Please enable JavaScript.

Coggle requires JavaScript to display documents.

WHY IS WAR FUNDAMENTALLY SOCIAL? - Coggle Diagram

- - - - as one US official told the New York Times last year, "al Qaeda is an insular, paranoid organisation - innocent neighbours don't hitchhike rides in the back of trucks headed for the border with guns and bombs" Byman, Daniel. 2013. “Why Drones Work.” Foreign Affairs. July/August 2013: 36
      - Zeeshan-ul-hassan Usmani who runs Pakistani body count says that neither the United States nor Pakistan releases any detailed information about the victims so although the United States like to call everybody Taliban I call everybody citizins Byman, Daniel. 2013. “Why Drones Work.” Foreign Affairs. July/August 2013: 36
      - after a strike in Pakistan militants often cordon off the area remove their dead and admit only local reporters sympathetic to their cause or decide on a body count themselves Byman, Daniel. 2013. “Why Drones Work.” Foreign Affairs. July/August 2013: 37
      - at the time Yemeni regime refused to allow the use of drones but had this not been the case a drone's real time surveillance would probably have spotted the large number of women and children and the attack would have been aborted Byman, Daniel. 2013. “Why Drones Work.” Foreign Affairs. July/August 2013: 38
      - abdu rabbi mansour hadi has publicly praised drones saying that "they pinpoint the target and have zero margin of error if you know what target you are aiming at Byman, Daniel. 2013. “Why Drones Work.” Foreign Affairs. July/August 2013: 38
      - drone strikes can win the enmity of entire tribes this has led critics to argue that the drone program is shortsighted that it kills today's enemies but creates tomorrows in the process Byman, Daniel. 2013. “Why Drones Work.” Foreign Affairs. July/August 2013: 39
      - as brooks has argued many of the groups now being identified as threats don't fall clearly under the AUMF's umbrella and many don't pose a significant danger to the united states Byman, Daniel. 2013. “Why Drones Work.” Foreign Affairs. July/August 2013: 40
      - Ron Paul then a Texas representative opinted out during his presidential campaign awlaki was never charged with any crime he added if the American people accept this blindly and casually that we now have an accepted practice of the president assassinating people who he thinks are bad guys I think its sad Byman, Daniel. 2013. “Why Drones Work.” Foreign Affairs. July/August 2013: 40
  - - - it is alarming to think what leaders such as Syrian president bashar al Assad who has used deadly force against peaceful pro democracy demonstrators he has deemed terrorirsts would do with drones of their opwn Byman, Daniel. 2013. “Why Drones Work.” Foreign Affairs. July/August 2013: 41
      - drones are highly capable weapons that are easy to produce and so there is no chance that Washington can stop other militaries from acquiring them and using them nearly 90 other countries already have surveillance drones in their arsenals and china is producing several inexpensive models for export Byman, Daniel. 2013. “Why Drones Work.” Foreign Affairs. July/August 2013: 41
      - the United States can still influence how they are used [] the US needs to set forth a clear policy on how extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings of terrorists and stick to it Byman, Daniel. 2013. “Why Drones Work.” Foreign Affairs. July/August 2013: 41
      - the rise of unconventional warfare has made this usual strategy more difficult because the battlefield is no longer clearly defined and enemies no longer wear identifiable uniforms making combatants harder to distinguish from civillians Byman, Daniel. 2013. “Why Drones Work.” Foreign Affairs. July/August 2013: 42
      - the us government needs to remember that many of the world's jihadist organisations are focused first and foremost on local regimes and that although the United States has an interest in helping its allies fight extremeists Washington cannot and should not directly involve itself in every fight Byman, Daniel. 2013. “Why Drones Work.” Foreign Affairs. July/August 2013: 43
- - - - one school of thought argues that the world is a jungle, that the strong prey upon the weak and that the only thing preventing one country from wolfing down another is military force
      - another school of thought argues that the so called law of the jungle isn't a natural law at all, humans made it and humans can change it [] unlike gravity war isn't a fundamental force of nature its intensity and existence depend on underlying technological economic and cultural factors as these factors change so does war
      - if you believe that historic change is impossible and that humanity never left the jungle and never will the only choice left is whether to play the part of predator or prey
  - - - the global economy has been transformed from one based on materials to one based on knowledge [] whereas you can seize oil fields by force you cannot acquire knowledge that way, the profitability of conquest has declined as a result
      - for the first time in history the world became dominated by elites who see war as both evil and unavoidable [] they usually come to power with dreams of domestic reforms rather than foreign conquests
      - its simply not true that military force alone prevents Brazil from conquering uraguay or prevents Spain from invading Morocco
      - a return to the jungle would also undermine global cooperation on problems such as preventing catastrophic climate change or regulating disruptive technologies such as artificial intelligence and genetic engineering
      - despite history, despite grinding poverty and despite seemingly insurmountable obstacles, Ukrainians established a democracy [] their democracy is a new thing, so is the new peace. both are fragile and may not last long. but both are possible and may strike deep roots. every old thing was once new, it all comes down to human choices.
  - - - when taking all types of conflict into account, in the first two centuries of the 21st century human violence has killed fewer people than suicide, car accidents or obesity related diseases, gunpowder has become less lethal than sugar
