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Democracy Studies, Democratization Theories, Institutional design and…

- - - - citizens ask for more freedom and opportunities of participation
      - more emancipatory values (‘self-realization’)
      - elites are also more pro-democratic
      - more individual resources
      - democratic institutions
  - - - Stability of new democracies is conditional on development
      - No county above a GDP per capita of 6000$ has ever transformed back to autocracy
      - Transformation to democracy is result of exogenous event (no impact of economic development)
    - - Development Important indicator prior to 1950
      - Economic development causes and sustains democracy
  - - - a larger middle class
      - improved information and communication technologies
      - higher levels of education
      - higher levels of urbanization
- - - - organized opposition
      - moderate camp of opposition stronger than radical camp
      - softliner can convince / or stronger than / hardliner
      - pact between softliner and moderate opposition
      - old regime needs to be divided (hardliner and softliner)
- - - - Political change: from one-party rule to democratization
      - Economic change: from centrally planned economy to market economy (privatization!)
      - State reforms: National states (conflicts over borders, see e.g. Crimea) and citizenship
    - - More to lose (high stakes)
      - High uncertainty about consequence of concessions in one area on the other area
- - - - End on time, 5 minute break (B)
      - End on time, no break (C)
      - End 15 minutes early, no break (A)
    - - No reduction in lecture time (ambitous): C > B > A
      - Break is important: B > A > C
      - Make it to next lecture: A > C > B
    - - A versus C – 2:1 – A winner
      - B versus C – 1:2 – C winner
      - A versus B – 1:2 – B winner
  - - - Congruence of preferences and policies
      - However, problem of aggregation (Condorcet Paradox)
      - Representing the interests and preferences of citizens and turning them into policy
    - - increases political legitimacy
      - Particularly important:
        
        if high political distrust (e.g. ethnic conflicts)
        
        uncrystallized interests
      - Several empirical studies show positive relationship with substantive representation
        
        or worker’s rights (O’Grady 2019)
        
        e.g. LGBT rights (Reynolds 2013)
- - - - List PR: open versus closed
      - District magnitude (the higher, the more proportional)
      - Proportional share in multimember districts
      - Electoral threshold (the lower, the more proportional)
    - - Most common: single-member district plurality (SMDP)
      - Majority (usually two rounds) versus plurality
      - Candidate with the most votes wins
  - - - representative agents of all factions in the society
      - Diffusion of power
      - All citizens preferences should be taken into account in policy-making procedure
    - - Clarity of responsibility is crucial
      - Office holders are able to make and implement policies
      - Elections are about reward and punish
      - Concentration of power
  - - - representation
      - accountability
- - - - Majoritarian electoral system (M) ! two-party system
      - Proportional electoral system (PR) ! multi-party system
      - Two mechanisms of Duverger’s law
        
        Mechanical effects:
        
        Majoritarian: Only parties that are the strongest party in a voting district win a seat. Second, third or fourth strongest parties receive no seats.
        
        PR: Proportional distribution of seats to all parties according to their vote share
        
        Psychological effects:
        
        Strategic voting: Voters do not vote for smaller parties in majoritarian systems (‘wasted vote’)
        
        Strategic entry: Low incentives for small or new parties to compete (alone) in majoritarian system
      - In reality, majoritarian systems rarely leads to two-party system (except US)
      - E.g. in the UK we have more than two parties in parliament
        
        Conservatives, Labour, Scottish National Party, Liberal Democrats, and some other regionalist parties
      - Reason: Unequal regional distribution of preferences
  - - - Electoral systems can have influence on democratic stability (electoral engineering)
      - Is a majoritarian or a proportional system better to mitigate conflicts?
      - Democratic institutions need to mitigate societal conflicts
    - - Accountability
        
        Low clarity of responsibility in PR
        
        Low possibility of punishing incumbents in PR
        
        PR leads to coalition governments
      - (Polarization): see last session
        
        PR systems bring extreme parties into government
        
        Majoritarian systems provide incentive for centrist positioning
        
        PR makes representation of extreme parties easier
        
        Empirically
        
        Cases of high polarization: US and UK
        
        Majoritarian systems are zero-sum games: higher affective polarization?
        
