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UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE - Coggle Diagram

- - - - CAUSE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST A FELLOW EMPLOYEE
        (b) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee,
        including DISCRIMINATION against an employee
        with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied
        OR
        to TERMINATE an employee on any ground other than the usual terms and conditions under which membership or continuation of membership is made available to other members;
        
        (COUNTERPART-e)
        
        VIOLATE DUTY TO BARGAIN
        (c) To violate the duty, or refuse to bargain collectively with the employer, provided it is the REPRESENTATIVE of the employees;
        
        (COMMON-g)
        
        CAUSE PAYMENT FOR SERVICES NOT PERFORMED
        (d) To cause or attempt to cause an employer
        to pay or deliver or agree to pay or deliver
        any money or other things of value,
        in the nature of an exaction,
        for services which are not performed or not to be performed,
        including the demand for fee for union negotiations;
        
        TO ASK/ACCEPT FEES (e) To ask for or accept negotiation or attorney's fees from employers as part of the settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or
        (COUNTERPART-h)
        
        VIOLATE CBA (f) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.
        
        (COMMON-i)
        
        ONLY OFFICERS, MEMBERS OF GOVERNING BOARDS, REPRESENTATIVES, OR AGENTS WHO -PARTICIPATED, AUTHORIZED, OR RATIFIED ULP(260)
        The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers, members of governing boards, representatives or agents or members of labor associations or organizations who have actually
        participated in,
        authorized or ratified unfair labor practices
        shall be held criminally liable.
  - - - REQUIRE NOT TO J/W(b) To require as a condition of employment that a person or an employee shall not join a labor organization or shall withdraw from one to which he belongs;
        
        CONTRACT TO IRC(c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization;
        
        IDAI/I (including FINANCIAL SUPPORT)
        
        IDAI w/ FORMATION(d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or supporters;
        
        DISCRIMINATE TO DISCOURAGE
        
        DISCRIMINATE(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
        
        (COUNTERPART-b)
        
        PREJUDICE WHO TESTIFIES(f) To dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having given or being about to give testimony under this Code;
        
        VIOLATE DUTY TO BARGAIN(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;
        (COMMON-c)
        
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        259(f) NOT AN ACT RELATED TO WORKERS' RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION
        Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers' right to organize. The prohibited acts are related to the workers' right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts, no matter how unfair, are not unfair labor practices. 23 The only exception is Article 248(f), which in any case is not one of the acts specified in PEU's charge of unfair labor practice.
        A review of the acts complained of as unfair labor practices of Philcom convinces us that they do not fall under any of the prohibited acts defined and enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor Code. The issues of misimplementation or non-implementation of employee benefits, non-payment of overtime and other monetary claims, inadequate transportation allowance, water, and other facilities, are all a matter of implementation or interpretation of the economic provisions of the CBA between Philcom and PEU subject to the grievance procedure.
        ||| (Philcom Employees Union v. Philippine Global Communications, G.R. No. 144315, [July 17, 2006], 527 PHIL 540-570)
        
        EXCEPT: UNION SECURITY CLAUSES
        Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall stop the parties from requiring membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition for employment, except those employees who are already members of another union at the time of the signing of the collective bargaining agreement.
        
        REASONABLE FEES FOR NON-MEMBERS WHO ACCEPT BENEFIT
        Employees of an appropriate bargaining unit who are not members of the recognized collective bargaining agent may be assessed a reasonable fee equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by members of the recognized collective bargaining agent, if such non-union members accept the benefits under the collective bargaining agreement:
        
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        Merely contracting out is not ULP
        There must be IRC with right to self-organization
        
        YELLOW DOG CONTRACTS
        Yellow dog contracts require, as a condition of employment that a person or an employee shall not join a labor organization OR shall withdraw from one to which he belongs
        (Azucena)
        