      - the decline of war has been a psychological as well as statistical phenomenon, its most important feature has been a major change in the very meaning of the term peace. for most of history peace meant only the temporary absence of war[] in recent decades peace has come to mean the implausibility of war
      - in recent decades governments around the world have felt safe enough to spend an average of only about 6.5% of their budgets on their armed forces while spending far more on education health care and welfare
      - the decline of war didn't result from a divine miracle or from a change in the laws of nature. it resulted from humans making better choices [] unfortunately the fact that it stems from human choice also means that it is reversible
  - - - the Russian threat to invade Ukraine should concern every person on earth, if it again becomes normative for powerful countries to wolf down their weaker neighbours it would affect the way people all over the world feel and behave
      - he will go down in history as the man who ruined our greatest achievement. just when we thought we were out of the jungle, he pulled us back in
- - - - war has the unintended effect of producing larger political groupings that help with human progress
      - there is a paradox in war, an uncomfortable one. it brings enormous destruction and death. we should want to avoid it. but it can also bring progress and peace
      - wars also have had the effect of adding to social cohesion [] 20th c wars also discredited totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. Germany was not very efficient. Britain, a democracy was better at mobilising resources for war
      - there's a deep relation between the terrible aspect of war and the social innovation thereafter Michael Ignatieff
      - war has created merging political units, larger political groupings which can help in progress
      - war as compensating, governments feel a need to compensate e.g. with welfare
  - - - Franklin Delano Roosevelt summarised the values of democracy in his four freedoms speech indicating that freedom of speech, worship, freedom from want and fear should be available for everyone in the world
      - a free society restrains the state and the law restrains both
      - there is a trust in progress
      - women getting the vote after WW1
      - if they're going to talk about fighting for democracy they've got to show it at home
      - BBC as telling the truth WW2
      - wars force you tube articulate of what values you hold dear
      - suicides go down in war, more sense of identity, collectivity
      - narrows wealth gap, rich taxed for war, all facing same threat
      - in democracies people can speak truth to their leaders
      - foreign policy has to be about more than furthering interests of material resources, but for values
      - notion that Wilson came with liberal ideals and europeans responded with scorn, myth, had been intended for long time, based on European thinking, League of Nations
      - peace so that the world could progress in other ways
      - maintaining peace, supporting legitimate governemtns, punishing oppression and aggression
  - - - while there have been no conflicts of the scale of the world wars there has been backtracking in terms of progress toward the four freedoms particularly in reaction to the 2001 terrorist attack on the world trade centre
      - we see a backlash to globalisation the rise of illiberal populist movements on the right and left we have an international order and it has managed since 1945 but I worry that any international order can only take so many countries that do not buy into it
      - the faded memory of war may also make for a dangerous future [] while wars may spark human progress the power of today's weapons and the scale of possible destruction are formidable
      - with the passage of time we forget. [] if we forget it we open the door to things that will damage us all
      - as war became more total governments had to explain why they were fighting, which entailed notions of compensation
      - governments had to articulate what they were fighting for; civillisational struggle but needed more than that, we are fighting for a better world
      - arbitrations instead of war, intermediary. imaginative ways to resolve international conflict
- - - - the expansion of this transnational shadow war reminds us that although Iraq and Afghanistan are typically seen as the prime examples of evolving forms of American warfare, they never constituted the totality of the military engagements known as the war on terror under president George W Bush that were continued under president Barack Obama Niva, S., 2013. Disappearing violence: JSOC and the Pentagon’s new cartography of networked warfare. Security Dialogue, 44(3), pp.186.
      - under the Obama administration this shadowy form of military engagement achieved a new density and centrality within US military and related agencies such that it has now become a primary theatre of contemporary American wafare Niva, S., 2013. Disappearing violence: JSOC and the Pentagon’s new cartography of networked warfare. Security Dialogue, 44(3), pp.186
      - its signature actions are secretive and targeted kill or capture operations that do not so much move across static borders as render them contingent producing proliferating grey areas in which violence is largely disappeared from media coverage and political accountability Niva, S., 2013. Disappearing violence: JSOC and the Pentagon’s new cartography of networked warfare. Security Dialogue, 44(3), pp.186
      - Peter singer has argued that the proliferation of robotic platforms across the battlefield is leading to a fundamental revolution in warfare itself Niva, S., 2013. Disappearing violence: JSOC and the Pentagon’s new cartography of networked warfare. Security Dialogue, 44(3), pp.186.
      - these operations utilised real time surveillance and strike capabilities provided by drones as well as an invisible army of spy satellites and banks of supercomputers that trawl phonelines and internet transmissions all of which did not exist or were just being tested before 2001 Niva, S., 2013. Disappearing violence: JSOC and the Pentagon’s new cartography of networked warfare. Security Dialogue, 44(3), pp.187