        Multitude of other institutions that matter
        
        Societal context crucial
      - Representation
        
        Majoritarian systems produce zero-sum and us-against-them logic
        
        Crucial question of geographic distribution (e.g. SNP in the UK)
        
        PR allows small groups/interests to be represented
- - - - Gives you the definition of the meaning of the word
      - According to Merriam Webster Dictionary: a dictionary provides lexical information - it tells you what a word cat means, not all there ist to know about cats
      - Democracy: Government by the people, that form of government in which the sovereign power resides in the people as a whole, and is exercised either directly by them or by officers elected by them. In mod. use often more vaguely denoting a social state in which all have equal rights, without hereditary or arbitrary differences of rank or privilege
    - - Normative
        
        How should something be?
        
        What shall we do and how shall we arrange our lives (Weber 1919)
        
        What should fair distribution look like? What is just war?
      - Positive
        
        What are the constitutive elements of something?
        
        Regularities, cause and effect of relations?
        
        What is a revolution?
    - - Necessary
        
        A condition that needs to be present for an outcome to be present (Clouds are necessary condition for rain)
      - Sufficient
        
        When a condition is present, the outcome is necessarily present too (Rain is sufficient for a wet ground)
- - - - Not a historically concrete state
      - Logical derivative to explain function and legitimacy of the state
      - What would life be like without a state?
      - Hobbes: war of every man against every man in which life is solitary, nasty, brutish and short
      - Why?
        
        State without a higher power
        
        Every man is strong enough to (at least in alliance) kill any other man
        
        Conflict over resources is inevitable
        
        Attack becomes rational (!) way of defense
        
        State of nature formalized as Prisoners Dilemma game
    - - Solution: contract of everyone with everyone
      - State guarantees security and order
      - The sovereign is outside of this contract in order to secure it
      - In the case of Hobbes: Justification of absolute monarchy
    - - John Locke
        
        State of nature does not equal state of war
        
        Already existing laws and especially property
        
        Legitimacy of state is baed on political community. Certain right are beyond the reach of the state
      - Jean Jacques Rousseau
        
        State of nature is the state of freedom
        
        State is only legitimate when political decisions represent volonte generale
        
        State form should be democratic and the representation of the volonte generale unmediated
- - - - Competion for votes
      - Elections
      - Necessary condition?
      - Clearly not sufficient (almost all countries worldwide have elections)
  - - - formulate preferences
        
        Freedom of expression
        
        The right to vote
        
        Eligibility for public office
        
        The right of political leaders to compete for support
        
        Alternative sources of information
        
        Freedom to form and join organizations
      - express preferences
        
        Free and fair elections
      - Reflect in government's action
        
        Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preferences
      - Participation
        
        Who gets to participate in the democratic process?
        
        Eg voting right restrictions
      - Contestation
        
        How strong is the influence of elections on government?
        
        Is leadership challenged through competition?
        
        Eg is the government determined through elections?
  - - - Electoral regime
        
        Elected officials
        
        Inclusive suffrage
        
        Right to candidacy
        
        Correctly organized, free and fair elections
      - Political rights
        
        Press freedom
        
        Freedom of association
    - - Civil rights
        
        Individual liberties from violations of own rights by state / private agents
        
        Equality before the law
      - Horizontal accountability
        
        Horizontal separation of powers
    - - Effective power to rule
        
        Eelected officials with the effective right to rule
  - - - Direct democracy should complement elections
    - - Quality of democracy depends upon process of preference formation (mini-publics)
    - - Do all citizens - independent from their socioeconomic resources - have the same possibilities to participate in democratic processes?
- - - - No transparency about coding
      - Some political bias towards US allies
  - - - Autocracies (-10 to -6)
      - Anocracies (-5 to + 5)
      - Democracies (+6 to +10)
    - - Executive recruitment
        
        Regulation of chief executive recruitment, competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment
      - Independence of executive authority
      - Political Competition and Opposition
        
        Regulation of participation, competitiveness of participation
    - - Participation (one of Dahls dimension) is missing, i.e. expansion of suffrage has no impact on democratic quality
      - No liberal components such as checks and balances, rule of law, independent judiciary, etc.
      - As a consequence, Hungry and Poland have still the highest score
- - - - mainly happens in democracies
      - slow and gradual
      - legal and democratically legitimated
        