        Differentiate from Union Security Clauses
        What I observe is that a closed shop clause deems an employer automatically a member of a union WHILE a Yellow Dog Contract is a promise by the employee that they will not join any Labor Organization subsequent to his employment or must withdraw from one
      - Unang titingnan because it is the widest in scope
      - ARTICLE 248 PRINCE TRANSPORT
        Under Article 248 (a) and (e) of the Labor Code,an employer is guilty of unfair labor practice if it interferes with, restrains or coerces its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization or if it discriminates in regard to wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
        (Prince Transport, Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. 167291, [January 12, 2011], 654 PHIL 296-315)
        
        Indeed, evidence of petitioners' unfair labor practice is shown by the established fact that, after respondents' transfer to Lubas, petitioners left them high and dry insofar as the operations of Lubas was concerned. The Court finds no error in the findings and conclusion of the CA that petitioners "withheld the necessary financial and logistic support such as spare parts, and repair and maintenance of the transferred buses until only two units remained in running condition." This left respondents virtually jobless.
        ||| (Prince Transport, Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. 167291, [January 12, 2011], 654 PHIL 296-315)
        
        It is of note that in this case, there were allegations that the employees were suspected of forming a Union. A petition for certification election was filed by the union and the employer took notice of this. The employer raised as a defense that it could not have discriminated based on the suspicions of a union being formed because the employees were already in a sub-company, "Lubas" and that, therefore, the employers accused of ULP could not have committed the same.
        However, the Supreme Court made a finding that Lubas and PTI (the parent company) were actually one and the same and that, therefore, the employers of the discriminated employees were in fact still under the same petitioner-employers.
  - - - LA HAS JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL ASPECT (258)
        Subject to the exercise by the President or by the Secretary of Labor and Employment of the powers vested in them by Articles 263 and 264 of this Code, the civil aspects of all cases involving unfair labor practices, which may include claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages, attorney's fees and other affirmative relief, shall be under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters. The Labor Arbiters shall give utmost priority to the hearing and resolution of all cases involving unfair labor practices. They shall resolve such cases within thirty (30) calendar days from the time they are submitted for decision. Recovery of civil liability in the administrative proceedings shall bar recovery under the Civil Code.
        
        LA'S FINAL JUDGMENT FIRST
        BEFORE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION (258)
        No criminal prosecution under this Title may be instituted without a final judgment finding that an unfair labor practice was committed, having been first obtained in the preceding paragraph. During the pendency of such administrative proceeding, the running of the period of prescription of the criminal offense herein penalized shall be considered interrupted: Provided, however, That the final judgment in the administrative proceedings shall not be binding in the criminal case nor be considered as evidence of guilt but merely as proof of compliance of the requirements therein set forth.
        
        PENALTIES;
        MTC, MeTC, RTC HAVE JURISDICTION OVER CRIMINAL ASPECT(303)
        ARTICLE 303. [288] Penalties. — Except as otherwise provided in this Code, or unless the acts complained of hinge on a question of interpretation or implementation of ambiguous provisions of an existing collective bargaining agreement, any violation of the provisions of this Code declared to be unlawful or penal in nature shall be punished with a fine of not less than One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) nor more than Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than three months nor more than three years, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. In addition to such penalty, any alien found guilty shall be summarily deported upon completion of service of sentence. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, any criminal offense punished in this Code shall be under the concurrent jurisdiction of the Municipal or City Courts and the Courts of First Instance.
        
        IF UNION OR CORPORATION= OFFICERS LIABLE (304)
        ARTICLE 304. [289] Who are Liable When Committed by Other Than Natural Person. —
        If the offense is committed by a corporation, trust, firm, partnership, association or any other entity, the penalty shall be imposed upon the guilty officer or officers of such corporation, trust, firm, partnership, association or entity.
        
        PRESCRIBES IN 1 YEAR (305)
        ARTICLE 305. [290] Offenses. —
        Offenses penalized under this Code and the rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto shall prescribe in three (3) years. All unfair labor practice arising from Book V shall be filed with the appropriate agency within one (1) year from accrual of such unfair labor practice; otherwise, they shall be forever barred.
        
