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QUASI-LEGISLATIVE (& QUASI-JUDICIAL) POWER OR RULE-MAKING POWER,…

- - - - QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER
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        FACT FINDING, INVESTIGATIVE, LICENSING, AND RATE-FIXING POWER
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        EXEC. SEC. MAY ISSUE A MEMORANDUM ORDER TO CREATE AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE
        (Larin v. Exec Sec.)
        
        SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS AUTHORIZED BY LAW BEFORE QJAs CAN REQUIRE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ONLY FOR DECISIONS
        In proceedings before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies created under laws which authorize summary proceedings, decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers or other documentary evidence only.
        They are not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence. As a matter of fact, hearings before such agencies do not connote full adversarial proceedings.
        (SEC v. Interport Resources Corp.)
        
        CROSS EXAMINATION OF AFFIANTS NOT REQUIRED IN SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS
        Therefore, it is not necessary for the rules to require affiants to appear and testify and to be cross-examined by the counsel of the adverse party. To require otherwise would negate the summary nature of administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings.
        In order to comply with the requirements of due process, what is required, among other things, is that every litigant be given reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his right and to introduce relevant evidence in his favor.
        (SEC v. Interport Resources Corp.)
        
        FORMAL HEARING WAS NOT REQUIRED BEFORE THE PED
        As such, the PED Rules provided that the Hearing Officer may require the parties to submit their respective verified position papers, together with all supporting documents and affidavits of witnesses.
        A formal hearing was not mandatory; it was within the discretion of the Hearing Officer to determine whether there was a need for a formal hearing. Since, according to the foregoing rules, the holding of a hearing before the PED is discretionary, then the right to cross-examination could not have been demanded by either party.|||
        
        (SEC v. Interport Resources Corp.)
        
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        RATE FIXING MAY BE LEGISLATIVE BUT MAY BE QUASI-JUDICIAL IF BASED ON A FINDING OF FACT
        (Vigan Electric Inc. v. PSC)
        
        ORDERS MAKING A FINDING OF FACT IS A QUASI-JUDICIAL ACT
        
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        DELEGATED LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION OF RATE-FIXING IS SUBJECT TO THE DUE PROESS CLAUSE
        RA 3531 and other pertinent laws have delegated the legislative function of rate-fixing. The due process clause, however, permits the courts to determine whether the regulation issued by the SEC is reasonable and within the bounds of its rate-fixing authority and to strike it down when a person’s right to property is arbitrarily infringed.
        (SEC v. GMA Network)
        
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        EXEC SEC. QUISUMBING ISSUED MEMO ORDER 164
        Sr. Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing issued Memorandum Order No. 164 which provides for the creation of an Executive Committee to investigate the administrative charge against Larin. (Larin v. Executive Secretary)
        
        POLICY: EVERY AGENCY SHALL ENCOURAGE AMICABLE SETTLEMENT, COMPROMISE, AND ARBITRATION
        SECTION 10. Compromise and Arbitration.—To expedite administrative proceedings involving conflicting rights or claims and obviate expensive litigations, every agency shall, in the public interest, encourage amicable settlement, compromise and arbitration.
        
        NOTICE, HEARING, OFFICIAL RECORD
        SECTION 11. Notice and Hearing in Contested Cases.—
        NOTICE 5 DAYS BEFORE HEARING
        (1) In any contested case all parties shall be entitled to notice and hearing. The notice shall be served at least five (5) days before the date of the hearing and shall state the date, time and place of the hearing.
        
        RULES OF EVIDENCE
        SECTION 12. Rules of Evidence.—In a contested case:
        
        SUBPOENA WITNESS/DOCUMENTS
        SECTION 13. Subpoena.—
        In any contested case, the agency shall have the power to require the attendance of witnesses or the production of books, papers, documents and other pertinent data, upon request of any party before or during the hearing upon showing of general relevance.
        
        DECISIONS SHALL BE IN WRITING; SHALL CLEARLY STATE FACTS & LAW
        SECTION 14. Decision.—Every decision rendered by the agency in a contested case shall be in writing and shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
        
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        AGENCY MAY INVOKE AID OF RTC
        Unless otherwise provided by law, the agency may, in case of disobedience, invoke the aid of the Regional Trial Court within whose jurisdiction the contested case being heard falls.
        
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        PROBATIVE VALUE TO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
        (1) The agency may admit and give probative value to evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs.
        
        DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE MAY BE RECEIVED IN FORM OF COPIES OR EXCERPTS
        (2) Documentary evidence may be received in the form of copies or excerpts, if the original is not readily available.
        PARTIES MAY REQUEST COMPARISON OF COPY AND ORIGINAL
        Upon request, the parties shall be given opportunity to compare the copy with the original.
        IF ORIGINAL IS IN OFFICIAL CUSTODY, CERTIFIED COPY MAY BE ACCEPTED
        If the original is in the official custody of a public officer, a certified copy thereof may be accepted.
        
