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Analysing International Relations - Coggle Diagram
Analysing International Relations
International system
Society
Hedley Bull: the anarchical society
International community vs. international society
International community
rhetoric
universal
partisan
collective actor
system
War
Waltz
Bull
Balance of power
Waltz
Bull
Bull & Watson: the expansion of international society
Crawford: a security regime among democracies
Hierarchy
Definitions
"Variations in authority exerted by a dominant state over a subordinate party" - Lake 2007
"Any system through which actors are organized into vertical relations of super- and subordination" - Zarakol 2017
Comcepts
Voluntary contracts
Lake: Escaped from the state of nature
Lake: Hierarchy in international relations
Kang: East Asia before the West
Clark et al.: Special responsibilities
Deep structure
Race
Gender
Class
Reflections of power differentials
Anarchy
International anarchy: absence of effective central authority above states
Billiard Ball model of IR
Arguments
Waltz: theory of international politics
Mearsheimer: anarchy and the struggle for power
Wendt: anarchy is what states make of it
Economy
States and their relative wealth
An integrated system
Market dynamics among sovereign but interdependent states and other actors
Structural dynamics among parts of an integrated world capitalist system
Lenin: Imperialism - The highest stage of capitalism
Prebisch: the economic development of Latin America and its principal problems
Marx
Rodney: How Europe underdeveloped Africa
Wallerstein: The modern world-system
application to global governance
Gramsci: the prison notebooks
Chimni: An imperial global state in the making
Cammack: the governance of global capitalism
Wealth of the world
International cooperation and institutions
Sources of international institutions
definition
international law
treaty law
customary law
international regimes
international norms
inter-governmental organizations
instruments
actors
forums
sources
two-level games (Putnam)
ideas (moral and causal)
power
Mearsheimer (weak tools of strong states)
Hurd (law has winners and losers)
Gruber (IOs not mutually beneficial)
identities (individual and collective)
joint interests (low transaction costs, transparent)
class interests (Chimni - transnational capitalist class)
examples
WTO
joint interests
power politics or class interests?
ICC
ideas
self-interest of rulers
Brexit
ideas
two-level games
Dynamics of international rules
How do international rules emerge, spread, and evolve?
norms cascade
localisation
imposition
unrestrained (Gruber)
restrained (Ikenberry)
contestation (Deitelhoff & Zimmerman)
apllicatory
validity
rational pursuit of joint gains
persuasion
why do actors comply with, evade, or violate international rules?
incentives approach
kosten-baten analyse
socialization
persuasion
bureaucratic normalization
role playing
managerial approach
ambiguity
state capacity
domestic politics
electoral influence
information
evasion
letter of the law
purpose of the law
example
France pays Roma
Banks creative accounting
international rules = international law + international norms
International cooperation
What makes cooperation difficult?
relative gains problem (anarchy)
free-rider problem
credible commitment problem (short-term gains)
pressures of two-level games (domestic/international)
populism (nationalist/anti-elitist
security dilemma (anarchy)
What makes cooperation possible?
the power of reassurance (reciprocal reassurance)
the power of reciprocity (mutual compromise)
Institutions facilitate cooperation (rational actors)
the power of positive incentives (log-rolling, side payments)
focus on absolute gains (more states, cheating not threatening)
the power of negative incentives
weak security dilemma (dominant defence, high transparency)
hegemonic leadership (capability, willingness, legitimacy)
What motivates states to cooperate
shared material interests (material gain)
shared dientities (common history/values)
shared sense of threat (anarchy)
The negotiation of international cooperation
level 1: domestic
level 2: international
what is cooperation?
Cooperation
Discord
Harmony
Dynamics of international organizations
design
rationalist approach
Korremenos, institutional design
sociological approach
normative aims and IO design (welfare state)
past choices and IO re-design
solution: layering
no solution: drift
autonomy
marxist theory
Cammack
principal-agent theory
advantages
easier resolution of disputes
greater credibility
easier decision-making
Policy continuity
specialization of functions
disadvantages
Slippage: IO moves towards own preferences
Slack: IO acts in a way undesired by states
Shirking: IO minimizes efforts on behalf of states
realist theory
Mearsheimer
Gruber
Waltz
organizational theory
power of IOs
forms
classification
the fixing of meanings
the diffusion of new norms
sources
modern society values neutralism, objectivity
control of technical expertise and information
pathological behaviour of IOs
normalization of deviance
insulation
bureaucratic universalism
cultural contestation
irrationality of rationalization
forms
formality
formal
informal
decision-making
inter-governmental
majority
mixed
consensus
supranational
membership & purpose
membership
limited
universal
purpose
govern issue-area
govern geographic space
represent culture/values
mixed
future trends (new forms of global governance)
new types
traditional
irrelevance (private actors)
illegitimacy
inflexibility
growing rivalry among great powers
new
informal intergovernmentalism
preferred by rising powers
new roles
collaboration
IGO > actor
orchestration (intermediaries) - Abbott & Snidal
managing states
IGO > intermediary > state > private actor
bypassing states
IGO > intermediary > private actor
new actors
network of...
