it better
        
        Because in the end the army can be drilled but the preparation will never be the same as real war.
  - - - describing the various branches in the art of war, Clausewitz necessitates separating tactics from strategy.
        
        Tactics: "the theory of the use of military forces in combat"
        
        Strategy: "theory of the use of combats for the object of the war."
        
        the three related fields
        
        maintanence of troops
        
        Marches (mass movement of soldiers)
        
        Camps (army resting)
        
        Cantonment (defense forces)
        
        Care for sick soldiers
        
        Repair of equipment and weaponry
        
        preparation of military
        
        deployment of forces
        
        These activities below can be categorized as either 'preparations for war' or 'war itself'
    - - read the sparknotes for all the 46 points because this is insanity
    - - Art and science should not be mistaken one for the other
        
        Art: engaging in the activity is the purpose of it
        
        Science: when knowledge is the goal of the activity
      - Is war art or science?
        
        "All thinking is indeed art," writes Clausewitz, but that does not mean war is art: it is neither an art nor a science.
        
        Clausewitz instead argues war belongs to the province of social life, as it is 'part of the intercourse of the human race."
        
        Treating it as either art or science leads to errors
        
        Analysis: warfare's uncertainty makes it resistant to scientific inquiry, but close relations to political goals does not properly nest it under art. Therefore, it stands more as a social phenomenon
    - - War is by nature uncertain
        
        Principles can be applied to tactics for what to do and what not to do, but methods serve as main means of war conduct, since war allows for few rigid principles
    - - Clausewitz defines it as: "is an application of abstract truth to real events"
        
        Different from mere narration in history as criticism implies analysis to cause and effects
        
        criticism of war is hard as the chaos of war does not serve for a sound foundation for criticism
        
        Evils of criticism
        
        "inadmissible application of certain one- sided systems as of a formal code of laws"
        
        "the pompous retinue of technical terms" making what is simple, difficult to grasp
        
        "misuse of historical examples"
        
        Chapter 6: On Examples
        
        Clausewitz argues that the art of war cannot be proved using historical examples
        
        4 ways historical proof can be used
        
        4 more items...
        
        4 ways of misuse of history
        
        4 more items...
  - - - Definition: Strategy is "the employment of the battle to gain the end of the war"
        
        strategy must be used to set a goal for military action to pursue war's ends
        
        i.e. means and ends in strategy must align with overall goals
      - 4 addendum points Clausewitz brings out
        
        1) "Possible combats" should be viewed as real ones, as they too have real effects. For example, a possibility of a fight can help guide or control the enemy -- either by their movement or forcing them to halt.
        
        2) Combat has TWO OBJECTIVES -- 1. destroying the enemy, 2. securing means like position or supplies to make destruction likely.
        
        3) the example of capture of Paris in 1814
        
        4) it is important to see a war campaign as a serious of battles chained together. there is multiple combats linked together and a strategist should look at that and be headed in the right direction
    - - 4 elements of strategy (they are all linked together and should not be treated separately, and also are not the only factors of strategy)
        
        moral qualities and effects
        
        organization and mass of military force
        
        angles of line of operation
        
        influences of geographical features
    - - Moral forces are "spirits which permeate the whole element of war"
        
        can also be thought as the will to fight or war morale, and these factors are seen as very difficult to grasp
        
        this can only been seen and felt, according to Clausewitz, though this is still imperative to the theory of war
        
        these are best grasped through the study of history
    - - The chief moral powers are:
        
        1) the talents of the commander
        
        the roles of each of these powers shift in relation to political and military circumstances
        
        2) army's virtue and national feeling
        
        the Napoleanic era where this was an all time high
    - - different from bravery and war enthusiasm
        (those above can be ingredients of military virtue, but not so much by themselves)
        
        military virtue needs the fitness of the army specialized for war -- it is displayed as more than the sum of its parts.
        
        two observations about military virtue
        
        1) it is a quality of permanent armies
        
        2) it is the most necessary when forces are scattered
        
        IF MILITARY VIRTUE IS LACKING
        
        The operations of war should be made as simple as possible
        
        demand more of their troops to make them excel
    - - Boldness is, to Clausewitz, the "noblest of virtues"
        
        unlike other factors, excessive boldness in a general or army is not bad as it is extremely useful in war
        
        boldness either exists or is gained through war