        Democratically elected government
        
        Change of constitution or implementation of law
        
        approved by majority in parliament (e.g. Hungary and Poland)
        
        approved by referendum (e.g. Turkey or Venezuela)
    - - Example: Democratic erosion in Hungary
        
        Fidesz (Orban’s party) has had 2/3rd majority in parliament
        
        New constitution and new legislation that consolidates Fidesz powerful position
        
        change in electoral system (more majoritarian, re-drawing constituencies)
        
        appointment of Fidesz-close persons in key positions of administration
        
        more control of public media, electoral commission, etc. by government
        
        Example: Reducing retirement age for judges
        
        Use of monetary incentives to weaken opposition
        
        Orban allies buy private media outlets
        
        Centrally-controlled corruption which benefits Orban’s allies in private industry
- - - - whether democratic norms are respected
      - whether parties and politicians act as gatekeeper
  - - - US: Change from convention system to primaries (example of Henry Ford, 1923)
      - Europe: party-internal decision, however, polls play increasingly important role
      - Party-internal selection (‘keep demagogues out’)
      - Trade-off between democratically selection candidates and gatekeeping
    - - cooperation of democratic parties with authoritarian leader/party
        
        government coalition
        
        electoral alliances
        
        Examples: Mussolini in Italy, Hitler in Germany supported by other center-right parties
      - Reasons for fateful alliances
        
        Preventing left-wing (or right-wing in case of left authoritarian figure) government
        
        False impression of ‘control
      - Examples of democratic alliances against authoritarian leaders
        
        Belgium 1936: Catholic party decided to join forces with their rivals - the Socialists and Liberals - to prevent a government with the fascist Rex Party
        
        Austria 2019: All parties supported the green candidate Alexander van der Bellen who competed against Norbert Hofer from the populist radical right party (FPÖ)
- - - - ‘an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté generale (general will) of the people.’
    - - people-centrism
      - reference to the ‘general will
      - anti-establishment rhetoric
    - - more forms of direct participation
      - implementation of majoritarian decision
      - higher voter mobilization
    - - e.g. freedom of press
        
        freedom of association
        
        other political rights
  - - - Voter polarization: Amount of ideological overlap of distributions of party electorates
        
        very likely reinforces negative effects of party polarization
        
        can (together with party polarization) lead to affective polarization
        (Gidron et al. 2020; Reijlan 2020)
        
        Why can it be a challenge to democracy?
      - Affective polarization: Intensity of partisan animosity
        
        voters do not perceive the disliked party and its voters as legitimate actor
        
        voters might be more willing to accept democratic violations (Svolik 2019)
        
        Why can affective polarization be a challenge to democracy?
        
        General remark: relationship between (different types) of polarization and democratic backsliding is ongoing research (still more empirical work needed!)
      - Party polarization: Average ideological distance between parties
        
        Why can it be a challenge to democracy?
        
        opponents more likely to be seen as threat
        
        centrifugal competition, i.e. reinforcement of polarization (Sartori 1976)
        
        government formation becomes more difficult (higher concessions
        necessary)
        