        Bihira: Since matagal talaga eh
        
        Sir: Matagal, it takes 8 years
      - Solutions for ULP
        
        Filing an administrative Complaint Labor Arbiter
        Art. 224(a)
        
        These are not cumulative options.
        (You may only choose one)
        
        But what about Voluntary Arbitrator?
        Kasama ba toh sa disjunctive rule lang?
        
        Filing of Notice of Strike - art. 278(c)
- - - - LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES FOR INDUSTRIAL PEACE (292h)
        (h) In establishments where no legitimate labor organization exists, labor-management committees may be formed voluntarily by workers and employers for the purpose of promoting industrial peace.
        The Department of Labor and Employment shall endeavor to enlighten and educate the workers and employers on their rights and responsibilities through labor education with emphasis on the policy thrusts of this Code.
- - - - ALL ACTS OF ULP ESSENTIALLY RELATE TO THE COMMISSION OF ACTS THAT TRANSGRESS THE WORKERS' RIGHT TO ORGANIZE
        "In essence, [unfair labor practice] relates to the commission of acts that transgress the workers' right to organize." 50 "[A]ll the prohibited acts constituting unfair labor practice in essence relate to the workers' right to self-organization." 51 "[T]he term unfair labor practice refers to that gamut of offenses defined in the Labor Code which, at their core, violates the constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization." 52
        (Mendoza v. Officers of Manila Water Employees Union, G.R. No. 201595, [January 25, 2016], 779 PHIL 96-122)
        
        3 RELATED PROVISIONS RELATING
        TO SELF-ORGANIZATION
        Guaranteed to all employees or workers is the 'right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining.' This is made plain by no less than three provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines. Article 253 (243) of the Code provides as follows:
        ||| (Mendoza v. Officers of Manila Water Employees Union, G.R. No. 201595, [January 25, 2016)
        
        ART. 253 (243) = RIGHT TO ORGANIZATION
        ART. 253 (243). Coverage and employees' right to self-organization. — All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable, medical, or educational institutions whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes or collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection.
        ||| (Mendoza v. Officers of Manila Water Employees Union, G.R. No. 201595, [January 25, 2016], 779 PHIL 96-122)
        
        PROHIBITION ON INTERFERENCE/RESTRAINT/COERCION
        Article 259 (248)
        (a) declares it to be an unfair labor practice for an employer, among others, to 'interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization.'
        Similarly, Article 260(a) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to 'restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization . . .'
        xxx xxx xxx
        (Mendoza v. Officers of Manila Water Employees Union, G.R. No. 201595, [January 25, 2016], 779 PHIL 96-122)
        
        RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZE INCLUDES RIGHT:
        
        TO ORGANIZE/AFFILIATE WITH A LABOR UNION
        OR
        
        TO DETERMINE WHICH OF 2 UNIONS TO JOIN AND
        
        TO ENGAGE IN CONCERTED ACTIVITIES WITH CO-WORKERS
        
        FOR PURPOSES OF
        
        COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
        OR
        
        FOR MUTUAL PROTECTION
        
        The right of self-organization includes the right to organize or affiliate with a labor union or determine which of two or more unions in an establishment to join, and to engage in concerted activities with co-workers for purposes of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing, or for their mutual aid and protection, i.e., the protection, promotion, or enhancement of their rights and interests. 53
        (Mendoza v. Officers of Manila Water Employees Union, G.R. No. 201595, [January 25, 2016], 779 PHIL 96-122)
        
