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DOES THE RISE OF CHINA ENTAIL THAT WE WILL FACE A PERIOD OF GREATER…

- - - - today's crucial foreign policy challenges arise less from problems between countries than from domestic politics within them Colgan, Jeff D., and Robert O. Keohane (2017) The Liberal Order Is Rigged: Fix It Now or Watch It Wither. Foreign Affairs 96: 36
      - [populism] the belief that each country has an authentic people who are held back by the collusion of foreign forces and self-serving elites at home Colgan, Jeff D., and Robert O. Keohane (2017) The Liberal Order Is Rigged: Fix It Now or Watch It Wither. Foreign Affairs 96: 36
  - - - for all of the order's success its institutions have become disconnected from the publics in the very countries that have created them Colgan, Jeff D., and Robert O. Keohane (2017) The Liberal Order Is Rigged: Fix It Now or Watch It Wither. Foreign Affairs 96: 37
      - we did not pay enough attention as capitalism hijacked globalisation. economic elites designed international institutions to serve their own interests and to create firmer links between themselves and governments. ordinary people were left out Colgan, Jeff D., and Robert O. Keohane (2017) The Liberal Order Is Rigged: Fix It Now or Watch It Wither. Foreign Affairs 96: 37
      - policy makers pursued a path of action favoured by many academics including us building international institutions to promote cooperation. but they did so in a biased way and for the most part we underestimated the risk that posed Colgan, Jeff D., and Robert O. Keohane (2017) The Liberal Order Is Rigged: Fix It Now or Watch It Wither. Foreign Affairs 96: 39
      - multilateral overreach [] the natural tendancy of institutions, their leaders and the bureaucracies that carry out their work is to expand their authority [] the cumulative effect of such expansions of international authority however is to excessively limit sovereignty and give people the sense that foreign forces are controlling their lives Colgan, Jeff D., and Robert O. Keohane (2017) The Liberal Order Is Rigged: Fix It Now or Watch It Wither. Foreign Affairs 96: 42
    - - peace building, rising out of poverty developing countries
  - - - the successful brexit campaign focussed on restoring british sovereignty, [] the trump campaign was explicitly nationalist in tone and content Colgan, Jeff D., and Robert O. Keohane (2017) The Liberal Order Is Rigged: Fix It Now or Watch It Wither. Foreign Affairs 96: 37
      - the loss of national solidarity brought on by the end of the cold war [] the crucial importance of othering in identity formation, for individuals and nations alike [] the fall of the USSR removed the main other from the american political imagination and thereby refuced social cohesion in the US Colgan, Jeff D., and Robert O. Keohane (2017) The Liberal Order Is Rigged: Fix It Now or Watch It Wither. Foreign Affairs 96: 40
  - - - the well off do not live near the poor or interact with them in public institutions as much as they used to. this self-segregation has sapped a sense of solidarity from american civic life even as communications technology has connected people as never before Colgan, Jeff D., and Robert O. Keohane (2017) The Liberal Order Is Rigged: Fix It Now or Watch It Wither. Foreign Affairs 96: 38
      - elites have taken advantage of the global liberal order sometimes inadvertently sometimes intentionally to capture most of the income and wealth gains in recent decades wand they have not shared much with the middle and lower classes Colgan, Jeff D., and Robert O. Keohane (2017) The Liberal Order Is Rigged: Fix It Now or Watch It Wither. Foreign Affairs 96: 38
      - politicians respond to electoral incentives even when those incentives diverge considerably from their country's long term interests and in recent years many voters have joined in the populist rejection of globalisation and the liberal order Colgan, Jeff D., and Robert O. Keohane (2017) The Liberal Order Is Rigged: Fix It Now or Watch It Wither. Foreign Affairs 96: 39
      - when china manipulated trade and currency arrangements to the disadvantage of the working class americans washington decided that other issues in US chinese relations were more important and did not respond strongly Colgan, Jeff D., and Robert O. Keohane (2017) The Liberal Order Is Rigged: Fix It Now or Watch It Wither. Foreign Affairs 96: 40
  - - - global integration must be accompanied by a set of domestic policies that will allow all economic and social classes to share the gains from globalisation in a way that is highly visible to voters. Colgan, Jeff D., and Robert O. Keohane (2017) The Liberal Order Is Rigged: Fix It Now or Watch It Wither. Foreign Affairs 96: 43