formal IGOs
firms
states
civil society actors
examples
KPCS
ICANN
governance without governments
private standards
private businesses
NGOs
future trend (globalisation and legitimacy)
legitimacy of global governance
why important? (Hurd)
legitimacy determines effectiveness
IOs have no coercive power
international elites (Scholten et al.)
elites favour global governance, more IOs
positive view on 14 major IOs
elite-citizen gap (Dellmuth et al.)
Citizens have less trust in IOs
depends on individual level
higher socio-economic status > more trust in IOs
o More ‘green-alternative-liberal’ political values -> more trust in IOs
More global (vs national) identity -> more trust in IOs
More trust in national institutions -> more trust in IOs
interdependence, (anti)globalisation
globalization - Scholte
A process of deterritorialization whereby “social space is no longer wholly mapped in terms of territorial places, territorial distances, and territorial borders.”
anti-globalization backlash
Immigration shock (isolationism)
Financial shocks
the effect of the digital revolution on embedded liberalism - Mansfield & Rudra
capitalism
automated trading (instability)
automation of production (few jobs)
global supply chains (vulnerable)
global ecological feedback loops (insecurity)
anti-globalization in developing countries (only higher class benefits)
China shock (loss of jobs)
Ideological change
interdependence (variation in dependence) - Keohane & Nye
power shifts and the future of global governance
power shifts and international order
emerging powers and international order
Stephen
States’ behaviour is shaped by structural features of global capitalism.
When economic growth required territorial gain -> conflict over territory.
Now, economic growth via integration in the world economy -> conflict over management of the world economy.
Result: rising powers pursue hybrid order: more transnational integration + less liberal principles
Weiss & Wallace
general approach
Focus on state sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference
Enable states to protect citizens from market forces
Limit the priority of individuals rights
preferences on specific issues depend on...
Centrality: how an international issue affects regime survival
Heterogeneity: how much domestic contestation over an international issue
Domestic political interest & ideology shape China’s approach to international order.
Newman & Zala
The difficulty of adapting international order to rising powers depends on what these states are contesting & demanding.
normative contestation
representational contestation
the US challenge to international order
Ikenberry
Neoliberalism -> economic inequality -> far-right populism and nationalism, including in Western states
Crisis of liberal internationalism is due to the loss of legitimacy and social purpose within states, not to the rise of a new great power (China)
Dai
After Cold War, costs were harder to justify
US approach to international order is now more conditional
Support where US retains dominant power (IMF, NATO…)
Challenge where US has lost power (WTO, democracy promotion)
US accepted costs of liberal international order when necessary for Cold War goals
theoretical perspectives
Keohane - wise hegemons
hegemons should invest in public goods > other states fear decline of hegemon
rise and fall of powers is not destabilizing to IOs and international rules
Mearsheimer
Great powers create international rules and institutions in order to maintain or increase their share of world power.
Redistributions of power destabilise existing international rules and institutions
power transitions and the risk of war
theoretical perspectives
Mearsheimer
As other states approach ‘great power’ status, they become more aggressive
Dominant states use force to resist rising states
Anarchy -> insecurity -> all states prefer to dominate their neighbours
Allison
Conclusion: Avoiding war requires great political & psychological flexibility
Gilpin
Uneven rates of economic growth -> misfits between the distribution of power among states and the rules that govern their relations -> risk of armed conflict
Hegemonic wars are contests between dominant and rising states
Distributions of power are inherently unstable, so the international system is always changing
Rising states will challenge the existing international order when the expected benefits are greater than the expected costs
Waltz
multipolar = unstable (because alliances unclear)
bipolar = stable
nuclear weapons = low risk of war
Organski
Satisfied states don’t challenge the dominant state
Weak, unsatisfied states don’t challenge the dominant state
strong, unsatisfied states challenge the dominant state -> war
Lemke & Reed
democratic peace theory
Finding: Power transitions involving two democracies are more likely to be settled peacefully than power transitions involving other types of regimes
examples
USA - UK, peaceful
UK - germany, war
Thucydides
A dominant state (Sparta) used force against a rising state (Athens) to stop it from gaining more power