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Competition Law - Coggle Diagram
Competition Law
101 TFEU
prohbit anti-competitive arrangments betweeen underakings which restrict or distort competition
practices
limiting or controlling production, technical development
divide the market
fixing purchase or selling prices
undertaking
Hofner & Elser
every entity engaged in economic activity
Wouters
includes self-employed
agreements, concerted practices, decsision of associations
concerted practice
catches things if evidence destroyed
Dyestuff
knowingly substitutes practical co-operation for risks of competition - simultaneously rising prices - no innocent explanation
Sugar Cartels
no direct or indirect contract between parties which influence conduct on market of competitor
descision of association
Belgian Roofers
trade associations
decision
title not important, substance is
code of conduct, offical price list
agreements
Re Polypropylene
agreement if parties reach a consensus on a plan which limits or likely to limit commercial freedom by determining limits of mutual action
Pre-Insulated Pipes Cartel
not necessary for every partipant to give express consent or be aware of every manifestation
Bayer v Commission
concurence of wills
prevent or restrict competition
trade between MS affected
Hugin Kassa Register
covers any agreement or practice capable of being a threat to freedom of trade between member states - migh harm single market objective
object or effect
object
Consten & Grundig
if objective is anti-competitive not necessary to show anti-competitive effect - absolute territorial protection
if object of restricting competition automatically void
Chemiefarma
fixing prices
partition markets
effect
societe technique minere
exclusive right of sale, not anti-competitive object - look at effect on competition - factors - nature, position and importance o parties
metropole
exclusivity clause, is the agreement objectively necessary and proportioante
commission guidance - has to have appreciable effect
de minimis doctrine
appreciable effect on inter-state trade
Commission notice
10% between competitors
15% between non-competitors
horizontal agreements likely restricting competition
101(2) any agreements prohibited void
101(3) provides some exemptions if improving production or distribution
consumers fair share of resulting benefit
technical or economic progress
4 conditions
benefits to the common market
guarantees consumers a fair share of benefit
a lot discretion - not just price benefit
improves product or distribution of goods or technical or economic progrss
not an unnecessary restriction
Metro v Commission
stabelising provision of employment factor improves general condition of production
vertical restraints
parties at different level of production chain
can effect consumer choice, welfare, mask cartels and harm single market
exclusive distribution agreements
only supply in one particular area
Societe Technique Minere
did not contain absolute territorial ban - not automatically prohibited
Hennessy-Henkell
obligation to obtain all supplies from particular supply
resale price maintenance not allowed - some exception maybe in franchise
Pronuptia de Paris v Schillgalis
selective distribution agreements
won't come under 101 if pick supplies on purely qualitive grounds
BMW
not allowed if absolute territorial protection
Metro
allowed to set conditions for stocking
franchise
Pronuptia
right to protect brands IP and standards
Yves Rocher
not allowed if deciding to market share
private enforcement
commission obliged to respond regulation 773/2004
Manfredi
dont have to show legal interest
hard to prove infringement linked to loss
private parties slow
Regulation 1/2003
aim
give MS a bigger role - 101 and 102 directly effect - national courts can apply
no need to notify commission is using 101(3) - reduce strain on commission
exemptions for research and development and motor vehicle distribution
enforcement
commission
DG Comp (department_
powers
to investigate
request information
leniency programmes
conduct dawn raids of business premises and homes (judicial permission)
adjudication
power to order cease and desist
power to accept commitments
fines
obstruction / failure to co-operate
infringement
appeal to courts
on point of law not on point of facts
public enforcement
105 TFEU
up to commission
regulation 1/2003
powers
request conduct to end
adjudicate
make a decision which is binding
impose fines -article 7
intentionally breach 101 or 102
10% of global turnover
guidelines
challenged unsuccessfully in
Pre-Insulated Pipes
fine determined by gravity, lenght, aggravating factors and mitigating factors
article 24 fine for non-compliance
investigate
request necessary info and time limit for compliance
article 23 misleading info 1% of turnover
102
prohibits abuse of dominant undertaking
dominant position
dominance by itself not bad, although gives responsibility to ensure conduct doesn't distort competition
, Michelin
need to establish dominance in each new case,
Coca Cola
market share
Michelin 1
57% market share and rival 4% to 8%
British Airways
39% but 7 times biigger then nearest rival
Akzo
more than 50% presume dominance
France Telecom v Commission
market rapidly fluctuating, can still be dominant even though rapidly growing and declining 8 times more then next
other factors
barriers to entry
Michelin
superiror technology
conduct
Michelin
obligatory trading partner -
Deutsche Bahn
collective dominance
CContinental Can
can be held by 2 or more firms of one corporate group
Airtours
3 conditions for collective dominance
transparency (monitor each other)
mechanisms to deter departure from policy
inability of consumers and competitors to erode common policy
common market
define the relavent market
product market
United Brands
level of interchangeability influential - banana has certain characteriscs in own market to other fruit
commission notice 1997
SSNIP test how demand reacts to price
useful evidence
subsitution
views of customers and competitors
barriers to switching to substitute
physical characteristics
Product Market Analysis
United Brands
bananas all year round fruit, and different to oranges - appearance, seedless, easy handling, soft, young and old
Michelin
car tyres vs van tyres - different consumers (consumers vs trade userS), different production processs
France Telecom v Commission
high speed vs low speed internet
geographic market
defined geographic brand where conditions of competition sufficiently homogenous
British Telecommunications
can be one MS
evidence - trade flows, geographic patterns of demands, demand characteristics (natural preferences, culture, language)
cross price elasticity
substantial part of internal market
De Minimis Rule
exclude cases of insufficient size and importance
principle of subsidiarity - allow MS deal with matters of local nature
Suiker Unie
take into account pattern and volume of production and consumption
B & I Line v Sealink
port substantial part of market (essential facility)
abuse
unfair price or trading conditions
predatory pricing
Agreeda Turner Test
if price above average variable costs ok, but if below not
Akzo
chemical in flour, two companies, wanted to stop other company arriving into market - price above Average variable costs but below below average total costs abusive if part of plan to eliminate competition
Tetrapak II
firm dominant in one market can have abuse in another if aim is to eliminate competitors
price discrimination
charging 2 purchasers different prices in same situation
United Brands
similar costs but very different prices - was an abuse (in ports)
loyalty rebates
unless objectively justified
British Airways
extra commission to travel agents to promote BA tickets, strategy discriminatory, promote loyalty effect
price squeezing
British sugar
refusal to supply
Chemical Solvents
in response to attempted takeover refused to supply - abusive unless excessive
Tying
Hilti
nail guns and cartidge strips, discounts for cartidges with nails and refused to supply cartridge strips to competing nail producers
limiting production, markets to prejudice of customers
Hoffman
conduct sought to influence market structure
Boosey & Hayes
dominant undertaking take reasonable steps to protect commercial interests, but be fair and proportioante
defence
objective justification
commission - dominant undertaking special obligation not to prevent emergence or growth of new comeptitors
undertaking
Hofner and Elser
Wouters
effect on interstate trade
Commercial Solvents
leniency notice 2006
discount for collaboration