      - international cooperation must be balanced with national interests to prevent overreach especially when it comes to the use of military force Colgan, Jeff D., and Robert O. Keohane (2017) The Liberal Order Is Rigged: Fix It Now or Watch It Wither. Foreign Affairs 96: 43
      - washington should nurture a uniquely american social identity. that will require othering authoritarian and illiberal countries and a national narrative Colgan, Jeff D., and Robert O. Keohane (2017) The Liberal Order Is Rigged: Fix It Now or Watch It Wither. Foreign Affairs 96: 43
      - a willing president could for instance make it clear that although the US may have an interest in cooperating with nondemocratic countries, it identifies only with liberal democracies and reserves its closest relationships for them Colgan, Jeff D., and Robert O. Keohane (2017) The Liberal Order Is Rigged: Fix It Now or Watch It Wither. Foreign Affairs 96: 43
      - it is not bigotry to calibrate immigration levels to the ability of immigrants to assimilate and to society's ability to adjust. proponents of a hlobal liberal order must find ways of seeking greater national consensus on this issue. to be politically sustainable their ideas will have to respect the importance of national solidarity Colgan, Jeff D., and Robert O. Keohane (2017) The Liberal Order Is Rigged: Fix It Now or Watch It Wither. Foreign Affairs 96: 44
      - like it or not global populism has a clear marketable ideology defined by toughness nationalism and antivism, america first is a powerful slogan Colgan, Jeff D., and Robert O. Keohane (2017) The Liberal Order Is Rigged: Fix It Now or Watch It Wither. Foreign Affairs 96: 44
- - - - liberalism does not have the answers posed by the advance in AI and bioengineering Freyne, P., 2018. Yuval Noah Harari: ‘It takes just one fool to start a war’. [online] The Irish Times.
      - when governments and corporations learn to hack humans it will be easiest to hack and manipulate those humans that believe in free will and believe that nobody can hack them Freyne, P., 2018. Yuval Noah Harari: ‘It takes just one fool to start a war’. [online] The Irish Times.
      - the present liberal story is still fundamental to the functioning of the global order and it is currently being attacked by religious and nationalist fanatics, these fanatics believe in nostalgic fantasies that are far more dangerous and harmful than the liberal story Freyne, P., 2018. Yuval Noah Harari: ‘It takes just one fool to start a war’. [online] The Irish Times.
      - this is one of the big costs of the current wave of nostalgia -it forces us to refight the old battles of previous centuries instead of focussing on the far more important challenges of the 21st century Freyne, P., 2018. Yuval Noah Harari: ‘It takes just one fool to start a war’. [online] The Irish Times.
    - - AI and bioengineering modern problems, liberal international order not modern enough to consider, focussing on nostalgia and fighting those wars instead of adapting to current affairs
  - - - human kind now faces three main challenges, nuclear war, climate change and technological disruption Freyne, P., 2018. Yuval Noah Harari: ‘It takes just one fool to start a war’. [online] The Irish Times.
      - say the EU bans the production of autonomous weapon systems and forbids genetically engineering human babies. what good will that do if the USA nevertheless produces killer robots and China engineers genetically enhanced super humans? Freyne, P., 2018. Yuval Noah Harari: ‘It takes just one fool to start a war’. [online] The Irish Times.
      - Consider Brexit, for example. How does Brexit help prevent nuclear war? It doesn’t. How does Brexit help prevent climate change? It doesn’t. How does Brexit help humanity deal with artificial intelligence and bioengineering? It doesn’t. It actually makes it harder to deal with all three problems. Freyne, P., 2018. Yuval Noah Harari: ‘It takes just one fool to start a war’. [online] The Irish Times.
      - people want more stability and in particular they want to have a secure identity that will give meaning to their lives. this is why we see a wave of nostalgic political vision that look more to the past than to the future. nationalism and religion are comforting because they explain to us in simple terms what is happening in the world Freyne, P., 2018. Yuval Noah Harari: ‘It takes just one fool to start a war’. [online] The Irish Times.
      - nationalist and religious stories claim to be absolute and eternal truths which cannot be changed even by the technological and economic revolutions of the 21st century Freyne, P., 2018. Yuval Noah Harari: ‘It takes just one fool to start a war’. [online] The Irish Times.
