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TRANSPORTATION V: PREROGATIVES OF OWNERSHIP AND OPERATION - Coggle Diagram

- - - - D. EQUALITY OF TREATMENT
        
        EQUALITY OF TREATMENT DOES NOT MEAN EXEMPTION FROM ALL KINDS OF TAXES
        Sec. 23 is not meant to act as a blanket exemption against all kinds of taxes.
        PLDT v. Province of Laguna, G.R. No. 151899, 16 August 2005
        
        SEC. 23 DOES NOT INCLUDE RESTORATION/GRANT OF EXEMPTION FROM TAX PROVISIONS
        An equality of treatment clause, in providing that any advantage, favor, privilege, exemption, or immunity granted under existing franchise, or may hereafter be granted, shall ipso facto become part of previously granted telecommunications franchises and shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the grantees of such franchises does not include the restoration/grant of in lieu of all taxes provisions.
        PLDT v. City of Davao, G.R. No. 143867, 25 March 2003
        
        EQUALITY BY RETROACTIVITY
        Section 23. Equality of Treatment in the Telecommunications Industry. - Any advantage, favor, privilege, exemption, or immunity granted under existing franchises, or may hereafter be granted, shall ipso facto become part of previously granted telecommunications franchises and shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the grantees of such franchises:
        (Sec. 23, Rep. Act No. 7925)
        
        SHALL NEITHER APPLY TO NOR AFFECT PROVISIONS OF TELECOM FRANCHISES CONCERNING:
        
        TERRITORY
        
        LIFE SPAN
        
        TYPE OF SERVICE
        Provided, however, That the foregoing shall neither apply to nor affect provisions of telecommunications franchises concerning territory covered by the franchise, the life span of the franchise, or the type of service authorized by the franchise.
        
        NOT A BLANKET EXEMPTION AGAINST ALL KINDS OF TAXES
        Sec. 23 is not meant to act as a blanket exemption against all kinds of taxes.
        (PLDT v. Province of Laguna)
      - FIRST LICENSEE > LATER LICENSEE
        So long as the first licensee keeps and performs the terms and conditions of its license and complies with the reasonable rules and regulations of the commission AND meets the reasonable demands of the public, it has more or less of a vested and preferential right over another who seeks to acquire a later license to operate over the same route.|||
        Batangas Transport Co. v. Orlanes, G.R. No. 28865, 19 December 1928
        
        GOOD STANDING OF LICENSEE REQUIRED FOR DUTY TO PROTECT INVESTMENT
        
        COMPLIES WITH T&Cs' OF LICENSE
        
        REGULATIONS OF COMMISSION
        
        REASONABLE DEMANDS OF PUBLIC
        “The duty of the PSC to protect the investment of a public utility operator refers only to operators of good standing - those who comply with the laws, rules and regulations — and not to operators who are unconcerned with the public interest and whose investments have failed or deteriorated because of their own fault.”
        Rizal Light and Ice Co. v. Municipality of Morong, G.R. Nos. L-20993 & 21221, 28 Sept 1968
        
        PUBLIC INTEREST > PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT
        "While it is true that operators of public convenience and service deserve some protection from unnecessary or unlawful competition, the rule is that nobody has any exclusive right to secure a franchise or a certificate of public convenience.
        Above any or all considerations, the grant of franchises and certificates of public convenience and service should be guided by public service and interest; the latter are the primordial considerations to be taken into account." Clearly then, this last error assigned cannot be deemed meritorious. The correctness of the decision under review has not been successfully impugned.
        (Philippine Rabbit v. Gabatin, G.R. No. L-24472, 31 July 1968)
        
        PRIOR NEGOTIATION WITH THE CURRENT LICENSEE IS NOT MANDATORY IF NOT MANDATED BY LAW
        This is not to say, however, that the lack of prior negotiation with the existing telephone system operator renders illegal the operation by BUTELCO of a telephone system. After all, the very provision in question phrases the prior negotiation requirement in less than mandatory terms. Section 79 (b) of Executive Order No. 94, Series of 1947 provides:||| (Republic v. Republic Telephone Company, Inc., G.R. No. 64888, [November 28, 1996], 332 PHIL 789-803)
        
        FREE COMPETITION MAY ALSO BE THE ANSWER TO MUCH-DESIRED IMPROVEMENT
        "Free competition in the industry may also provide the answer to a much-desired improvement in the quality and delivery of this type of public utility, to improved technology, fast and handy mobil service, and reduced user dissatisfaction. After all, neither PLDT nor any other public utility has a constitutional right to a monopoly position in view of the Constitutional proscription that no franchise certificate or authorization shall be exclusive in character or shall last longer than fifty (50) years (ibid., Section 11; Article XIV, Section 5, 1973 Constitution; Article XIV, Section 8, 1935 Constitution)."||| (Republic v. Republic Telephone Company, Inc., G.R. No. 64888, [November 28, 1996], 332 PHIL 789-803)
        
        PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS RULE IS
        NOT ABSOLUTE
        The “protection-of-investments rule” is not absolute for nobody has exclusive right to secure a franchise or a certificate of public convenience.
        (Rizal Light and Ice Co. v. Municipality of Morong, G.R. Nos. L-20993 & 21221, 28 Sept 1968)
        
        RATIONALE:
        
        PROTECTION OF HIS INVESTMENT; AND
        
        NOT TO BE SUBJECT TO RUINOUS COMPETITION
        So long as the first licensee keeps and performs the terms and conditions of its license and complies with the reasonable rules and regulations of the commission and meets the reasonable demands of the public, it has more or less of a vested and preferential right over another who seeks to acquire a later license to operate over the same route.||| (Batangas Trans. Co. v. Orlanes, G.R. No. 28865, [December 19, 1928], 52 PHIL 455-473)
      - PSC HAS THE DUTY TO PROTECT RATHER THAN DESTROY THE INVESTMENT OF THE FIRST LICENSEE FROM LATER ONES
        The Government having taken over the control and supervision of all public utilities, so long as an operator under a prior license complies with its terms and conditions and the reasonable rules and regulations for its operation, and meets the reasonable demands of the public, it is the duty of the commission to protect rather than to destroy its investment by the granting of the second license to another person for the same thing over the same route of travel.||| (Batangas Trans. Co. v. Orlanes, G.R. No. 28865, [December 19, 1928], 52 PHIL 455-473)
    - - RATE OF RETURN IS PRESCRIBED BY ADMINISTRATIVE & JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS, NOT BY STATUTE
        a rate of return of a public utility is prescribed not by statute, but by administrative and judicial pronouncements. In this case, the SC has consistently adopted a 12% rate of return for public utilities.
        b) rate base - an evaluation of the property devoted by the utility to the public service or the value of invested capital or property which the utility is entitled to a return
        c) the return itself or the computed revenue to be earned by the public utility based on the rate of return and rate base
        Republic v. MERALCO, G.R. No. 141314, 9 April 2003
        
        RATE BASE MUST NOT BE CONFISCATORY
        The determination of what constitutes the rate base forms the basis for judging whether or not rates are confiscatory, reasonable or just.
        (NAECR v. ERC)
        
        ???
        Agan v. PIATCO, G.R. No. 155001, 5 May 2003
        
        DEPRECIATION IS SUBTRACTED FROM RATE BASE AS AN OPERATING EXPENSE
        Depreciation on plant and equipment is subtracted from the rate base and carried as an operating expense.
        The theory behind including depreciation as an expense is that capital may be accumulated for further expansion and growth.
        (NAECR v. ERC, G.R. No. 226443, 8 October 2019)
      - PSC HAS POWER TO APPROVE PROVISIONAL RATES WITHOUT A HEARING
    - - LEGISLATIVE: FIXES RATES
        
        JUDICIARY: DETERMINES WHETHER THESE ARE REASONABLE AND JUST
        While the power to fix rates is a legislative function, whether exercised by the legislature itself or delegated through an administrative agency, such as the ERC, a determination of whether the rates so fixed are reasonable and just is a purely judicial question and is subject to the review of the courts.
  - - - PRIVATE PROPERTY ALREADY DEVOTED TO PUBLIC USE CAN BE EXPROPRIATED FOR A DIFFERENT PUBLIC PURPOSE
        Private property which is already devoted to a public use can be burdened by expropriation with a different public purpose.
        
        RATIONALE: EMINENT DOMAIN NOT EXHAUSTED BY USE
        Ratio: Power of eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty which is not exhausted by use. Otherwise, promotion of public good will be frustrated.
    - - DELEGATE'S RIGHT RESTRICTIVELY LIMITED TO CONFINES OF DELEGATING LAW
        The delegate's exercise of the right of eminent domain is restrictively limited to the confines of the delegating law.
        The scope of this delegated legislative power is necessarily narrower than that of the delegating authority and may only be exercised in strict compliance with the terms of the delegating law.
        (PNOC Alternative Fuels v. NGCP)
        
        STRICTISSIMI JURIS
        "ACQUIRE SUCH PRIVATE PROPERTY" MEANS ONLY PRIVATE PROPERTY MAY BE EXPROPRIATED
        Upon a simple perusal of Section 4 of R.A. No. 9511, it states in no equivocal terms that "[t]he Grantee (referring to respondent NGCP) may acquire such private property as is actually necessary for the realization of the purposes for which this franchise is granted[.]"
        The Court has previously held that under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim, index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) "rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it differently." 43