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Secuirty in V2X - Coggle Diagram

- - - - Security in Hybrid Vehicular Communication based on ITS-G5, LTE-V, and Mobile Edge Computing
        
        4 different communication channels
        1) via ITS-G5
        2)via C-V2X on PC5 for autonomous non-operator managed" and "operator managed"
        3) Using C-V2X via Uu inteface
        4) via cell tower using MEC
        
        Key threats: 1) denial of transmission and reception, 2) modification and deletion of i nformation, 3) masquerade of a station, and 4) acquisition of personal information
        
        Requirements
        Must: 1) data integrity 2) sender authentication and authorsiation, 3) replay protectly 4) availability
        For some use cases 5) confidentiality, 6) accountability
        
        Must: (Data) integrity
        
        Message/data integrity has to be ensured to detect manipulations on message made by attackers.
        
        System and software integrity has to be ensured in order to protect keys, certificates, and configurations agains manipulations
        
        Must: Authentication and authorisation
        of senders shall be ensured to allow only trusted systems to participate activity in C-ITS communications. The provision of authentications and authorization shall be revocable to exclude systems from C-ITS if necessary.
        
        Must: Replay protection
        Replay of valide messages has to be deleted
        
        Must: Availability
        Availability of C-ITS services should not be preved by malicious activity
        
        Should: Confidentiality
        Confidentiality of V2X message content is required if a C-ITS service shall only be used by selected authorized stations. Sensitive data such as symmetric and private keys in trasition and at rest shall not be exposed to external entities. Credentials for cellular network access shall reside on the Unviersal Integrated-Circuite Card (UICC)
        
        Privacy protection
        Privacity protection is required in order to prevent ITS-internal or externa entities to collect personal identifying information. Neither a network operator nor security infrastructure operator shall be able to l ink a pseudonymous identifier of a C-ITS sation to its long-term ID. Furthermore it shall not be possible to link different pseudonyms to the same owner. Attacker shall not be able to track a vehicle by collectiving v2X messages from the wirless radio.
        
        Detection of malicious station behavior shall be considred in order to achieve trust and confidence in V2X messages on top of cryptographic authenticiation measures.
        
        Existing security concepts
        
        Security for the direct V2X communication (ITS-G5, PC5)
        
        European C-ITS Certificate Policy (C-ITS CP)
        
        1) Each C-ITS station owns at leas on asymmetric key pair whereby the public key is part of a certificate, which is sighed by trusted Certificate Authority that is par to of Public Key infrastructure
        2) For securing a V2X message, the sender is signing the message payload with its private key and transmits the signed message together with its certificate.
        3) Eech receiver is then able to trust in the integrity of the message by verifying the message signature and is able to trust in the authentification of the originator by verifying the signature of the sender's certification.
        
        Root CA is the trust anchor of the system. Since there might be a severl RCAs in C-ITS, a Trust List Manager (TLS) creates and distributes a signed Certificate Trust List (CTL) containing root certificates of trusted RCAs as well as access information to contact the RCAs from the end entities.
        2) EAch station needs to registed in one Enrolment Authority (EA) in order to get a valid pseudonym certificate for the V2X communication in form of an Authorisation Ticket (AT)
        3) For private C-ITS Stations the EA and AA need to operated by different organisations in order to protect the station's privacy.
        4) The AA gets request for a new AT but is not able to identify the requesters identity because the signer of the AT request can only be decrypted by the EA.
        5) After issueing an AT certificate, the EA only know that a specific trusted station has requested an AT but it has never seen any content of the AT. On the other hand, the AA has issued the AT without having seen the identity of the requester.
        
        Security in 5G
        
        1) Network access security
        2) Network domain security
        3) User domain security
        4) Application domain security
        5) SBA (Service based API) domain security (Unique in 5G)
        6) Visibility and configurability of security
        
        Network access security
        
        Network access security includes mutual authentication (between user and the network) as well as privacy features.
        2) protection of signaling traffic and use plane traffic in the access is also included. this protection provide confidentiality and/or integrity of traffic.
        
        Network access security generally has access/technology specific components (different solutions for different technologies). With 5GS, a large degree of harmonisation has been done e.g., to use common access authentication. The system now allows authentication over NAS to be used over both 3GPP and non-3GPP access technologies.
        
        ARPF (Authentication credential Repository and Precessing Function): The ARPF contians the subsriber's credentials (long-term key(s)), and the subsription identifier SUPI. ARPF servicesare provided via the UDM, and no open interface is defined between UDM and ARPF.
        AUSF (AUthenticaiton SErver Function): the AUSF is defined as a standalong NF in the 5GC, located in the subsriber(s home network. It is responsible for handling the authenticiation in home network based on information received from UE and UDM/ARPF.
        SEAF (SEcurity Anchor Function): the SEAF is functionality provided by the AMF and is responsible for handling the authentication in the serving (visited) network, based on informaiton received fro mthe UE and AUSF.
        4) SIDF (Subscription Identfier De-concealing Function): The SIDF is a service offered by the UDM NF in the home network. It is responsible for reslving the SUPI from the SUCI.
        
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        Network domain security
        
        Mobile network contains many network functions (NFs). Network domain security is to allow these functions to security exchange data and protect agains attacks on the network between NFs, both between NFs within a PLMN and indifferent PLMNs.
        
        1) When a NF service consumer wants to access a service provided by a NF service provider, there is support in 5GS to authenticate and authorize the consumer before granding access to the NF servcie.
        2)These features are optional withing a PLMN and an operator may decide to instead rely e.g., on physical sercurity.
        
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        Servcie based interfaces between PLMNs in roaming
        
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        Network domain security for IP based communication (NDS/IP)
        
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        User domain security
        It is refers to the set of security features that secure physical access to the terminal. For example the user may need to enter a PIN code before being able to access the terminal and before being able to use the SIM card in the terminal.
        
        Application domain security
        Application domain security is the security features used by application such as HTTP or IMS.
        
        SBA domain security
        1) It is the set of security features that enables Network Functions using service based interfaces/APIs to security communicate withing a network, and between network domains e.g., in case of roaming.
        2) Such features include NF registration, discovery, and ahtorisation aspects ans as well as protection of the service-based interfaces.
        
        Visibility and configurability of security
        This is a set of features that allos the user to learn whether a security features is in oepration or not and wheter theuse and provision of services will depend on the security feature.