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Intellectual humility or modesty - Coggle Diagram
Intellectual
humility or modesty
In an epistemic context, they involve how we relate to the truth or rationality of our own beliefs, views and judgements rather than good qualities more generally
Anti-Expertise
To be an anti-expert about a topic
= to be reliably wrong about that topic
When someone is an anti-expert about directions, whenever they think they should go left they should really go right and whenever they think they should go right, they should really go left (Egan and Elga, 2005)
one cannot rationally believe oneself to be an anti-expert
one can accept that others are anti-experts with no problems, but self-ascription seems self-undermining
Anti-Expertise is a limit on epistemic modesty—rationality prohibits one from thinking that their own faculties are anti-reliable
Disagreement
Disagreement highlights the limits of what attitudes we can take to our own epistemic states and faculties in a social context by considering how one should respond to disagreement with others who have similar evidence and faculties as you.
Intellectual Humility
epistemic virtue
the intellectually humble person doesn’t care about the social status of intellectual activities or the social status of believers (Roberts and Wood, 2003)
the intellectually humble person attends to and owns (learns and faces) their own limitations (Whitcomb et al., 2015)
there is something special about our own limitations that warrant special attitudes beyond concern for epistemic limitations more generally
the intellectually humble person accurately tracks the non-culpable positive epistemic status of one’s own beliefs
the intellectually humble person has proper beliefs about the status of first-order beliefs
moral virtue (strongly relational)
disposition to embrace others as partners in cognitive activity
awareness of our own ignorance and limitations
focus on the epistemic agency of others
Open-mindedness
epistemic virtue
way of responding to counter-evidence to one’s own beliefs (Adler, 2004)
type of self-knowledge and self-monitoring (Riggs, 2010)
detachment from one’s default point of view because one wants to get to the truth (Baehr, 2011)
involves taking a special attitude to oneself
moral virtue
disposition to change our beliefs without being opinionated out of moral concern (Arpaly, 2011)
willingness to consider alternate self-narratives
freedom from certain mental habits involving the self and its place in the world