Constitutive Panpsychism: The right combination of microphysical elements neccessitate consciousness in all possible universes. (Chalmers, 2017, p. 3)

Russellian Panpsychism: The thesis that microphenomenal properties are quiddities. (Chalmers, 2017, p. 3)

Panpsychism: The view that all fundamental physical entities have the experience of consciousness. (Chalmers, 2017, p. 1)

Nonconstitutive Panpsycism: Microphysical things do not neccessarily result in conscoiusness. (Chalmers, 2017, p. 3)

Combination Problem: How do microphysical entities combine to yield macrophysical entities? (Chalmers, 2017, p. 1)

Structure Combination Problem: How do microstructures combine to yield macrostructures? (Chalmers, 2017, p. 5-6)

Quality Combination Problem: How do microqualities combine to yield macroqualities? (Chalmers, 2017, p. 5)

Mental Combination Problem: How do lower-order mental states that are intrinsic can combine to yield higher-order mental states?

Subject Combination Problem: How do micro subjects combine to yield macrosubjects? (Chalmers, 2017, p. 4-5)

Panpsychism views that entities have conscious experience (Chalmers, 2017, p.1). (How does it solve the problem of mental causation?) There are various sub-views confined under the umbrella of panpsychism. Constituitive panpsychism is the view that the right combination of microphysical elements necessitates consciousness in all possible universes (Chalmers, 2017, p.3). Contrary to this view, Nonconstituitive panpsychism proposes that microphenomenal properties do not constitute macrophenomena (Chalmers, 2017, p.3). Although, according to Nonconstituitive panpsychism, quiddities necessarily constitute macrophenomena (Chalmers, 2017, p.3). Quiddities are the collection of fundamental properties that are associated with something. A sub-view of Nonconstituitive panpsychism is emergent panpsychism: the thesis that macrophenomenal properties are emergent from microphenomenal properties. In Russellian panpsychism, microphenomenal properties are quiddities, and they come together for macrophenomenal properties. However, quiddities don’t necessitate macrophenomenal properties. Such necessitation applies to Constituitive Russellian panpsychism.

The most significant problem raised regarding panpsychism is the combination problem: how do microphysical properties combine to yield macrophysical properties (Chalmers, 2017, p. 1)? The combination problem spreads into different branches according to the assumptions made for panpsychism.

The subject combination problem is how microsubjects combine to yield macro subjects (Chalmers, 2017, p. 4-5). The mental combination problem asks how lower-order mental states that are intrinsic can combine to produce higher-order mental states (citation). The structure combination problem meddles in solving how microstructures that are inherently physical combine to yield macrostructures observed to be mental (Chalmers, 2017, p. 5-6). Lastly, the quality combination problem strives to solve how microqualities combine to yield macroqualities (Chalmers, 2017, p. 5)? The problems mentioned above will be expanded on their assumptions and their implications on panpsychism.

Consciousness -> ’the property of being a things such that there is something that is like to be that thing’ (Goff, 2009, p.129)

’[...] subjects of experience, i.e., things which have consciousness (things such that there is something that it is like to be them), just don't seem to be the kind of things that can ”sum togwthwer” to make other subjects of experience” (Goff, 2009, p. 130)

phenomenal bonding -> ”that relation such that when subjects of experience bear it to each other the existence of a different subjects of experience is necessitated” (Goff, 2009)

What differentiates me from an exact physical duplicate of me that lacks consciousness is the fundamental constituents that cause the phenomenal-bonding, which leads to consciousness (Goff, 2009, p. 135).

To solve the combination problem, the panpsychist would have to get into some mysterianism, but in doing so, would disrupt the inherent motivations of panpsychism (Goff, 2009, 135).

”Conceptual Isolation of Subjects (CIS): For any group of subjects, instantiating certain conscious states, it is conceivable that just those subjects with those conscious states exist in the absence of any further subject.” (Goff, 2016, 4)

The No Summing of Subjects Argument (Goff, 2016, p. 8)

Which subjects bear the phenomenal bonding relation to each other?

Why does a vague boundary between the conscious and the non-conscious pose a problem? - ”Making sense of vagueness as a semantic. phenomenon requires associating each vague predicate with a spectrum of sharpening, and (given a couple of fairly plausible assumptions) it is hard to make sense of the predicate 'is conscious' being associated with a spectrum of sharpenings.’’ (Goff, 2016, p. 14)

Functionalist accounts of macrosubjects (Morris, 2017, p. 14)

Most philosophers overlook the possibilities of mind and focus on the comprehensible mental features (Not, 2013, p. 1)

"We lack a conception of how composition of mentality could be true" (Skrbina, 2011, p. 120, as cited in Noh, 2013, p. 44)

"Goff argues thay what it feels like to be LITTLE PAIN 1 cannot be part of what it is like to be BIG PAIN because the phenomenal characters of each PAIN are different." (Goff, ibid, p. 57, as cited in Noh, 2012, p. 47)

"An essential feature of subjective experiences in general id their indubitability due to our dirext acquaintance with them." (Blamaurer, 2011, p. 305)