      - unlike operations conducted by more hierarchical actors the spatial character of these operations tends to defy and cut across standard spatial boundaries jurisdictions and distinctions between state and society, public and private , war and crime, civillian and military, policy and military legal and illegal to operate in the cracks and gray areas of the society Niva, S., 2013. Disappearing violence: JSOC and the Pentagon’s new cartography of networked warfare. Security Dialogue, 44(3), pp.190
  - - - rather than a top down transformation from hierarchies to networks this transformation came about through a largely self-organised and bottom up process of military adaptation in the peripheries of the long war,Niva, S., 2013. Disappearing violence: JSOC and the Pentagon’s new cartography of networked warfare. Security Dialogue, 44(3), pp.187.
      - one of the things we have seen since 9/11 is an extraordinary coming together particularly of CIA and the military in working together and fusing intelligence and operations in a way that just I think is unique in anybody's history said Gates after the Bin Laden raid Niva, S., 2013. Disappearing violence: JSOC and the Pentagon’s new cartography of networked warfare. Security Dialogue, 44(3), pp.188.
      - more than just new platforms and technologies Schmitt and shanker concluded that the USA had developed new organisational forms and new doctrines to guide its fight against increasinfly networked opponents it was a network fighting a network Niva, S., 2013. Disappearing violence: JSOC and the Pentagon’s new cartography of networked warfare. Security Dialogue, 44(3), pp.188
      - in contrast to more hierarchical forms of organisation networks are interconnected sets of decentralised components having significant autonomy which combine togyther on the basis of shared information and a shared strategy Niva, S., 2013. Disappearing violence: JSOC and the Pentagon’s new cartography of networked warfare. Security Dialogue, 44(3), pp.188
      - the debates around the use of the network -centric warfare clearly show an impetus towards greater decentralisation and the use of the network form of organisation within armed forces Niva, S., 2013. Disappearing violence: JSOC and the Pentagon’s new cartography of networked warfare. Security Dialogue, 44(3), pp.189.
      - this organisational decentralisation and tactical autonomy was the key orgnaisational innovation that enabled JSOC to experiment with more networked and increasingly chaoplexic operations in iraq Niva, S., 2013. Disappearing violence: JSOC and the Pentagon’s new cartography of networked warfare. Security Dialogue, 44(3), pp.192
  - - - its intelligence driven operations and the use of technology in particular persistence surveillance an unblinking eye that lets you conduct a sustained campaign one mission leads to another we didn't know how to do these kinds of operations before 9/11 a lot of intelligence investment we had made came together in 2007 Niva, S., 2013. Disappearing violence: JSOC and the Pentagon’s new cartography of networked warfare. Security Dialogue, 44(3), pp.195.
      - these special operations formations cannot by themselves win the nations wars, however with them we have a tool or enormous and decisive strategic significance which has crucial importance in the global war on terrorists, Niva, S., 2013. Disappearing violence: JSOC and the Pentagon’s new cartography of networked warfare. Security Dialogue, 44(3), pp.195
      - what was bureaucratically unthinkable and operationally impossible before the emergence of JSOC as an adaptive and highly networked force that experimented with more networked and chaoplexic forms of welfare is now increasingly routine Niva, S., 2013. Disappearing violence: JSOC and the Pentagon’s new cartography of networked warfare. Security Dialogue, 44(3), pp.197
      - the emergence of this american form of shadow warfare is largely the result of the growing embrace of more networked and horizontal forms of organisation which a number of scholars had argued was the key development necessary for the American exploitation of more networked forms of warfare Niva, S., 2013. Disappearing violence: JSOC and the Pentagon’s new cartography of networked warfare. Security Dialogue, 44(3), pp.198
      - this networked metric of targeted counter network operations emerged separately from but then worked in synergy with the adoption of population centric counterinsurgency doctrine in ira and Afghanistan owing to their overlapping focus on social networked and information led operations Niva, S., 2013. Disappearing violence: JSOC and the Pentagon’s new cartography of networked warfare. Security Dialogue, 44(3), pp.198
      - all this points towards a future of worldwide virtual occupations in which US power is projected primarily by drone based COIN supplemented with relatively small teams of special forces Niva, S., 2013. Disappearing violence: JSOC and the Pentagon’s new cartography of networked warfare. Security Dialogue, 44(3), pp.199
      - the emergence of a shadowy form of war in which targeted operations can occur anytime and anyplace suggests that warfare and violence have not so much disappeared but are increasingly extending even further into the social fabric of life in different parts of the world becoming a permanent social relation, Niva, S., 2013. Disappearing violence: JSOC and the Pentagon’s new cartography of networked warfare. Security Dialogue, 44(3), pp.199
      - if war is no longer an exceptional condition but the normal state of affairs if that is we have now entered a perpetual state of war then it becomes necessary that war not be a threat to the existing structure of power not a destabilising force but rather on the contrary an active mechanism that constantly creates and reinforces the present global order Niva, S., 2013. Disappearing violence: JSOC and the Pentagon’s new cartography of networked warfare. Security Dialogue, 44(3), pp.199
      - winning such a war does not mean ceasing hostilities but rather managing risk through continuous population management - which replaces ending violence or solving the social and political problems that produce the challenges to the present global order in the first place Niva, S., 2013. Disappearing violence: JSOC and the Pentagon’s new cartography of networked warfare. Security Dialogue, 44(3), pp.199
- - - - QUOTE
        
