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Annotated Bibliography Map HF Tools ( A) People :check: - Coggle…

- - - - Did not ensue Take-off clearance ACTIVE FAILURE
        
        was influenced by simulator- PRE CONDITION FAILURE
        
        No proper roster procedure- LATENT FAILURE
        
        *1.2 Analysis and Assessment into task nature :fire: tasks
        
        It was suggested in Bourne & Yaroush (2003) that "time pressures significantly increases error rates. :red_flag:
        
        Sim task is not associated with time pressure , which is different to actual flying
      - was worry about Duty and Time Limitations- PRE-CONDITION
        
        No procedures of back up plan by the airlines - Latent Failure
        
        1.3 Assessment of Fatigue Management system and operational pressure : :fire: :
        
        Essentially, Lamond and Dawson (1998) found that after 20 to 25 hours of sustained wakefulness performance is equivalent to that of a person with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10%. : :red_flag:
    - - Did not follow the procedure of taking over- PRE CONDITION FAILURE
        
        Allowed the captain to take-off while they still in doubt- PRE CONDITION FAILURE
        
        They were influenced by the captain authority and experience- Latent Failure
        
        The American Society 2011, identify different human factors issues, includes poor producers follow up as a contributing factor : to different well know disasters : :red_flag:
        
        1.4 Analysis into applying : procedures and unsafe supervision and : : :fire:
        
        According to Helmreich, organization must understand cultural impacts on their operations if safety is to be achieved (1999). : :red_flag:
  - - - Watching game while on duty - PRE CONDITION
        
        poor communication minutes before the accident - ACTIVE FAILURE
        
        Analysis into situation awareness of changes : :fire:
        
        **According to Jensen (1997), as the situation changes, pilots are required to ‘keep up with the changes’ and act up on at the right time to prevent error from taking place :red_flag:
        
        *Assessment of adapting to critical safety arises : issues :fire: :
        
        According to CASA, when communication difficulties arise, crew cannot formulate messages and may skip important information and speech will make no sense ( 2012). :red_flag:
  - - - Authority Gradient - PRE CONDITION
        
        The rest of the crew accepted the captain decision-**unsafe supervision
        
        Reason 1997, used the Swiss Cheese Module to discus's the defences failure and human contribution to accident ,
        active and latent failures and engineering of safety culture :red_flag:
        
        * 1.1 Analysis into Task allocationand Organisational Safety Culture :unsafe supervision* :fire:
        
        According to Helmreich et al (2000), error recovery was not evident in Tenerife accident since the junior crew did not take error recovery by not taking correction action