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        HEARSAY EVIDENCE MAY BE ADMITTED BASED ON RELEVANCE, TRUSTWORTHINESS, AND NECESSITY
        Hearsay evidence may be admitted on the grounds of “relevance, trustworthiness, and necessity.”
        When certain facts are within judicial notice of the Court, newspaper accounts only buttress the facts taken judicial notice of as facts.
        (Bedol v. COMELEC)
        
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        HEARING
        (2) The parties shall be given opportunity to present evidence and argument on all issues...
        
        AGENCY SHALL KEEP OFFICIAL RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
        (3) The agency shall keep an official record of its proceedings.
        
        INFORMAL DISPOSITION ALLOWED IF NOT PRECLUDED BY LAW
        ...If not precluded by law, informal disposition may be made of any contested case by stipulation, agreed settlement or default.
        
        QUASI JUDICIAL POWER MUST BE DELEGATED, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
        A public official exercises power, not rights. The government itself is merely an agency through which the will of the State is expressed and enforced. Its officers therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of discharging its functions.
        As such there is no presumption that they are empowered to act. There must be a delegation of such authority, either express or implied.
        (Tolentino v. Inciong)
        
        INVOKING POLICY DOES NOT SUFFICE
        In this case, Inciong’s concern that the objectives of Presidential Decree 21 be attained is not justification for exercising a power not conferred by such decree.
        
        LIMITED JURISDICTION; STRICTISSIMI JURIS
        The SEC, like any other administrative body, is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction and as such, could wield only such powers as are specifically granted to it by its enabling statute (or PD 902-A in this case). Its jurisdiction should be interpreted in strictissimi juris.
        (Ching v. LBP)
        
        SEC LIMITED TO SUSPENSION OF PAYMENTS, EXCLUDES DECLARATION OF INSOLVENCY
        The construction of PD 902-A, as amended, provides that the regular courts have exclusive and original jurisdiction over petitions for declaration of insolvency of private corporations.
        The SEC may entertain such petitions only as an incident of and in continuation of its already acquired jurisdiction over petitions to be declared in the state of suspension of payments in the two (2) cases provided in Section 5 (d) of P.D. 902-A, as amended.
        This cannot be stretched to provide SEC jurisdiction over petitions for declaration of insolvency, which the regular courts have jurisdiction over.
        (Azarcon v. SB)
        
        JURISDICTION OF A COURT OVER A CASE IS DETERMINED AT THE TIME OF COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION
        (Azarcon v. SB)
        
        AZARCON v. SANDIGANBAYAN
        In this case, PD 1606 (as amended by PD 1861) applies and not RA 7975 which introduced amendments AFTER the commencement of the action.
        Under Section 4 of PD 1606, Sandiganbayan only has jurisdiction over private individuals when the complaint charges the private individual as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.
        Azarcon was not charged as co-principal/accomplice/accessory of a public officer.
        (Azarcon v. SB)
        
        FACT FINDING IS NOT ADJUDICATION
        Fact-finding is not the same as judicial function of a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency or official.
        (Cariño v. CHR)
        
        JUDICIAL FUNCTION DEFINED
        
        RECEIVE EVIDENCE,
        
        MAKE FACTUAL CONCLUSIONS,
        
        APPLY LAWS TO FACTUAL CONCLUSIONS
        
        DECIDE CONTROVERSIES FINALLY
        To be considered a judicial function, the function of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
        
        (Cariňo v. CHR)
        
        INVESTIGATE vs ADJUDICATE
        The power to investigate is different from the power to adjudicate.
        “Investigate” means to FOLLOW UP, step by step by patient INQUIRY/OBSERVATION; to trace or track; to search into, to examine, etc.
        Meanwhile, “adjudicate” means to SETTLE in exercise of judicial authority; to determine finally.
        
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        APPEAL FROM QJAs CAN BE MIXED QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW
        (Megaworld v. DSM Construction & Dev't Corp.)
        
        MEGAWORLD V. DSM CONSTRUCTION & DEV'T CORP
        Awards of the Construction Industry Arbitration Committee were held to be appealable to the CA on mixed questions of fact and law, instead of directly to SC.
        (Megaworld v. DSM Construction and Development Corp.)
        