        if we consider the pure concept of war we should have to say that the political purpose of war had no connection with war itself for if war is an act of violence meant to force the enemy to do our will its aim would have always and solely to be to overcome the enemy and disarm him Clausewitz, C., Howard, M. and Paret, P., 1989. On war. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, p.90.
        
        three broad objectives the armed forces the country and the enemy's will Clausewitz, C., Howard, M. and Paret, P., 1989. On war. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, p.90.
        
        [both the forces can be destroyed and the country occupied and yet] the war, that is the animosity and the reciprocal effects of hostile elements, cannot be considered to have ended so long as the enemy's will has not been broken [] the enemy governemt and its allies must have been driven to ask for peace or the population made to submit Clausewitz, C., Howard, M. and Paret, P., 1989. On war. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, p.90.
        
        we must always consider that with the conclusion of peace the purpose of war has been achieved and its business at an end Clausewitz, C., Howard, M. and Paret, P., 1989. On war. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, p.91.
        
        not every war need be fought until one side colapses Clausewitz, C., Howard, M. and Paret, P., 1989. On war. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, p.91.
        
        the end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed and trained, the whole object of his sleeping, eating, drinking and marching is simply that he should fight at the right place and the right rtime Clausewitz, C., Howard, M. and Paret, P., 1989. On war. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, p.95.
      - PARAPHRASE
    - - QUOTE
        
        the aim of disarming the enemy, the object of the war in the abstract, is in fact not always encountered in reality and need not be fully achieved as a condition of peace Clausewitz, C., Howard, M. and Paret, P., 1989. On war. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, p.91.
        
