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WHAT IS MEANT BY THE CONCEPT OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND HAS IT…

- - - - before capitalism will go to hell it will for the foreseeable future hang on in limbo, dead or about to die from an overdose of itself Chakrabortty, A., 2022. Wolfgang Streeck: ‘Look at London – it’s a second Rome. This is what an empire looks like’. [online] the Guardian.
      - public discontent is fitful and fragmented, ready to fall into trump's tiny hands. meanwhile capitalism - unrestrained and unreformed - will die[] Streeck is predicting that the capitalists will be their own gravediggers Chakrabortty, A., 2022. Wolfgang Streeck: ‘Look at London – it’s a second Rome. This is what an empire looks like’. [online] the Guardian.
      - Caravaggio is always there just before the explosion, this morning might have been a caravaggio moment: just before the election of trump Chakrabortty, A., 2022. Wolfgang Streeck: ‘Look at London – it’s a second Rome. This is what an empire looks like’. [online] the Guardian.
    - - capitalism will die but is drawing it out, trump symptomatic not a source of end of LIO, LIO plants seeds of own destruction
  - - - he sees the support for Brexit and trump as stemming from the same source. 'you have a growing group of all people who, under the impact of neoliberal internationalisation have become increasingly excluded from the mainstream of their society' Chakrabortty, A., 2022. Wolfgang Streeck: ‘Look at London – it’s a second Rome. This is what an empire looks like’. [online] the Guardian.
      - citizens too can panic and act irrationally just like financial investors even thought they have no banknotes as arguments but only words. Chakrabortty, A., 2022. Wolfgang Streeck: ‘Look at London – it’s a second Rome. This is what an empire looks like’. [online] the Guardian
      - why would the new oligarchs be interested in their countries' future productive capacities and present democratic stability if, apparently, they can be rich without it, Chakrabortty, A., 2022. Wolfgang Streeck: ‘Look at London – it’s a second Rome. This is what an empire looks like’. [online] the Guardian
      - the ones who fly yearly on holiday rather than weekly on business, the downsized, the indebted losers of neoliberalism [] 'one thing they do know is that conventional politics has totally written them off Chakrabortty, A., 2022. Wolfgang Streeck: ‘Look at London – it’s a second Rome. This is what an empire looks like’. [online] the Guardian.
      - he quotes keynes, when the facts change I change my mind, in another interview he has described the most urgent task for the left as sobering up Chakrabortty, A., 2022. Wolfgang Streeck: ‘Look at London – it’s a second Rome. This is what an empire looks like’. [online] the Guardian.
    - - voters are not part of LIO, financiers and big men are, brexit and trump one and the same reaction, exclusion, do states really care about democracy spreading or money
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        it is increasingly difficult to speak of the world as if it were whole. we are seeing th emergence of regional orders - or most pronounced in the Middle East - disorders, each with its own characteristics.
        
        the fate of the failing liberal order is neither liberal nor worldwide nor orderly Haass, R., 2022. Liberal World Order, R.I.P.. [online] Council on Foreign Relations.
        
        the weakening of the liberal world order is due more than anything else to the changed attitude of the US under Pres. Donald Trump, the US decided against joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership and to withdraw from the Paris climate agreement Haass, R., 2022. Liberal World Order, R.I.P.. [online] Council on Foreign Relations.
        
        its three components liberalism universality and the preservation of order itself are being challenged as never before in its 70-year history Haass, R., 2022. Liberal World Order, R.I.P.. [online] Council on Foreign Relations.
        
        russia violated the most basic norm of international relations when it used armed force to change borders in Europe and it violated US sovereignty through its efforts to influence the 2016 election Haass, R., 2022. Liberal World Order, R.I.P.. [online] Council on Foreign Relations.
        
        global institutions have failed to adapt to new power balances and technologies Haass, R., 2022. Liberal World Order, R.I.P.. [online] Council on Foreign Relations.
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        liberalism as in retreat, Brexit, rise of populism, loss of elite influence, US own president attacking media, courts, law enforcement, china, Russia, turkey more powerful
        
        little governing of cyberspace, protectionism rise, global trade ever disrupted
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        the US is not just another country it was the principal architect of the liberal world order and its principal backer it was also a principal beneficiary America's decision to abandon the role it has played for more than seven decades thus marks a turning point the liberal world order cannot survive on its own because others lack either the interest or the means to sustain it Haass, R., 2022. Liberal World Order, R.I.P.. [online] Council on Foreign Relations.
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        US as critical role, architect, backer, beneficiary, can't abandon and it survive because US is its nurturer and no other power has the means nor intentions to sustain it
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        the United States working closely with the United Kingdom and others established the liberal world order in the wake of WWII the goal was to ensure that the conditions that had led to two world wars in 30 years would never again rise Haass, R., 2022. Liberal World Order, R.I.P.. [online] Council on Foreign Relations.
        