        ARBITRATION AWARDS ARE NOT APPEALABLE
        Judicial review of an arbitration award is more limited than a judicial review of a trial. As an exception, if the conditions in Articles 2038, 2039, and 2040 are present, the arbitrator’s award may be annulled or rescinded
        (NAPOCOR v. Alonzo-Leasto)
        
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      - STATUTES ARE PROSPECTIVE
        Generally, statutes are prospective.
        (CIR v. Reyes)
        
        REMEDIAL STATUTES ARE EXEMPT FROM RULE AGAINST RETROACTIVITY
        However, statutes that are remedial, or that do not create new or take away vested rights, do not fall under the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes.
        (CIR v. Reyes)
        
        RULE PERTAINED TO PROCEDURE IN TAX ASSESSMENTS AND PROTESTS THERETO AND, THUS, WAS MERELY REMEDIAL
        In this case, Section 228 only provides for the procedure in case an assessment is protested and does not create new or take away vested rights. Therefore, it can be applied retroactively.
        On another note, RA 8424 does not state, either expressly or by necessary implication, that pending actions are excepted from the operation of Section 228, or that applying it to pending proceedings would impair vested rights.
        (CIR v. Reyes)
        
        INTERPRETATIVE RULES RETROACT TO EFFECTIVITY OF STATUTE
        Notwithstanding this, the Court still ruled that an administrative rule that is merely interpretive of a statute, and not declarative of certain rights and corresponding obligations, is given retroactive effect as of the date of the effectivity of the statute.
        (CIR v. Reyes)
        
        RR12-99 ONLY INTERPRETS TAX CODE; THUS, IT RETROACTS TO JAN. 1 1998 EVEN IF ISSUED 1.5 YRS LATER
        RR 12-99 is one such rule. Since it only interprets the provisions of the Tax Code, this regulation retroacts to January 1, 1998, 2 even if it was only issued a year and a half later or on September 6, 1999.
        
        PROCEDURAL LAWS APPLICABLE TO PENDING ACTIONS AT TIME OF PASSAGE
        procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent.
        (Rosario Dadulo v. CA)
        
        ROSARIO DADULO V. CA, OFFICE OMBUDSMAN, ET AL
        In this case, the general rule applies. During the time period of the cases of Lapid and Laxina, Sec. 7 of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman was SILENT as to the execution of the Ombudsman’s decisions pending appeal.
        (Rosario Dadulo v. CA)
        
        IRRs may retroactively cause BROAD EXCLUSION to a PD that has a BROAD INCLUSION because of a cloud of doubt in the PD's application
        Formerly under PD 851, basic salary doubtfully included all kinds of remunerations. The subsequent IRRs dissipated this cloud by excluding other remunerations paid by ER to EE.
        While doubt may have been created by the prior Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851 which defines basic salary to include all remunerations or earnings paid by an employer to an employee, this cloud is dissipated in the later and more controlling Supplementary Rules and Regulations which categorically, exclude from the definition of basic salary earnings and other remunerations paid by employer to an employee.
        (San Miguel Corp. v. Inciong)
        
        SAN MIGUEL CORP V. INCIONG INVOLVED IRRs THAT CAUSED A BROAD EXCLUSION TO PD THAT INVOLVED A BROAD INCLUSION
        A cursory perusal of the two sets of Rules indicates that what has hitherto been the subject of a broad inclusion is now a subject of broad exclusion. The Supplementary Rules and Regulations cure the seeming tendency of the former rules to include all remunerations and earnings within the definition of basic salary.
        THERE WAS A RETROACTIVITY CLAUSE
        "All allowances and monetary benefits which are not considered or integrated as part of the regular basic salary of the employee at the time of the promulgation of the Decree on December 16, 1975."
        The all-embracing phrase "earnings and other remunerations" which are deemed not part of the basic salary includes within its meaning payments for sick, vacation, or maternity leaves, premium for works performed on rest days and special holidays, pays for regular holidays and night differentials.
        As such they are deemed not part of the basic salary and shall not be considered in the computation of the 13th-month pay. If they were not so excluded, it is hard to find any "earnings and other remunerations" expressly excluded in the computation of the 13th-month pay. Then the exclusionary provision would prove to be idle and with no purpose.
        (San Miguel Corp. v. Inciong)
        
        JUDICIAL RESPECT FOR ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTRUCTION
        w/o PRIOR JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION
        Judicial respect for administrative construction only applies where the courts have not previously interpreted the statute.
        (Asturias Sugar Central v. Commissioner of Customs)
        
        RR BY BUREAU OF CUSTOMS RECEIVED IMPLIED LEGLISLATIVE APPROVAL AND JUDICIAL RESPECT
        As applied to this case, considering that Bureau of Customs is the office charged with implementing and enforcing the TCC, its interpretation should be given controlling weight.
        Courts give respect to such interpretations as these government agencies are charged with its administration, where they are competent, experts, experienced, and have informed judgment, and the fact that they are usually the drafters of the law they interpret.
        (Astruias Sugar Central v. Commissioner of Customs
        