    - - nationalism and religion are comforting as sources of identity and so nostalgic political visions are attractive in a state of flux
      - but only global corporations can face climate change, nuclear war and technological disruption
  - - - despite all the problems human kind today is more prosperous, healthy and peaceful than ever before [] for the first time in human history starvation kills fewer people than obesity, plagues kill fewer people than old age and violence kills fewer people than accidents Freyne, P., 2018. Yuval Noah Harari: ‘It takes just one fool to start a war’. [online] The Irish Times.
      - indeed we are living in the most peaceful era in history
      - previously wealth was mainly material wealth [] this encouraged war because it was relatively easy to conquer material wealth through war, today wealth is increasingly based on knowledge and you cannot conquer knowledge through war Freyne, P., 2018. Yuval Noah Harari: ‘It takes just one fool to start a war’. [online] The Irish Times.
      - War declined because of wise human decisions. And if humans start making unwise decisions, war will return. It takes a lot of wise people to make peace, but it is sometimes enough to have one fool to have a war. Freyne, P., 2018. Yuval Noah Harari: ‘It takes just one fool to start a war’. [online] The Irish Times.
      - economic changes have turned knowledge into the main economic asset Freyne, P., 2018. Yuval Noah Harari: ‘It takes just one fool to start a war’. [online] The Irish Times.
    - - war decline because collective suicide and different economic gains, knowledge, so decline, but war is easily fallen into
- - - - voters are questioning the merits of globalisation, protectionism is on the rise and attacks on experts and the mainstream media are increasingly common S. Guriev, E.Papaioannou (2020) The Political Economy of Populism, p.2,
      - they are worrisome as they are contemporaneous with rising within country inequality, stagnating social mobility, falling confidence in core democratic institutions and political polarisation S. Guriev, E.Papaioannou (2020) The Political Economy of Populism, p.2,
    - - populism is on the rise
  - - - a thin centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous antagonistic groups, the pure people and the corrupt elite. S. Guriev, E.Papaioannou (2020) The Political Economy of Populism, p.6,
      - anti elite and anti expert sentiment S. Guriev, E.Papaioannou (2020) The Political Economy of Populism, p.9,
      - the rise of populism in europe in the 21st century reflects the increasing popularity of right wing nationalistic parties such as UKIP, the national front, golden dawn, sweden democrats and Jobbik. S. Guriev, E.Papaioannou (2020) The Political Economy of Populism, p.14.
    - - populism is on the rise lol
  - - - neoclassical trade theory based on technological differences or difference in factor proportions suggests that globalisation increases aggregate output but there are winners and losers. S. Guriev, E.Papaioannou (2020) The Political Economy of Populism, p.20.
      - A large body of research suggests that a non-negligible portion of manufacturing’s decline is attributable to the “China shock,” which started in the early to mid-1990s and accelerated in the early 2000s. S. Guriev, E.Papaioannou (2020) The Political Economy of Populism, p.21
      - The China shock explains only about 20% of the recent decline of employment in U.S. manufacturing, but it has had major political implications. Voters in the communities exposed to the shock have, on average, moved to the right. The U.S. evidence suggests a shift toward conservative (Republican) candidates, at the expense of free-trade Repub- licans and Democrats.S. Guriev, E.Papaioannou (2020) The Political Economy of Populism, p.34
  - - - As the Fourth Industrial Revolution is marching forward, artificial intelligence, Big Data, machine learning, and robotization penetrate every industry. The International Federation of Robotics estimates that in 2009 there were around 6 million industrial robots globally; in 2017, there were 381 million. The 2022 forecast is for 700 million. S. Guriev, E.Papaioannou (2020) The Political Economy of Populism, p.30
  - - - In her influential analysis of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Mutz (2018) argues that Trump supporters were not driven by “pocketbook” concerns but rather by the threat to their status within the society—and to U.S. global dominance.S. Guriev, E.Papaioannou (2020) The Political Economy of Populism, p.51,
      - empirical studies suggest that trade globalization, the crisis, and austerity have shaped the Brexit referendum outcome. However, even if the economic factors explain jointly 10 percentage points (a generous assessment), deeper cultural—and perhaps historical—factors must explain the remaining 42 percentage points of Leave’s 52% vote share.S. Guriev, E.Papaioannou (2020) The Political Economy of Populism, p.51,
- - - - the aunipolar moment is over and the pax americana the era of american ascendancy in international politics that began in 1945 is fast winding down Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.1
      - contrary to the claims of unipolar stability theorists, the distribution of power in the international system no longer is unipolar Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.1
      - this article takes on the institutional lock in argument which holds that by strentghening the pax americana's legacy institutions the US can perpetuate the essential elements of the international order it constructed following world war II even as the material foundations of the american primacy erode Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.1
      - the great recession has had a two fold impact, first highlighted the shift of a global wealth and power from west to east a trend illustrated by china's breathtakingly rapid rise to great power status. second it has raised doubts about the robustness of the economic and financial underpinnings of the united state's primacy Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.1
    - - rejects notion that order is unipolar or nothing