        the liberal world order was thus based not just on ideals embraced by democracies but also on hard power Haass, R., 2022. Liberal World Order, R.I.P.. [online] Council on Foreign Relations.
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- - - - a stronger approach would be a free world strategy one that preserves liberty at home and in other democracies [] if you want to protect your democracy free press rule of law open internet integrity of critical infrastructure NGOs actions at home are necessary but not sufficient. you need to support a competitive foreign policy that pushes back against Neo-authoritarianism Wright, T., 2022. The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable. [online] The Atlantic.
      - a conversation on deterring foreign political interference is precisely the one we need to have Wright, T., 2022. The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable. [online] The Atlantic.
      - the American people must think seriously about how interdependent they want to be with china and other authoritarian powers or If the time has come to pull back in certain areas to reduce their vulnerability Wright, T., 2022. The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable. [online] The Atlantic.
      - a free world strategy would be an evolution in American foreign policy, not a rejection of the liberal international order [] it would emphasise new threats to free societies, threats that have largely been ignored by successive administrations Wright, T., 2022. The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable. [online] The Atlantic.
    - - a free world strategy, adapting to the cyber developments, acknowledging threats, competitive foreign policy pushing against Neo-authoritarianism
      - deterrence of foreign interference
      - whether to pull back or stay considering the rise of China
  - - - framing the primary goal of American strategy as maintaining a liberal order completely misses the point [] sounds rather abstract [maintaining the threat away from home] particularly at a time when external powers threaten liberties at home and among America's closest allies Wright, T., 2022. The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable. [online] The Atlantic.
      - the policy elites believed the best way to protect US interests was through a postwar western order organised around free trade, institutions and a US military presence in Europe and Asia Wright, T., 2022. The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable. [online] The Atlantic.
      - the term liberal international order was hardly used during the Cold War Wright, T., 2022. The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable. [online] The Atlantic.
      - Americans have never been particularly enamoured with the liberal international order it's a clunky partisan sounding phrase especially to republicans and conjures images of shadowy unaccountable forces controlling the world Wright, T., 2022. The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable. [online] The Atlantic.
      - as avarell Harriman the then US ambassador to the Soviet Union put it, Africans wanted to settle all of our differences with Russia and then go to the movies and drink coke Wright, T., 2022. The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable. [online] The Atlantic.
    - - questions the conscious role of the Americans in creating the LIO, just did it out of pragmatism to maintain their world view
      - wanted to settle the Russia issue and then retreat back into nationalism
  - - - russia's attack on American democracy. cyberattacks on critical infrastructure including the power grid Chinese political interference including pressure on American companies especially in the media and social media sector. the mass theft of intellectual property. the collection of private data by foreign powers. the strategic use of corruption to build networks of support and the backing for authoritarian movements in countries that were, until several years ago, stable democracies Wright, T., 2022. The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable. [online] The Atlantic.
      - Barack obama and Donald trump both understood that the American people wanted to pull back do less and have other actions share more of the burden Wright, T., 2022. The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable. [online] The Atlantic.
      - [trump] is a kindred spirit of Neo-authoritarians [] he would go much further than he has in partnering with Vladimir Putin's Russia and developing what a senior White House official described as a "no friends, no enemies" worldview Wright, T., 2022. The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable. [online] The Atlantic.
    - - all those areas that LIO has enabled but cannot regulate, cyberspace, data harvesting, meddling etc,
      - trump as following a no friends no enemies policy, Neo-authoritarian spirit
  - - - the notion of a liberal international order never really resonated with voters. and its success arose from the fact that American power was unrivaled Wright, T., 2022. The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable. [online] The Atlantic.
      - the era of convergence came to an end because Russian and Chinese leaders concluded that if the liberal order succeeded globally it would pose an existential threat to their regimes.[] they worried about google and social media companies aiding dissenters in their own societies crucially they realised that these companies made their choices independent of Washington Wright, T., 2022. The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable. [online] The Atlantic.
      - true accommodation [of china and Russia into the ILO] would have fundamentally and irrevocably changed the world for the worse [] it would mean, at best, turning a blind eye to a massive and coercive Chinese and Russian effort to pressure western media outlets, NGOs and even universities [and favoured an era where] a few people carved the world up into spheres of influence, rather than a system where rules, values and vpotes play a leading role. nWright, T., 2022. The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable. [online] The Atlantic.
      - John ikenberry brought the term to prominence in the 1990s and 2000s Wright, T., 2022. The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable. [online] The Atlantic.
    - - as a domestic policy it doesn't really stick, people are attentive to what they feel they have immediate responsibility to, hence nationalism, protectionism, an instinctive retreat, why stay in this meddling foreign policy where players have no accountability, cannot see gain
      - LIO successful not because of home support but because US no rivalry abroad
      - the appeal of authoritarianism, the leaning of technology toward that end incidentally in the west and intentionally in the east
      - a feigned incorporation of China and Russia in LIO, had it been real would have ended up in a sphere of influence type situation
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        additional agreements between the united states, western europe and japan solidified the open and multilateral character of the postwar world economy. after the on set of the cold war, the marshall plan in europe and the 1951 security pact between the united states and japan further integrated the defeated axis powers into the western order Ikenberry, John G. (2008) The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive? Foreign Affairs 87.1: 23-37.
        