        e.g. Sartori 1967 discusses the Weimar Republic of an example where polarization leads to the collapse of the system
  - - - Lower party identification
      - Lower party membership
      - Higher electoral volatility (= higher shifts in party support)
      - Lower political trust
    - - Individualization
      - Information through mass media (and now social media)
    - - Opportunity to open up political space (new ideas, new issues, etc.)
      - Populist parties and polarization, however, become more likely
- - - - (A): occupant of a public office
      - (B): intended beneficiary of that office (‘the public’)
      - (C): actual beneficiary of the particular exercise of that office
    - - (B): the public that should benefit from safe streets
      - (C): the bribing person who does not have to pay the fine
      - (A): Police officer
    - - political offices (executive and legislative)
      - judges (judicative)
      - civil servants (executive)
      - managers/employers at state-related companies
    - - for oneself or for family members, friends, party, etc
      - ideological reasons, or e.g. disagreement with the speeding law, is not corruption
      - money, job, status, etc
    - - Petty corruption: lower-ranked public officials (police, hospitals, local level, etc.) with smaller private gains
      - Grand corruption: higher-ranked public officials (ministers, MPs, etc.) with large(r) private gains
  - - - Example: social benefits for a vote
      - Nepotism: hiring friends and family members in public administration
      - Clientelism: ‘the trade of votes and other types of partisan support in exchange for public decisions with divisible benefits’ (Piattoni 2001: 4)
      - Patronage: exchange of jobs in public administration for favors
  - - - ‘When implementing laws and policies, government officials shall not take into consideration anything about the citizen/case that is not beforehand stipulated in the policy or the law’
    - - e.g. Singapore is not democratic but has a high QoG
      - democratization often leads to lower QoG at the beginning, but higher QoG later on (u-turn)
      - effect of democracy on QoG is empirically mixed
    - - Patronage
      - Clientelism
      - Nepotism
  - - - experts such as NGOs or development bank
      - business executives
      - citizens
      - Problems: not clear if all have the same understanding of corruption
    - - business
      - Problem: focus on particular type of corruption (citizens: petty corruption; businesses: public procurement, business sector)
      - citizens (focus on petty corruption)
    - - transparency rules
      - anti-corruption body
      - focus on anti-corruption legislation
      - Problem: says nothing about whether these rules matter in reality
    - - quality of life
      - Problem: not sure if corruption or other factors influence these indicators
      - quality of public service
    - - Widely used indicator: Corruption Perception Index
      - Yearly expert assessment of different experts
- - - - Executive: To maintain the legitimacy for collective action, the executive has to act in line with the public interest as defined by the law
      - Judiciary: To keep the defined laws meaningful, the judiciary has to guarantee equality before the law
      - Legislative: To maintain legitimacy for law-making power, the legislative has to be responsiveness to voters (and not money or power)
      - He expands it to non-state domains (media, civil society, markets), however, this is disputed (see e.g. Rothstein 2011)
- - - - stable cabinets
      - lower effective number of parties
      - majoritarian governments
      - (weak influence of opposition parties in parliament)
  - - - blame politicians for it
        
        potential group or partisan biases prevent blame attribution
        
        frequent corruption allegations might reduce credibility of claims
      - and adjust their voting behavior (4. politicians must react to it and behave less corrupt)
        
        trade-off with performance in other areas (e.g. economic growth, crisis management, etc.)
        
        lack of ‘clean’ alternative
        
        trade-off with ideological proximity
      - Voters must know about corruption
        
        media coverage
        
        political campaigns on corruption
        
        personal experience (e.g. bribery in public health sector, administration, etc.)
    - - Central and Easter Europe has high levels of corruption
        
        Petty corruption has been reduced in many countries
        
        Grand corruption remains a problem (recurrent scandals)
      - As a result, trust in politicians is very low
      - Corruption is a popular topic in elections
    - - This is not what we usually observe, as often these anti-corruption parties are involved in corruption scandals themselves a few years later
      - Example of Bulgaria
        
        2001: New party formed by King Simeon II (who lived in exile) won elections by promising clean politics
        
        2009: New party formed by Boris Borisov won elections by promising to reduce crime (reference to mafia)
        
        2019: New party Who Owns The State wants to get rid of Borisov because of corruption and mafia scandals
      - Never-ending story of new party success and the politicization of
        corruption
      - I.e. voters hold politicians accountable, but it does (often) not reduce the problem of corruption
      - Long-term consequences for democracy?
  - - - meritocratic recruitment reduces corruption
      - (fiscal) size of government (direction of relationship unclear)
- - - - Votes vs. turnout buying
      - Vote-rich but resource-poor constituencies
        
        Preferential access to (quasi-)public employment
        
        Consumer goods
        
        Social benefits
      - Resource-rich but vote-poor constituencies
        
        public procurement contracts
        
        regulatory proceedings and rulings
  - - - Politicians hold voters accountable
      - Reward depends on political support
      - Result: Voters trade (potential) long-term benefits with short-term
        benefits
    - - Key role of brokers (intermediaries between voters and politicians) of poor neighborhoods
      - Representatives for their constituencies and bargaining power
      - Empirical evidence for improvement of living standard in poor
        communities (e.g. in Indian Slums)
    - - centralized clientelist network (relational clientelism)
      - decentralized clientelist network (‘single-shot’ clientelism)
- - - - nor in political program
      - provides political leader that promises better future to all (currency = faith)
      - neither invest in party organization
  - - - in party organization
      - but not coherent political programs
    - - ‘the trade of votes and other types of partisan support in exchange for public decisions with divisible benefits’
    - - Social benefits
      - Public procurement contracts
      - Preferential access to (quasi-)public employment
      - Regulatory proceedings and rulings
      - Consumer goods
    - - procedure (= exchange of political support with benefits)
        