        IMPLIED LEGISLATIVE APPROVAL (ACQUIESCENCE)
        As a rule, "Implied legislative approval by failure to change a longstanding administrative construction is not essential to judicial respect for the construction but is an element which greatly increases the weight given such construction."
        (Asturias Sugar Central v. CC)
        
        ASC V. CC
        Applied to this case, the administrative orders appear to be in consonance with the intention of the legislature to limit the period of exporting imported containers to 1 year WITHOUT extension.
        Otherwise, in enacting the TCC Code to supersede PTA 1909, Congress would have amended Section 23 of PTA so as to overrule the view that the one-year period is not extendible.
      - ABSENCE OF A REGULATION DOES NOT MAKE THE LAW INOPERATIVE
        While it is desirable for the government authority or administrative agency to have a regulation immediately issued after a law is passed, the absence of said regulation does not automatically mean that the law itself would become inoperative.
        (CIR v. Reyes)
    - - IF PROCEDURE FOR PROMULGATION IS FOLLOWED + SCOPE IS WITHIN ENABLING LAW, THEN BINDING ON COURTS
        Consequently, so long as the procedure fixed for promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, a rule is binding on the courts.
        (VMC v. SSC)
    - - INTEPRETATIONS MERELY ADVISORY; COURTS HAVE FINAL WORD
        In contrast, an administrative interpretation of the law is at most, advisory, as it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.
        (VMC v. SSC)
        
        DELETION OF OTHER REMUNERATIONS WAS INTERPRETED BY CIRCULAR 22 AS AN INCLUSION TO COMPENSATION
        In this case, Circ. No. 22 was issued by the SSC, in view of the amendments of the Social Security Law provisions that defined the term compensation.
        Initially, RA 1161 Sec. 8 (f) defined compensation but RA 1792 amended this definition to a shorter one and deleted the phrase on bonuses, allowances, overtime pay, among others.
        This deletion made it ambiguous whether such benefits were no longer to be granted under the law. To clarify this ambiguity, Circular No. 22 was made.
        Since the purpose of the Circular was merely to interpret the amendment, it was merely interpretative. Memorandum Circular No. 22's express elimination of the exemptions included in the old law in the definition of compensation means that the same should be included in the computation of employees’ remuneration.
      - ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATIVE RULES = COURTS ARE NOT BOUND TO APPLY
        As a general rule, the court is not bound to apply such rule when the executive interpretation is clearly erroneous, there is no ambiguity in the law interpreted, and the language of the words used is clear and plain.
        Administrative interpretations are at best advisory for it is the Court that finally determines what the law means.
        (NFA v. Masada)
        
        INTERPRETATIONS OF LABOR AGENCIES CANNOT BIND THE COURT
        Therefore, the interpretation given the labor agencies in this case which went as far as supplementing what is otherwise not stated in the law cannot bind this court.
        (NFA v. Masada)
        
        IRR EXTENDED LIABILITY FOR INCREASED REMUNERATIONS TO PRINCIPALS DESPITE LAW ONLY PERTAINED TO STATUTORY MINIMUM WAGE
        The term wage used in Sec. 6 pertains to no other “statutory minimum wage” Statutory minimum wage is defined by the Rules Implementing RA 6727 as the lowest wage rate fixed by law that an employer can pay his worker.
        The prescribed increases or the additional liability to be borne by the principal under Sec. 6 is the increment of amount added on top of the remuneration of an employee for an 8-hr work.
        Since the increase in wage referred to in the law only pertains to the statutory minimum wage, principals in service contracts cannot be made to pay the corresponding wage increase in overtime pay, night differential, etc.
        While the basis of those remuneration and benefits is the statutory minimum wage, the law cannot be unduly expanded to include those NOT stated in the provision, expresio unius est exclusion alterius.
        Additionally, the law should be interpreted verba legis; it is presumed that lawmakers knew that the term “wage” meant the statuory minimum wage.
        If their intention was to extend further the liability of principals to other benefits and remuneration, it would have so expressly specified.
        
        RULES INCONSISTENT WITH ENABLING LAW = NULL AND VOID
        Administrative rules derive their ability from the statute that they are intended to implement. Any rule which is not consistent with statute itself is null and void.
        (SGMC Realty Corp v. OP)
        
        SGMC REALTY CORP V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT = 15 DAY APPEAL, NOT 30
        In this case, Presidential Decrees 957 and 1344 provide that appeals to the OP and NHA are 15 days.
        Therefore, the period of appeal of 30 days set forth in Sec 27 of HLURB 1994 Rules of Procedure no longer holds true for being in conflict with the provisions of the said PDs.
        In this case, SGMC filed its appeal to the OP 28 days later beyond the reglementary period
        SGMC Realty Corp v. OP