        if a negative aim that is the use of every means available for pure resistance gives an advantage in war, the advantage need only be enough to balance any superiority the opponent may possess in the end his political object will not seem worth the effort it costs he must then renounce his policy Clausewitz, C., Howard, M. and Paret, P., 1989. On war. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, p.94.
        
        there is only one means in war: combat [] the fact that only one means exists constitutes a strand that runs through the entire web of military activity and really holds it together Clausewitz, C., Howard, M. and Paret, P., 1989. On war. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, p.96.
        
        the policy with a positive purpose calls the act of destruction into being, the policy with a negative purpoose waits for it Clausewitz, C., Howard, M. and Paret, P., 1989. On war. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, p.98.
      - PARAPHRASE
    - - QUOTE
        
        if war were what pure theory postulates a war between states of markedly unequal strength would be absurd and so impossible [] wars have in fact been fought between states of very unequal strength for actual war is often far removed from the pure concept postulated by theory Clausewitz, C., Howard, M. and Paret, P., 1989. On war. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, p.91.
        
        it is in the very concept of war that everything that occurs must originally derive from the combat Clausewitz, C., Howard, M. and Paret, P., 1989. On war. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, p.95.
        
        the violent resolution of the crisis, the wish to annihilate the enemy's forces is the first born son of war Clausewitz, C., Howard, M. and Paret, P., 1989. On war. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, p.99.
      - PARAPHRASE
  - - - if we consider the actual basis of information how unreliable and transient it is we soon realise that war is a flimsy structure that can easily collapse and bury us in its ruin Clausewitz, C., Howard, M. and Paret, P., 1989. On war. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, p.117.
      - in short most intelligence is false and the effect of fear is to multiply lies and inaccuracies as a rule most men would rather believe bad news than good and rather tend to exaggerate the bad news Clausewitz, C., Howard, M. and Paret, P., 1989. On war. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, p.117.
      - the difficulty of accurate recognition constitutes one of the most serious sources of friction in war by making things appear entirely different from what one had expected Clausewitz, C., Howard, M. and Paret, P., 1989. On war. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, p.117.
      - ordinary men who normally form the initiative of others tend to lose self confidence when they reach the scene of action, things are not what they expected the more so as they still let others influence themClausewitz, C., Howard, M. and Paret, P., 1989. On war. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, p.118.
      - war has a way of masking the stage with scenery crudely daubed with fearsome apparition. once this is cleared away and the horizon becomes unobstructed developments will confirm his earlier convictions this is one ofthe great chasms between planning and execution Clausewitz, C., Howard, M. and Paret, P., 1989. On war. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, p.118.
- - - - technological innovations from the clock to the internet don't just change how armies fight their battles they've changed how those armies think about war in the first place
      - key technologies in modern history evolve into metaphors for social organisation enabling the military as a consummate social organisation to regulate itself
      - we always plan to fight the last war [] the failure of Vietnam Robert macnamara's pervasive quantification didn't do much in the end to convince the Viet cong that they were facing defeat
      - chaoplexic war likes its cybernetic predecessor is information driven but cyberneticism emphasised total control of the battle space through information dominance in theory that was supposed to create a predictable controllable war zone environment chaoplexity on the other hand understands the order hidden within chaos and complexity
      - characterised by non-linearity self organisation and emergence the central metaphor of chaoplexic war is that of the network the distributed model of information exchange perhaps best embodied by the internet
  - - - an ever more intimate symbiosis between science and warfare has established itself with the increasing reliance on the development and integration of technology within complex social assemblages of war
      - four distinct regimes of the scientific way of warfare each of which is characterised by a specific theoretical and methodological constellation: mechanistic, thermodynamic, cybernetic and chaoplexic warfare at the heart of each he writes we find an associated paradigmatic technology respectively the clock the engine the computer and the network
      - Bousquet argues serious questions remain as to whether network centric warfare is really part of the new way of war or just a rebranding of older appraoches
      - in the US SWOW's descriptions of networks and chaoplexity feel more like tactical cybernetics than a truly new approach to war