        UNION MEMBER
        As members of the governing board of MWEU, respondents are presumed to know, observe, and apply the union's constitution and by-laws. Thus, their repeated violations thereof and their disregard of petitioner's rights as a union member — their inaction on his two appeals which resulted in his suspension, disqualification from running as MWEU officer, and subsequent expulsion without being accorded the full benefits of due process — connote willfulness and bad faith, a gross disregard of his rights thus causing untold suffering, oppression and, ultimately, ostracism from MWEU. "Bad faith implies breach of faith and willful failure to respond to plain and well understood obligation."
        ||| (Mendoza v. Officers of Manila Water Employees Union, G.R. No. 201595, [January 25, 2016], 779 PHIL 96-122)
      - CLOSURE DUE TO IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCE AND TO END BARGAINING DEADLOCK IS ULP
        Citing jurisprudence, in St. John Colleges, Inc. v. St. John Academy Faculty and Employees Union, bad faith was evidenced by the timing of and reasons for the closure and the timing of and reasons for the subsequent opening.
        In that case, St. John admitted that the closure of the school was due to irreconcilable differences between the Union and school management, SJCI in effect admitted that it wanted to end the bargaining deadlock and eliminate the problem of dealing with the demands of the Union.
        This is precisely what the Labor Code abhors and punishes as unfair labor practice since the net effect is to defeat the Union’s right to collective bargaining.
        ||| (Digital Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. Digitel Employees Union, G.R. Nos. 184903-04, [October 10, 2012], 697 PHIL 132-157)
        
        ENFORCEMENT OF UNION SECURITY CLAUSES NOT PROHIBITED UNDER
        ARTICLE 248
        Union security clauses are recognized and explicitly allowed under Article 248 (e) of the Labor Code, which provides that:
        Art. 248. Unfair Labor Practices of Employers. — . .
        xxx xxx xxx
        (e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall stop the parties from requiring membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition for employment, except those employees who are already members of another union at the time of the signing of the collective bargaining agreement.
        (Emphasis supplied.)
        ||| (General Milling Corporation v. Casio, G.R. No. 149552, [March 10, 2010], 629 PHIL 12-38)
        
        REQUISITES FOR
        TERMINATION BY UNION SECURITY CLAUSE
        In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union security clause, the employer needs only to determine and prove that:
        
        APPLICABLE - the union security clause is applicable;
        
        REQUESTED - the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA; and
        
        EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT - there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the union to expel the employee from the union.
        
        These requisites constitute just cause for terminating an employee based on the union security provision of the CBA. 26|||
        (General Milling Corporation v. Casio, G.R. No. 149552, [March 10, 2010], 629 PHIL 12-38)
        
        GMC v. Casio LACKED THE 3RD ELEMENT
        It is apparent from the aforequoted letter that GMC terminated the employment of Casio, et al. relying upon the Resolution dated February 29, 1992 of Pino, et al. expelling Casio, et al. from IBM-Local 31; Gabiana's Letters dated March 10 and 19, 1992 demanding that GMC terminate the employment of Casio, et al. on the basis of the closed shop clause in the CBA; and the threat of being sued by IBM-Local 31 for unfair labor practice.
        The letter made no mention at all of the evidence supporting the decision of IBM-Local 31 to expel Casio, et al. from the union. GMC never alleged nor attempted to prove that the company actually looked into the evidence of IBM-Local 31 for expelling Casio, et al. and made a determination on the sufficiency thereof. Without such a determination, GMC cannot claim that it had terminated the employment of Casio, et al. for just cause.
        
        FAILURE TO DETERMINE SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO EXPEL DENIES DUE PROCESS
        The failure of GMC to make a determination of the sufficiency of evidence supporting the decision of IBM-Local 31 to expel Casio, et al. is a direct consequence of the non-observance by GMC of procedural due process in the dismissal of employees.
        As a defense, GMC contends that as an employer, its only duty was to ascertain that IBM-Local 31 accorded Casio, et al. due process; and, it is the finding of the company that IBM-Local 31 did give Casio, et al. the opportunity to answer the charges against them, but they refused to avail themselves of such opportunity.
        
        MERE ALLEGATION DOES NOT SUFFICE
        This argument is without basis.
        The Court has stressed time and again that allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence because mere allegation is definitely not evidence. 28 Once more, in Great Southern Maritime Services Corporation. v. Acuña, 29 the Court declared:
        
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        Does absence of one of these elements automatically mean that there is ULP?
        
