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8) Defreezing: ghosts return (BRUBAKER) - Coggle Diagram
8) Defreezing: ghosts return (BRUBAKER)
DEFREEZING
idea, that communism when it came it froze the political situation and now, we opened the freezer and the same ghosts of WW2 will be reawakened
peaceful (CSSR, USSR) x violent (Yugoslavia) state dismemberment (BUNCE VALERIE) - more v T8 non-oblig
Yugoslavia:
1974 constitutions: decentralization republics + equality among the republics
death of Tito (1980) + intro of collective decision-making units at the centre that were based on equal votes allocated to each republic and province
confederalism: domination of republis over the centre
eco segmentation - centre eliminated as a key eco and political player
eco, political and cultural sovereignty: Yugoslav MVZ system
Serbia goal: reforming socialism, recentralizing the state, establishing "Greater Serbia"
JNA: overrepresentaion of SErbs, powerful political player, its direct representation at the highest level of teh party apparatus
Y held by TITO, PARTY, ARMY
when Tito died and party became fully republicized by the early 80s -
military was the only part that was left to defend both regime of socialism and the state of Yugoslavia
threat to army: political and eco turmoil, reduction in the military´s legitimacy and resources
Y (Serbia): rich in institutional resources
but impoverished with respect to political power - opposite in the other 2 states
large Serbian minorities in Croatia and Bosnia
= ethnic nationalism
violent bc federation long decentralized
Serbs were less powerful than their numbers (and their history) would indicate, yet
empowered at the same time by the institutions of Serbian repub
Yugoslav military domestic political actor
oppossing the dismantling of the state
CSSR+ USSR
federalism: shared power based on territorial- admin divisons
weak Russian identity
vznik institutional foundation for national identity and state tradition and kinds of instituions that served in the Slovak republic as the foundation for state building
CR: institutionally weak, politically strong
CZ goal: end socialism, establish a democratic and capitalist regime operation within the federal state
civic nationalism
they wanted either build federal system or it was out of question new states
military not involved in the state dismemberment.....
larger nation of Czechs / Russians dominant in political but deprived of institutional resources.. !!!
peaceful bc
centralized until transition
, then rapid decentralization
shared:
diverse domestic populations
territorially concentrated national minorities
federation sys during socialism
short time-frame of disintegration
limited players in each state dissolution
Re-doing Annus Mirabilis (1989)
fall of the iron curtain ? - defending our cultural heritage new walls
end of communism? - survival of the parties, secret services, nostalgia,
the end of history arrived? - questioning liberal democracy
Triumph of the west? - sceptics West, NATO, EU integration
end of dictatorship? - too much quarrel, ineffectiveness, iliberal and hybrid regimes
proof: YUGOSLAVIA war
what are the attributes/ symptoms of the political backslide in ECE?
resurfacing of depp undercurrent of the region´s political culture (precommunist politics of ECE)
rise of illiberal democracy and populism (end of 90s)
ECE: Hungary, poland + number is growing
no playing field, not fully free speech, no constitutional checks..)
resurfacing of depp undercurrent of the region´s political culture (precommunist politics of ECE)
hybrid regime (between right government and democracy)
free elections (everyone can go and vote, no falsifications of results) but not fair (freedom of speech and press limited, governing party more resources to convice people)
3 functions of EU when it comes to Hungarian regime
financial help
it constrains it - to what extent?
legitimization
ethnic-national conflicts resurface: collapse of CSR, war in Yugoslavia (Horthy and Pilsudski x Masaryk x Beneš)
BRUBAKER: National Minorities, Nationalizing States, External National HOmelans in the New EU
triangular configuration (the triadic nexus)
nationalizing state
(Croatia)
tendency to see the state as an "unrealized nation-state, as a state destined to be a nation-state
struggles: to impose and sustain a certian kind of stance vis-a-vis the state
the perception and characterization of the host state are crucial objects of struggle within the political fields of the national minority and the external national homeland
external national homeland
(Serbia)
shared nationhood makes the state responsible, in some sense, not only for its own citizens but also for ethnic conationals who live in other states and possess other citizenships
state must protect its own citizens even when they live in other states but cannot legitimately claim to protect tis ethnic conational while live in another state and hold the citizenship of that state
the idea that this shared nationhood makes the state responsible in some sense, not only for its own citizens but also for ethnic conational who live in other staes and posses other citizenship
shared nationhood across the boundaries of state and citizenship
national minority
(Serbs in croatia)
2) the demand for state recognition of this distinct ethnocultural nationality
3) assertion, on the basis of this ethnoculturalnationality, of certain collective cultural and/ or political rights (minority language, autonomy...)