      - the world order is already past this unipolar moment
  - - - unipolarity objectively described the post-cold war distribution of power in the international system Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.2
      - Pointing to a long historical record, they argued that failure is the fate of hegemons. The hegemonic bids of the Habsburgs (under Charles V and Philip II), France (under Louis XIV and Napoleon), and Germany (under Wilhelm II and Adolph Hitler) were all defeated by the resistance of countervailing alliances, and by the consequences of their own strategic overextension. In a unipolar world, the unipolar pessimists argued, the United States would not be immune from this pattern of hegemonic failure. Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.2
      - unipolar optimists assert that the military and eco- nomic power gap between the United States and its nearest rivals is insurmountable, so wide that no state can hope to close it [] US hegemony is ‘‘benevo- lent,’’ there is no reason why other states would want to balance against the United States. Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.2
      - the unipolar era has ended and the unipolar exit has begun Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.2
      - the relative decline of the United States and the end of unipolarity are linked inextricably: the rise of new great powers—especially China—is in itself the most tangible evidence of the erosion of the United States’ power. China’s rise signals unipolarity’s end. Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.2
      - the United States remains preeminent militarily, the rise of new great powers like China, coupled with US fiscal and economic constraints, means that over the next decade or two the United States’ military dominance will be challenged. Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.3
      - Indeed, because of China’s great-power emergence, and the United States’ own domestic economic weaknesses, it already is withering. Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.3
    - - US as benevolent, incentives security and economic benefits from US hegemony, balance of threat argument, soft power attactive ideology
  - - - To spur its economic growth, for some three decades (beginning with Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms) China took a low profile in international politics and avoided confrontation with the United States and its regional neighbors. To spur its modernization as well, China integrated itself in the American-led world order. China’s self-described ‘‘peaceful rise’’ followed the script written by Deng Xiaoping: ‘‘Lie low. Hide your capabilities. Bide your time.’’Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.3
      - In a May 2011 report, the World Bank predicted that six countries—China, India, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, and South Korea—will account for one-half of the world’s economic growth between 2011 and 2025 Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.3
      - China now sees the United States in decline while simultaneously viewing itself as having risen to great-power status. China’s newly gained self-confidence was evident in its 2010 for- eign policy muscle-flexing.Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.3
      - The International Monetary Fund forecasts that China’s share of world GDP (15%) will draw nearly even with the United States (18%) by 2014 (see Figure 2). This is especially impressive given that China’s share of world GDP was only 2% in 1980 and as recently as 1995 was only 6%. Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.3
      - The Economist Intelligence Unit (2009) predicts China will become the world’s largest economy in 2021 Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.3
      - as rising great powers become wealthier, their politi- cal ambitions increase and they convert their new- found economic muscle into the military clout (Zakaria 1998) Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.3
    - - china is on the rise, set to become worlds largest economy, potentially delayed by covid, some time between 2020-2040, has risen to great power status, low profile and abiding by american-led WTO to do so
  - - - the 1980s declinists did not claim either that the United States already had declined steeply, or that it soon would undergo a rapid, catastrophic decline. Rather, they pointed to domestic and economic drivers that were in play and which, over time, would cause American economic power to decline relatively and produce a shift in global distribution of power. Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.5
      - 1980s declinists said, the United States’ goals of geopolitical dominance and economic prosperity would collide. Today, their warnings seem eerily prescient. Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.5
      - the debate about US decline ended abruptly when, in short order, the United States’ main geopolitical and economic rivals—the Soviet Union and Japan, respectively—experienced dramatic reversals of fortune. Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.5
      - China’s rise is one powerful indicator of America’s relative decline. Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.5
      - Between now and 2025, the looming debt and dollar crises almost certainly will compel the United States to retrench strategically, and to begin scaling back its overseas military commitments. Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.6
      - States must provide both guns—the military capabilities needed to defend and advance their external interests—and butter, ensuring prosperity and supplying needed public goods Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.5
      - the Great Recession, which caused the Obama administration and the Federal Reserve to inject a massive amount of dollars into the economy, in the form of stimulus spending, bail-outs, and ‘‘quantitative easing,’’ to avert a replay of the Great Depression of the 1930s. Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.6