        or without oversight, but potential threat in case of non-compliance
        
        with oversight
      - not the outcome: collective versus club goods
    - - provision of collective and common goods for society
      - but also, club goods for their supporters (Wahlgeschenk, pork barrel)
  - - - political program
      - party organization
    - - salience of different issues (or dimensions)
      - issue ownership
      - valence issues (i.e. corruption, etc.)
  - - - Coherent political programs (ideologies) rely on universalistic principles (socialism, liberalism, etc.)
      - Clientelism relies on the opposite, namely particularistic interests
      - Example: ‘Parteibuchwirtschaft’ of Austrian SPÖ vs. socialism
    - - The latter require a stronger party organization
      - Party organization = distribution of power (leadership dilemma)
  - - - reducing voting costs for voters
      - pooling resources for candidates
    - - ideological dimensions reduce complexity
      - solves social choice problem for voters
- - - - Poor people
        
        higher risk aversion
        
        Short-term benefits > long-term benefits
      - Strong middle class
        
        higher costs for benefits
        
        higher opportunity costs of social monitoring (control)
      - Parties that address poor constituencies are more clientelist
      - Higher clientelism in poor countries
    - - Presidentialism
        
        more personalized, less programmatic competition
        
        Higher independence of MPs with own constituency
      - Professionalized civil service
        
        at the time of universal suffrage -> programmatic
        
        later -> clientelism
      - Personalist electoral systems (open list or majoritarian system)
      - Legal rules and ballot system
    - - Liberalism, Socialism, Left-libertarian -> universalist claims ->
        programmatic claims
      - Ethno-cultural ideologies (ethnic, religious, regional, etc.) -> particularist claims -> clientelism
- - - - but democracy is more robust to external shocks (i.e. economic or political crises)
      - autocratization has different origins than the authoritarian past (new challenges that makes democratic actors undemocratic)
    - - State (i.e. monopoly of legitimate force)
      - Free and contested elections (i.e. Dahl’s Polyarchy)
      - Actors respect the democratic rules
  - - - At the beginning of democratic consolidation
      - Key political institutions (executive, legislative, judiciary, electoral system, etc.) are
        
        defined (de jure)
        
        guaranteed (rule of law and independent judiciary)
        
        and respected (de facto)
      - BTI Index siehe VL
    - - Political parties and interest groups are consolidated actors
      - Fulfill function to organize political conflicts
      - BTI Index: to what extent
        
        is there a stable and socially rooted party system able to articulate and aggregate societal interests?
        
        programmatic competition, low fragmentation, low polarization, low volatility
        
        is there a network of cooperative associations or interest groups to mediate between society and the political system?
        
        broad range of different organizations, no power concentration, cooperation
    - - Potential veto players (military, entrepreneurs oligarchs, organized crime) pose no threat to democracy
        
        either acceptance of rules
        
        or no influence on government
      - BTI Index: To what extent. . .
        
        do democratically elected political representatives have the effective power to govern, or to what extent are there veto powers and political enclaves?
    - - Citizens support democratic values
      - Political and social trust
      - BTI Index: To what extent. . .
        
        How strong is the citizens’ approval of democratic norms and procedures?
        
        have social self-organization and the construction of social capital advanced?
  - - - Consolidated democracies in 2005: Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia
        
        Since then: No more consolidated democracies, but Poland and Hungary backslided
      - Semi-consolidated democracies in 2005: Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Macedonia
        
