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European Integration, History of European Integration, EU Policies, The…

- - - - States with biggest economies pay more
- - - - Avoid a race to the bottom
      - Refelct changing policy preferences
- - - - intpret law as it applies in specific instances
      - adjudicate disputes between parts of government
    - - rule on the constitutionality of law
      - create law though rulings
- - - - Rights must be identifiable from the provisions of the directive
      - Causal link exists between the breach of EU obligations by the national government and the loss suffered by the individual
      - Directive confers rights on individuals
- - - - Inverse Goldilocks Principle: not too much party politics, not too little, just the wrong amount
      - Until recent Fidesz participated in European Peoples Party
      - Fidesz provided votes to pass legislation in the EP and Council
      - Supported Europarty in choce of Commission President
      - Europarties are sufficiently institutionalized so that they matter for politics, but not enough that voters punish parties for cooperating with autocrats
    - - Article 7 of EU Treaties allows Member States to sanction other members, but requires unanimity to identify violation
      - Europarty cooperation makes this less likely
      - In September 2018 EP votes for actions against Hungary, but many EPP members opposed
      - With removal of Fidesz from EPP, some form of sanctioning may become easier
    - - Free movement of people means that liberals can more easily leave than stay and make noise
      - Less pressure from people at home for change
- - - - Labor Mobility: unemployed in recession state can move to high growth state
      - Wäge flexibility / capital mobility: recession states can reduce wages and attract capital from high wages ares
      - Fiscal transfers and budget deficits: tax boomin economy, transfer revenues to recession are. Run a budget deficit to meet economic demands (maybe only a temporary option)
      - Why do OCAs require these thing? When one is in recession:
        
        Use monetary policy to devalue currency - makes labor and exports cheaper to other state, but import more expensive
        
        Decrease wages and increase labor mobility between states
- - - - Regulation is incredibly important because it ensure a level playing field
      - Everyone plays by the same rules - cant gain advantage by undercuttingg someine (cutting costs by cutting environmental protections)
      - Common regulation ensure fairness, eliminates non-tariff barriers to trade, avoids a race to the bottom
        
        Non-ttariff barriers to trade are anything that may block trade for reasons other than taxes on imports
        
        Different regulatory environments are a primary example (Cassis case)
        
        Race to the bottom
        
        One country treis to gain a competitive advantage by developing lower and cheaper regulatory standards
        
        To compete, other countries try to match then
        
        Common regulations at the supranational level can eliminate both
      - Because the EU designs regulations for the single market, organizations lobby in Brussels
- - - - National Governments
        
        Council of the EU (ministers)
        
        European Council (heads of government)
    - - European Commission
- - - - The Commission
      - The European Council
    - - European Parliament
      - The Council of Ministers
    - - Court of Justice of the EU
  - - - Presidentialism
        
        Citizens
        
        President
        
        Congress
      - Parliamentarism
        
        Citizens
        
        Parliament
        
        Government
- - - - Appointed by member states, taking EP elections into account and subject to the approval of the Parliament
  - - - Works with national bureaucracies
      - Can issue warning letters and take states to CJEU
    - - Plays a key role in drafting EU budget
    - - International trade negotiater
      - Vets applicant countries
      - Oversees relationship with oder IO's
- - - - Working groups
        
        what inital agreement can be reached?
        
        report to COREPER
        
        examine text of Commission proposal
      - COREPER decides
        
        might simplify confirm working group's opinion
        
        if disagreement: might refer back to working group, resolve in COREPER, or pass to the ministers
      - ministerial level
        
        Council may give approval without discussion
        
        May require political decisions, consensus sought or may be put to a vote
- - - - EP consent required for most policy proposals
      - Truly co-equal legislature with Council
    - - EP approval required before the budget can be accepted and implemented
    - - Approves appointment of Commission
      - Can ask questions of Council and Commission
      - ^Can ensure and dismiss Commission
  - - - 20 standing comittees
      - Membership of approx 20-80 MEPs
      - Develop and discuss proposals / drafts
      - Appointment by groups
- - - - Subsidiarity means making decisions at the lowest level of possible
  - - - Both EP and Council can veto and amend proposal
    - - Assent Procedure - For nominating Commission and certain policy areas (civil rights and discrimination)
      - Consultation Procedure - EP only issues advice (police cooperation, family law)
      - Agreement - No amendments, used for international agreements
      - Open Method of Coordination - where no legal basis for EU action, but member sstates want coordination
  - - - Regulations
        
        binding on all member states
      - Directives
        
        sets out goals, but up to member states to implement them
      - Decisions
        
        binding on those addressed by the decision
- - - - Fokus auf supranationale Akteure
      - Supranational organisations are relevant and autonomous actors, enterpreneurs
        