        power transitions are typically seen as being played out between two countries a rising state and a declining hegemon and the order falls as soon as the power balance shifts. but in the current order the larger aggregation of democratic capitalist states, and the resulting accumulation of geopolitical power shifts the balance in the order's favour. Ikenberry, John G. (2008) The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive? Foreign Affairs 87.1: 23-37.
        
        the western order is built around rules and norms of nondiscrimination and market openness creating conditions for rising states to advance their expanding economic and political goals within it. [] the barriers to economic participation are low and the potential benefits are high Ikenberry, John G. (2008) The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive? Foreign Affairs 87.1: 23-37.
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        power shifts accommodated in LIO, accumulated power among democratic states,
        
        Japan, US Western Europe open, multilateral character of postwar world economy.
        
        high stakes, high wins situation in free economy, giving china chips in the game get them hooked
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        as china sheds its status as a developing country and therefore a as client of these institutions it will increasingly be able to act as a patron and stakeholder instead Ikenberry, John G. (2008) The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive? Foreign Affairs 87.1: 23-37.
        
        [Marc Lanteigne] what separates china from other states, and indeed from previous global powers is that not only is it 'growing up' within a mileu of international institutions far more developed than ever before but more importantly it is doing so while making active use of these institutions to promote the country's development of global power status'
        
        china will surpass the as the largest state in the global system sometime around 2020 Ikenberry, John G. (2008) The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive? Foreign Affairs 87.1: 23-37.
        
        [john mearsheimer] if china continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades, the united states and china are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war Ikenberry, John G. (2008) The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive? Foreign Affairs 87.1: 23-37.
        
        realists note [] china will try to use its growing influence to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve its interests and other states in the system especially the declining hegemon will start to see china as a growing security threat Ikenberry, John G. (2008) The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive? Foreign Affairs 87.1: 23-37.
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        china rises and coerces LIO to its own ends, inevitable conflict of powers, security competitions, around 2020, china as stakeholder and patron
        
        china is working within rather than outside of the western order and increasing its power thus
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        john rawls argued that political institutions should be conceived behind a veil of ignorance, that is the architects should design institutions as if they do not know precisely where they will be within a socioeconomic system [] the system safeguards the person's interests whether he is rich, poor, weak strong, Ikenberry, John G. (2008) The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive? Foreign Affairs 87.1: 23-37.
        
        as it faces an ascendant China, the US should remember that its leadership of the western order allows it to shape the environment in which china will make critical strategic choices. [] it must sink the roots of this order as deeply as possible giving china greater incentives for integration than for opposition Ikenberry, John G. (2008) The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive? Foreign Affairs 87.1: 23-37.
        
        if the defining struggle of the twenty-first century is between china and the united states, china will have the advantage. if the defining struggle is between china and a revived western system, the west will triumph Ikenberry, John G. (2008) The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive? Foreign Affairs 87.1: 23-37.
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        western system as it is now will fail against a rising china unless it is revived
        
        LIO should have been created without vested interest/ concepts of where you are in the order so rich, poor, strong, weak would benefit
        