      - the cost of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have been financed by borrowing from abroad rather than raising taxes to pay for them. These wars have been expensive. Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.6
      - America’s geopolitical preeminence hinges on the dollar’s reserve currency role. If the dollar loses that status, US hegemony will literally be unaffordable. The dollar’s reserve currency status has, in effect, been a very special kind of ‘‘credit card.’’Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.6
      - China’s vote of no confidence in the dollar’s future is reflected in its calls to create a new reserve currency to replace the dollar, the renminbi’s gradual ‘‘internationalization,’’ and in the lectures China’s leaders regularly deliver telling Washington to get its fiscal house in order. Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.7
      - In June 2011, the IMF said that unless the United States enacts a credible plan to reign in its annual deficits and accumulating national debt, it could face a sovereign risk crisis in the next several years. Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.7
      - as the United States spends less on defense, China (and other new great powers) will be able to close the military power gap with the United States. Second, the United States’ ability to act as a regional stabilizer and a guardian of the global com- mons will diminish. Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.7
    - - america cannot afford dollar crisis and military overseas spending so will reduce military to reserve dollar status but this closes military gap
      - declinists were arguing in 1980s of tell tale signs of decline, domestic and internal aspects, domestic dollar issues with debt external military expansionism a cause of the debt, QE
  - - - Hegemonic stability theory holds that an open international economic system requires a single hegemonic power to perform critical military and economic tasks. Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.8
      - An economic hegemon is supposed to solve global economic crises, not cause them. However, it was the freezing-up of the US financial system triggered by the sub-prime mortgage crisis that plunged the world into economic crisis. Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.8
      - From World War II’s end until the Great Recession, the international economy looked to the United States as the locomotive of global economic growth. As the world’s largest market since 1945, America’s willingness to consume foreign goods has been the firewall against global economic downturns. Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.8
      - The United States’ inability to galvanize global recovery demonstrates that in key respects it no longer is capable of acting as an economic hegemon. Indeed, President Barak Obama conceded as much at the April 2009 G-20 meeting in London, where he acknowledged the United States is no longer able to be the world’s consumer of last resort, and that the world needs to look to China (and India and other emerging market states) to be the motors of global recovery. Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.8
    - - US already isn't the economic hegemon, cannot recover the world from economic disasters and indeed causes them
  - - - As Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf says, ‘‘The collapse of the western financial system, while China’s flourishes, marks a humiliating end to the ‘unipolar moment.’ Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.9
      - At the zenith of its military and economic power after World War II, the United States had the material capacity to furnish the international system with public goods. In the Great Recession’s aftermath, however, a financially strapped United States increas- ingly will be unable to be a big time provider of public goods to the international order.Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.9
      - China and the United States have fundamental differences on what the rules of international order should be on such key issues as sovereignty, non-interference in states’ internal affairs, and the ‘‘responsibility to protect.’’ While China has integrated itself in the liberal order to propel its economic growth, it is converting wealth into hard power to challenge American geopolitical dominance. Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.9
      - it also is laying the foundations—through embryonic institutions like the BRICs and the Shang- hai Cooperation Organization—for constructing an alternative world order that, over the next twenty years or so, could displace the Pax Americana.Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.9
      - Martin Jacques has observed, China is operating ‘‘both within and outside the existing international system while at the same time, in effect, sponsoring a new China-centric international system which will exist alongside the present system and probably slowly begin to usurp it’’ (Jacques 2009:362). Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.9
      - propose to China is for Washington ‘‘to accommo- date a rising China by offering it status and position within the regional order in return for Beijing’s acceptance and accommodation of Washington’s core interests, which include remaining a dominant security provider within East Asia’’ Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.10, ikenberry
      - or as a geopolitical example of Newtonian physics (two hegemons cannot occupy the same region at the same time). From either perspective, the dangers should be obvious: unless the United States is willing to accept China’s ascendancy in East (and Southeast) Asia, Washington and Beijing are on a collision course.Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.10
      - Hegemonic decline always has consequences. As the twenty-first century’s second decade begins, history and multipolarity are staging a comeback. The world figures to become a much more turbulent place geopolitically than it was during the era of the Pax Americana. Layne, C., 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), pp.10