        Transnational policy enterpreneurs push for integration. National actors acquise because of short-term interests
      - Momentum of integration not intended by national governments, driven by spillover
        
        Functional spillover: integration in one sector leads to pressure to integrate in another
        
        Technical spillover: alignment of standards
        
        political spillover: new loyalties lie beyond the nation-state and create pressure for more integration
        
        We observe integration when transnational actors desire it and supranational actors are able to support them
    - - Fokus auf Government Akteure
      - nation-state remain key actors driving integration; supranational actors do not have the power to push beyond what nation-states allow
      - Variants
        
        Realist intergovernmentalism: integration depends on national power and security interests
        
        Liberal intergovernmentalism: integration depends on sector specific benefits/costs of integration that lead organised interest groups to lobby national governments
      - observin integration because:
        
        Governments rationally chose to integrate
        
        State preferences explained ny domestic politics, conditioned by constraints and opportunities created by economic interdependence
        
        Bargaining and bargaining power
      - Limits of integration
        
        Little integration in areas of high politics
        
        Supranational organisations remain weak
        
        Liberal Intergovernmentalism sees them as offering credible commitmens
  - - - Focus on supranational actors
      - We must understand EU integration as an interaction between multiple layers of governance
      - Subnational layers can directly access EU decision-making bodies
      - Integration more complex than simple transfer of authority from member state governments to supranational actors
      - Subnational regions created specifically for EU
    - - Depends on which actors are important for policy-making
      - Less concerned with when and why we see widening/deepening
      - More concerned with how politics works within the system that exists
      - Focus on institutions - the rules and norms that structure how political actors interact with one another
      - Borrows institutional theories used to explain parliamentary and legislative politics in European states and the US
      - Which actors are required to agree to pass law?
        
        When the agreement of more actors is required, change will be more difficult
      - Which actors get to make policy proposals to the other actors?
        
        The Commission is more powerful when it can make a proposal that is easier for the Council to accept than to amend
      - The Court has power to make importnat rulings when member states cannot agree on how to overrule the court
- - - - Opposition and minor parties well-represented in EP
      - Some parties survive because they do well in EP
    - - Especially true countries where more parties in EP than national parliament
      - Sincere voters vote for who they really want to vote for rather than who they think will win
      - Expressive voting means voting for a party to send a message or express an opinion
- - - - A generally favorable prevailing attitude towards integration, but low salience issue. People have non-attitudes
- - - - Again relates to education, class, wealth
      - Feelings towards immigration, others
  - - - When people perceive their national government as performing relatively well, they are more sceptical of EU
      - When people perceive their national government as performing poorly, they are less sceptical
      - People ask who woul more complemently deal with this probllem? EU or National Gov.
      - Support for the EU is benchmarked against national performance
    - - Centries parties generally more favourable towards Europe than extreme parties
      - Matters as more extreme parties come to prominence in the EU
      - Knowledgeable voters take cues from political elites
  - - - Workers in countries where labour is cheap and abundant may benefit
      - Workers in countries where labour is expensive may face more competition
      - Free strade does not benefit everyone equallyy, there are winners and losers
      - All people employed in uncompetitive industries may lose
- - - - Do voters vote rationally on anything?
      - Conflict in EP looks increasingly like conflict at the national levels
    - - Agreed, but the EU tends to do boring things that are unlikely to get voters exited (trade policy/regulation)
      - Citizens are becoming more knowledgable
    - - But: it has been significantly strengthened in recent times
    - - But: Who cares! National parliaments dont have much power anywys, and governemtns are already responsible to them
    - - Yes, its a system of checks and balances that makes change hard