        Since then: Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia backslided
- - - - Degree of urbanization
      - Economic development
      - Education
  - - - Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and USSR
      - National states with predefined borders
    - - Patrimonial communist countries (= agrarian societies) relied less on a strong bureaucracy than. . .
      - industrialized states with a stronger working and middle class
  - - - Examples: Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine
      - agrarian societies
      - weak middle class and weak working class
      - regime relied mainly on patrimonial and clientelist networks
      - weak bureaucracy, i.e. state reforms necessary during transition
      - weak middle class (‘Bildungsbuergertum’, Ekiert 2010)
      - no strong opposition during transition (unorganized middle class with no experience)
      - socialists remained in power
      - state capture (Grzymala-Busse 2006) and weak democratic institution
    - - Examples: Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic
      - strong working class and middle class
      - regime relied on a strong state apparatus
      - large protests of middle class & workers
      - socialists ousted from power
    - - regime relied on concessions to middle class
      - organized opposition from middle class
      - strong middle class (with democratic experience during interwar period)
      - negotiation of transition
      - Example: Hungary, Slovenia, Poland
      - socialists lost in elections
- - - - Economic benefits
        
        Increased investment & growth
        
        Transfer from EU budget
        
        Increased entrepreneurship & skills
        
        Access to EU market
      - Political benefits
        
        EU membership as catalyst for domestic reform process
        
        Protection of EU rules
        
        Voice in EU decision-making
  - - - These conditions need to be fulfilled before the country becomes an official EU candidate and start negotiations
      - EU accession negotiations: Preparation for implementing all EU laws (“acquis communitaire”) from about 30 chapters
      - Conditionality had effect on reform processes by national governments
        
        Credible commitment: high costs for new government to change direction of reforms (loss of credibility)
        
        Conditionality: many political and economic reforms that helped
        democratic consolidation
        
        Asymmetric power relation: EU much more powerful
  - - - Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, North Macedonia
      - Turkey
    - - Backsliding tendencies in the Western Balkans
      - EU lost normative power due to democratic backsliding in member states
      - No consensus among EU member states about enlargement
        
        Some member states veto membership of single countries (e.g. Bulgaria currently vetoes North Macedonia)
        
        France wants EU-internal reforms
  - - - Some parties experienced strong electoral losses (e.g. HZDS in Slovakia 1998)
      - Most parties adopted a pro-reform agenda (pro-democratic, progressive, and pro-market)
- - - - Numerical rules
      - Qualitative rules
    - - Left-right category
      - Ideological dimensions
      - Party families
    - - We count a party, when it has either
        
        Coalition potential, or
        
        Blackmailing potential (veto power)
    - - The (non-)existence of particular party families are one way to look at party systems (von Beyme 2000)
      - Party families
        
        siehe Liste VL
      - We can also classify party systems according to the ideologies that parties represent
  - - - Western Europe
      - historical processes restructured society and created new cleavages
        
        State formation and nation-building
        
        Industrial revolution
    - - Cleavage theory (historical events matter) more likely
      - However, other aspects (party characteristics, volatility, etc.) matter as well
      - Cleavages less often, because very context-specific
  - - - Participation in elections
      - Political positions in different political areas
      - Permanent organizational structures
    - - Switzerland: no official criteria (‘Verein’)
      - In many European countries: registration of political parties with additional requirements (signatures, etc.)
    - - Parties can have different objectives (Strøm 1990)
        
        Vote-seeking
        
        Policy-seeking
        
        Office-seeking
    - - Linkage
        
        Link between society and state
        
        Vertical network: regional parties ! national parties ! parliament/government
        
        Horizontal network: link between interest groups, media, social movements, and the state
      - Representation
        
        aggregation of interests
        
        articulation of interest
        
        selection of interests
      - Legitimization
        
        Justify and explain political decisions to citizens
        
        Be accountable towards citizens
      - Recruitment
        
        Political personnel for political offices
        
        ‘Training’ of (junior) politicians
      - Control
        
        Constraining power of other parties
        
        Control other parties
  - - - GAL: Green-Alternative-Libertarian
      - TAN: Traditionalist-Authoritarian-Nationalist
    - - Socio-structral characteristics of the divide
      - Social identity
      - Party organizations that represent the divide
- - - - Origins in the National Assembly after the French Revolution
        
        Progressive had their seats on the ‘left’ side
        
        Conservatives on the ‘right’ side
      - E.g. before the emergence of the social democrats, liberals were
        considered ‘left’
      - Continuous scale or dichotomous category
    - - Bobbio 1994:
        
        Left parties: all persons are equal and inequality needs justification
        
        Right parties: inequality is justified (economically or traditionally)
- - - - Economy: support transition to capitalism, or oppose it
      - Democracy: support transition to liberal democracy, or oppose it
    - - Western Europe (early 20th century)
        