1) public claim to membership of an ethnocultural nation different from the numerically or politically dominat ethnoculturalnation
if there is a bloody conlfict depends on how the borders are and where the people are
national minority which live in the newly nationalizing states xxx their national homelands external to which they belong
napr. Poles in Lithuania, 3 million of ethnic Hungarians in Romania,Slovakia, Ukraine and Serbia..
nationalization of political space = left tens o millions of people outside their own national territory
not given by the facts of ethnic demography
- dynamic political stance, family of related yet mutually completion stances, not a static condition
Russians in Ukraine - no clear boundaries how to differentiate these 2 gropus (different competetive positions of stances...)
state becomes
external national homeland
for its
ethnic diaspora
when political or cultural elites define ethnonational kin in other states as member of the same nation - cliaming that they belong to the state
relation between national minority, nationalizing states and external national homeland - relation between relational fields - closely intertwined with relations internal to the sconstitutive of the fields
actors in each field closely and continuously monitor relations and actions in each of the other two fields
YUGOSLAVIA CASE
1st phase view in US press:
dyadic struggle
(Serbia determined to reaasert centralized control over Y as a whole xxx Slovenia+Croatia seeking autonomy and ultimately independece)
CROATIAN conflict: TRIADIC: tension fraught between an incipient national minority (Serbs in Croatia), an incipient nationaizing state (Croatia) and an incipient external national homeland (Serbia)
1987: Miloševic leader of the Serbian Communist Party (nationalist rhetoric)
efforts to mobilize the Serb minority in Croatia depended on efforts to represent Croatia as a dangerously nationalizing state, while nationalizing elites in Croatia sought to represent the mobilizing Serb minority as disloyal and Serbia as an irredentist homeland
resurgent Croatian nationalism (late 80s) = deep historical roots
proccess in which representation of Croatia as a dangerously nationalizing, even profascist state = took root and became hegemonic among serbs in certain parts of Croatia´s ethnic borderlands
efforts to nationalist radicals in Serbia to mobilize grievances and fears among Croatian Serbs - important part of the process
Serbian homeland politics centered initially on Kosovo
among villages: Serbs incipient Croatian natioanlizing state interpreted through the prism of wartime trauma, generated intransigent opposition to Croatian independence
Kosovo pormoted near-republic status in 1974
gradual albanization: viewed by Serbs intellectuals as a quiet secession that had in practice stripped Serbia of its historic heartland
problem: "small Serbia" and a large Serb community in Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires issue before WW1:
Serbs viewed teh Yugosalve state as a whole as their own
nationalization of constituent units of Yugosalvia and USSR eroded Serbs and Russians sens of being at home throughout the sstate
Slovenia, Croatia and later BaH moved towards independence
Serbian homeland politics with Miloševic in charge
focused increasingly on Serbs minorities in Croatia and Bosnia
used narratives of victimization by linking the past with the present and projecting onto the future
after election of Tudjmn threat was seen in Croatia
C claimed its self-determination and sovereign statehood
clash with Serbs: also wanted self determination
Serbian claims to speak for Croatian Serbs by challenging Croatian sovereignty and reinforcing representation and fears of aggressive Serb hegemony - pushed Croatian Politics towards full independence
SERBIA
Aug 90: holding a referendum on autonomy for Croatian Serbs despite its prohibition by Croatian authorities
Dec 1990: establishment of Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina
July 1990: SErbian National Council
Feb 91: proclaiming regions separation from Croatia
occupied nearly 1/3 of Croatian terriotry
3 general features of the relational nexus
close interdependence of relations within and between fields
the responsive and interactive character of the triadic relational interplay between the fields
the amidated character of this responsive interplay
n
ational question once again in vogue:
multinational states (CSSR?, USSR, Yugoslavia) disappered = * new nation states