        Ikenberry thinks US should dig its heels in and give china incentive to integrate rather than oppose
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        the road to global power, in effect, runs through the western order and its multilateral economic institutions Ikenberry, John G. (2008) The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive? Foreign Affairs 87.1: 23-37.
        
        the US led order is distinctive in that it has been more liberal than imperial and so unusually accessible, legitimate and durable. its rules and institutions are rooted in and thus reinforced by the evolving global forces of democracy and capitalism Ikenberry, John G. (2008) The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive? Foreign Affairs 87.1: 23-37.
        
        when a state occupies a commanding position in the international system, neither it nor weaker states have an incentive to change the existing order, but when the power of a challenger state grows and the power of the leading state weakens, a strategic rivalry ensues and conflict - perhaps leading to war - becomes likely Ikenberry, John G. (2008) The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive? Foreign Affairs 87.1: 23-37.
        
        there are different types of power transitions. some states have seen their economic and geopolitical power grow dramatically and have still accommodated themselves to the existing order Ikenberry, John G. (2008) The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive? Foreign Affairs 87.1: 23-37.
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        the factors responsible for successful pandemic responses have been state capacity, social trust and leadership. countries with all three - a competent state apparatus, a government that citizens trust and listen to, and effective leaders have performed impressively, limiting the damage they have suffered. countries with dysfunctional states, polarised states or poor leadership have done badly, leaving their citizens and economies exposed and vulnerable. Fukuyama, F., 2022. The Pandemic and Political Order. [online] Foreign Affairs.
        
        governments in hungary and the phillipines have used the crisis to give themselves emergency powers, moving them still further away from democracy Fukuyama, F., 2022. The Pandemic and Political Order. [online] Foreign Affairs.
        
        Putin tried to play down the importance of the pandemic at first, then claimed russia had it under control, and will likely have to change his tune yet again as COVID19 spreads throughout the country. [his] legitimacy was already weakening before the crisis and that process may have accelerated Fukuyama, F., 2022. The Pandemic and Political Order. [online] Foreign Affairs.
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        successful pandemic management: state capacity, social trust, leadership. poor pandemic management: dysfunctional, polarised states, poor leadership
        
        opportunist leaders in phillipines, Hungary, entrenching emergency powers to profit politically
        
        Putin maybe facing a legitimacy crisis not helped by his underestimation of pandemic
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        conspiracy theories used to flourish in places such as the middle east where ordinary people were disempowered and felt they lacked agency. today, they have spread widely throughout rich countries as well, thanks in part to a fractured media environment caused by the internet and social media and sustained suffering is likely to provide rich material for populist demagogues to exploit Fukuyama, F., 2022. The Pandemic and Political Order. [online] Foreign Affairs.
        
        the democratisation of authority spurred by the digital revolution has flattened cognitive hierarchies along with other hierarchies and political decision making is now driven by often weaponised babble Fukuyama, F., 2022. The Pandemic and Political Order. [online] Foreign Affairs.
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        conspiracy theories galvanised by fractured media, provides a gold mine of resource for demagogues to exploit because they are cyclical
        
        democratisation of authority spurred by technological advancement leading to political decision coerced to ends of weaponisation
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        it has often taken just such a huge external shock to break sclerotic political systems out of their stasis and create the conditions for long overdue structural reform and that pattern is likely to play out again Fukuyama, F., 2022. The Pandemic and Political Order. [online] Foreign Affairs.
        
        rather than cooperate constructively for their common benefit, countries have turned inward, bickered with one another and made their rivals political scapegoats for their own failures Fukuyama, F., 2022. The Pandemic and Political Order. [online] Foreign Affairs
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        sources: breaking down of communication, blaming, external shock to break stasis and encourage structural reform, maybe pandemic can be that force
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        while national leaders play the blame game, scientists and public health officials around the world are deepening their networks and connections Fukuyama, F., 2022. The Pandemic and Political Order. [online] Foreign Affairs.
        
        the pandemic could lead to [] the continued erosion of the liberal international order and resurgence of fascism across the globe [] it could also lead to a rebirth of liberal democracy, a system that has confounded skeptics many times, showing remarkable powers of resilience and renewal [] the general forecast is gloomy Fukuyama, F., 2022. The Pandemic and Political Order. [online] Foreign Affairs.
        