        If the dismissal is illegal, does that automatically mean that the enforcement of the USC was ULP?
        
        POWER TO DISMISS vs ENFORCEMENT OF UNION SECURITY CLAUSE
        More importantly, in Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc., 32 the Court issued the following reminder to employers:
        The power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of the employer. However, this is not without limitations. The employer is bound to exercise caution in terminating the services of his employees especially so when it is made upon the request of a labor union pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement. . . . . Dismissals must not be arbitrary and capricious. Due process must be observed in dismissing an employee because it affects not only his position but also his means of livelihood. Employers should therefore respect and protect the rights of their employees, which include the right to labor. . . . .
        
        DISMISSAL FOR DISLOYALTY UNDER UNION SECURITY CLAUSE MUST NOT VIOLATE
        
        DUE PROCESS,
        
        SELF-ORGANIZATION, AND
        
        SECURITY OF TENURE
        The Court reiterated in Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield v. Ramos 33 that:
        
        While respondent company may validly dismiss the employees expelled by the union for disloyalty under the union security clause of the collective bargaining agreement upon the recommendation by the union, this dismissal should not be done hastily and summarily thereby eroding the employees' right to due process, self-organization and security of tenure.
        
        ENFORCEMENT OF USC
        MUST NOT BE ARBITRARY;
        ALWAYS REQUIRES DUE PROCESS
        ALWAYS REQUIRES SEPARATE HEARING
        The enforcement of union security clauses is authorized by law provided such enforcement is not characterized by arbitrariness, and always with due process. Even on the assumption that the federation had valid grounds to expel the union officers, due process requires that these union officers be accorded a separate hearing by respondent company. (Emphases supplied.)
        ||| (General Milling Corporation v. Casio, G.R. No. 149552, [March 10, 2010], 629 PHIL 12-38)
        
        TWIN REQUIREMENTS OF
        NOTICE & HEARING
        (PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS)
        The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of procedural due process.
        The law requires the employer to furnish the employee sought to be dismissed with two written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected:
        
        NOTICE TO BE HEARD AND DEFEND
        a written notice apprising the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought in order to afford him an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of counsel, if he desires, and
        
        NOTICE OF DISMISSAL PROPER
        a subsequent notice informing the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him.
        (General Milling Corporation v. Casio, G.R. No. 149552, [March 10, 2010], 629 PHIL 12-38)
        
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        ATTACKING THE EXISTENCE OF A UNION AND THE STATUS OF THE UNION'S MEMBERSHIP TO PREVENT ANY NEGOTIATION INCLUDED IN ULP
        Violation of the duty to bargain collectively is an unfair labor practice under Article 258 (g) of the Labor Code. An instance of this practice is the refusal to bargain collectively as held in General Milling Corp. v. CA. 20
        In that case, the employer anchored its refusal to bargain with and recognize the union on several letters received by the former regarding the withdrawal of the workers' membership from the union. We rejected the defense, saying that the employer had devised a flimsy excuse by attacking the existence of the union and the status of the union's membership to prevent any negotiation. 21
        
        FAILURE TO CHALLENGE MAJORITY STATUS OF UNION DURING FREEDOM PERIOD MEANS EMPLOYER SHALL CONTINUE TO RECOGNIZE THE SAME
        It bears stressing that Ren Transport had a duty to bargain collectively with SMART. Under Article 263 in relation to Article 267 of the Labor Code, it is during the freedom period — or the last 60 days before the expiration of the CBA — when another union may challenge the majority status of the bargaining agent through the filing of a petition for a certification election. If there is no such petition filed during the freedom period, then the employer "shall continue to recognize the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent where no petition for certification election is filed." 22
        ||| (Ren Transport Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 188020 & 188252, [June 27, 2016])
        