        Status quo = capitalism
        
        Change = expansion of universal suffrage and workers’ rights (represented by social democrats)
      - However, Western Europe during democratic revolutions
        
        Status quo = feudalism
        
        Change = economic freedom and democracy (represented by liberals)
        
        Structure similar to post-communsit Europe
      - Post-communist countries:
        
        Status quo = communism
        
        Change = democracy and capitalism
    - - more similar to Western Europe (Slovenia)
      - more diverse (Czechia, Poland)
      - the structure of party system stayed the same (Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia)
    - - Left parties = roots in the communist party are considered left
      - Right parties = roots in the pro-democratic movement are considered right
      - No easy answer
      - However many new parties with no links, it depends on
        
        party positions
        
        how the main axis of competition runs
        
        where the post-communist party is located
- - - - Input legitimacy
        
        Democratic procedures that link citizens preferences with political decisions
        
        ‘Government by and of the people’
      - Output legitimacy
        
        production of effective outcomes
        
        ‘Government for the people’
      - (Throughput legitimacy, Schmidt 2020)
        
        Between input and output
        
        Quality of government that guarantees transparency and accountability in the policy-making process
        
        The ‘black box’ between the government ‘by the people’ and ‘for the people’
    - - Reasons for low legitimacy (Kriesi 2013): type and normative basis
      - Procedural (input) legitimacy I:
        
        Low quality of democracy correlates with low satisfaction with democracy (Ferrin and Kriesi 2016)
        
        Low subjective representation correlates with low satisfaction with
        democracy (Dahlberg et al. 2013)
      - Procedural (output) legitimacy II:
        
        Low quality of governance correlates with low satisfaction with democracy (Norris 2011)
        
        Corruption correlates with low satisfaction with democracy (Dahlberg et al. 2011)
      - Partisan (output) legitimacy:
        
        Winner-loser gap in satisfaction with democracy (Linde and Ekman 2003)
        
        Generally, gap is larger in younger democracies (long line, Dahlberg and Linde 2016)
        
        The reason for this difference: winner-loser gap is not independent from input legitimacy (Dahlberg and Linde 2016)
      - Outcome (output) legitimacy:
        
        Satisfaction with life and satisfaction with democracy (Norris 2011)
- - - - lower levels of political trust (van der Brug et al. 2005)
      - lower levels of democratic satisfaction (Bowler et al. 2017)
    - - they would prefer more participatory democracy
      - and less liberal democracy
    - - Voters of populist radical right parties are not in favor of more DD (Bowler et al. 2017)
      - Citizens with populist attitudes (anti-elite and people-centered attitudes) are in favor of more DD (Mohrenberg et al. 2019)
      - Mixed evidence
  - - - Participatory democracy
        
        More direct democracy
        
        This might come at the cost of less liberal democracy
      - Egalitarian democracy
        
        equal resources to participate
        
        social rights and low social inequality
      - Liberal democracy
        
        Polyarchy + civil liberties + rule of law + horizontal accountability
- - - - Military dictatorship (Napoleon, Latin America in 19. 20. century)
      - Ideological one-party state (fascist, communist and other regimes)
      - Democratically disguised democracies (democratic facade, not the same as competitive authoritarianism!)
  - - - Personal rule
        
        Dictatorial monarchs (ruling monarchs, eg monarchies in Arab world)
        
        Monarchial dictators (solely ruling leaders, eg Mao Zedong)
      - Military rule
      - One-party rule
        
        Fascist (Mussolini, Hitler)
        
        Communist
        
        Non-western world
    - - Totalitarianism
      - Authoritarianism
      - Hybrid Systems
      - Democracy
  - - - Ideology
      - Single party (one leader)
      - Terroristic police
      - Communication monopoly
      - Weapons monopoly
      - Centrally-directed economy
  - - - siehe Tabell VL
- - - - Main opposition leader in Russia
      - August 2020: Poisoned in Siberia, hospital in Berlin
      - January 2021: Arrested when arriving back in Moscow
  - - - electoral reform which benefits Fidesz (gerrymandering)
      - almost no independent media
      - corruption and clientelism
      - judiciary is only partly free
      - restrictions for civil societies and NGOs