        the global distribution of power will continue to shift eastward since east asia has done better at managing the situation than europe or the united states Fukuyama, F., 2022. The Pandemic and Political Order. [online] Foreign Affairs.
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        but pandemic hasn't totally ruptured LIO, states inward but scientific and multinational corporations outward in fight against covid, entrenched relations of intelligence and action
        
        could go either way, Fukuyama predicts not well for LIO, with power shifting eastward to china dealing better with covid
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        the world can watch TV too and has stood by in amazement with china quick to make the comparison clear Fukuyama, F., 2022. The Pandemic and Political Order. [online] Foreign Affairs.
        
        the united states has bungled its response badly and seen its prestige slip enormously [] its current highly polarised society and incompetent leader blocked the state from functioning effectively Fukuyama, F., 2022. The Pandemic and Political Order. [online] Foreign Affairs.
        
        the president stoked division rather than promoting unity, politicised the distribution of aid, pushed responsibility onto governors for making key decisions while encouraging protests against them for protecting public health and attacked international institutions rather than galvanising them. Fukuyama, F., 2022. The Pandemic and Political Order. [online] Foreign Affairs.
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        trump division > unity, politicisation of aid, basically a very destructive, inward looking force, the world watching - this the unipolar of LIO? thus prestige lost
- - - - what is LIO, when do they appear, why did it fail, what comes next
      - LIO 1990, unipolar, and democracy at main pole, now doomed to fail v Russia and china, multipolar and multi visions.
    - - south 2004/2005 it has failed and is doomed, contains the seeds of its own destruction, resurrection of russian power and rise of china
      - the Liberal international order was created in 1990 when the cold war ended, not in 1945, when the world became unipolar, united states is the sole pole in creating that order Mearsheimer, J., 2019. The Liberal International Order.
  - - - an order, an organised group of international institutions that help govern the interactions among the member states
      - an international order, includes all great powers, US, CHINA RUSSIA
      - a bounded order, do not include all the great powers are usually regional in scope, cold war, one was soviet one was capitalist, these are bounded
      - whats a liberal international order, one where the pole state is a liberal democracy, goals: spread liberal democracy around the world, promote economic openness, integrate states into more institutions because they will benefit and institutions are the building blocks of orders
    - - breaks down LIO into order, international order and LIO, foundation is international institutions governing interactions of members, int. order = all great powers, beyond regional scope of influence, liberal int. order unipolar, democratic
      - spread liberal democracy, intergrate states, promote economic openness
  - - - conditions: number of great powers in the system, political ideology of the dominant state
      - got a LIO in 1990 because we moved into a unipolar order where the dominant state was a liberal international order, doesn't pay attention to real politik, the balance of powers because there were no other great powers in the system so free to pursue real agenda
      - cold war: two bounded realist orders, soviet and US led capitalist all institutions were part of a bounded order in the west, comicon, cominform, EU, NATO,
      - 1989 soviet union bounded order collapses, US prevails thus, NATO expansion, colour revolutions in eastern europe, bush doctrine, engagement with China, no great power security competition, wish to remake world in own image
      - lets get china hooked on capitalism, they'll get rich, they'll want democracy
    - - crucial that real politic goes out the window, no balance of powers, because no contending power
      - Cold War, bounded orders, regional scope, different competing multinational institutions against each other formed not for integration but opposition
  - - - six flaws: alternatives, endless wars, crusade = poisoned relations, sovereignty, hyper globalisation = economic + political crises, integration undermines unipolarity
      - trump symptomatic not the source of LIO downfall
      - unipolarity is over and done with
    - - I do not believe that donald trump is responsible for the mess we are in
      - donald trump was elected by running a campaign against the ILO, he is a protectionist, never seen an institution he likes, he's not the problem he is a manifestation of the problem
      - six fatal flaws: there are alternatives to liberal democracy [against Fukuyama, there are alternative models, ask the russians about liberal democracy they think about the 1990s where the place was a disaster] the crusading sole pole ends up in endless wars with the minor wars, we are addicted to wars, that's what happens when you become a crusader state, crusading pole poisons relations with the world's major powers [you think the russians are happy with us driving NATO up to their borders?] order clashes with nationalism undermines sovereignty and national identity [brussels is a curse word to many brits, thats why we have brexit] [taking in refugees in the age of liberalism thats prescription for trouble] hyper globalisation causes serious economic and political problems, integrating china into ILO undermined unipolarity
      - unipolarity is finished because russia and china are great powers
  - - - thin realist international order of cooperation, chinese-led bounded order, US-led bounded order
      - the UN is the truest international institution on the planet and i didn't mention it because it is the most meaningless institution on the planet
    - - predicts similar conditions to cold war