        FAILURE TO REMIT UNION DUES AND VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION (CERTIFICATION ELECTION) OF BARGAINING UNIT INCLUDED IN ULP
        Interference with the employees' right to self-organization is considered an unfair labor practice under Article 258 (a) of the Labor Code.
        In this case, the labor arbiter found that the failure to remit the union dues to SMART and the voluntary recognition of RTEA were clear indications of interference with the employees' right to self-organization. 25
        It must be stressed that this finding was affirmed by the NLRC and the CA; as such, it is binding on the Court, especially when we consider that it is not tainted with any blatant error.
        As aptly pointed out by the labor arbiter, these acts were ill-timed in view of the existence of a labor controversy over membership in the union. 26
        Ren Transport also uses the supposed disaffiliation from SMART to justify the failure to remit union dues to the latter and the voluntary recognition of RTEA. However, for reasons already discussed, this claim is considered a lame excuse that cannot validate those acts.
        ||| (Ren Transport Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 188020 & 188252, [June 27, 2016])
        
        ULP MAY BE COMMITTED EVEN IF CBA EXPIRED;
        DUTY TO BARGAIN STILL EXISTS EVEN IF MOST MEMBERS OF UNION DISAFFILIATE;
        PENDING DISAFFILIATION ISSUE, THE SEBA STILL EXISTS
        [I]t is our considered view that the respondents committed acts of unfair labor practice even if the CBA between the complainant union and respondent company already expired and majority of the workers of the existing bargaining agent disaffiliated therefrom, formed its own union and have it registered as an independent one, still the respondent Company has the duty to bargain collectively with the existing bargaining agent.
        It bears stressing that the disaffiliation issue of the members of the complainant union is still pending before the DOLE and has not yet attained its finality, that there is no new bargaining agent certified yet by the DOLE, there is no legal basis yet for the respondent company to disregard the personality of the complainant union and refused or ignored the agent for renewal of its CBA.
        It is still the certified collective bargaining agent of the workers, because there was no new [u]nion yet being certified by the DOLE as the new bargaining agent of the workers.||| (Ren Transport Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 188020 & 188252, [June 27, 2016])
        
        OUTSOURCING POSITIONS IN THE EXISTING BARGAINING UNIT IS NOT ULP
        In essence, the primordial issue in this case is whether or not the act of BPI to outsource the cashiering, distribution and bookkeeping functions to BOMC is in conformity with the law and the existing CBA. Particularly in dispute is the validity of the transfer of twelve (12) former FEBTC employees to BOMC, instead of being absorbed in BPI after the corporate merger.
        The Union claims that a union shop agreement is stipulated in the existing CBA. It is unfair labor practice for employer to outsource the positions in the existing bargaining unit, citing the case of Shell Oil Workers' Union v. Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. 24
        The Union's reliance on the Shell Case is misplaced. The rule now is covered by Article 261 of the Labor Code, which took effect on November 1, 1974. 25 Article 274(261) provides:
        
        ONLY FLAGRANT AND/OR MALICIOUS REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH ECONOMIC PROVISIONS OF CBA ARE ULP
        ART. 274 (261). Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. — . . . Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement. [Emphases supplied]
        Clearly, only gross violations of the economic provisions of the CBA are treated as ULP. Otherwise, they are mere grievances.
        In the present case, the alleged violation of the union shop agreement in the CBA, even assuming it was malicious and flagrant, is not a violation of an economic provision in the agreement...
        
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        EMPLOYERS FOUND GUILTY OF ULP CANNOT BE MADE TO PAY BACKWAGES BEYOND LEGITIMATE CLOSURE
        In the case of Chronicle Securities Corp. v. NLRC, 37 we ruled that even an employer who is "found guilty of unfair labor practice in dismissing his employee may not be ordered so to pay backwages beyond the date of closure of business where such closure was due to legitimate business reasons and not merely an attempt to defeat the order of reinstatement." ||| (Polymer Rubber Corp. v. Salamuding, G.R. No. 185160, [July 24, 2013], 715 PHIL 141-154)
        
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