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(N (What is its relation to politics?, The particular will to power…
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The particular will to power expressed within a truth is evident in the third essay of GM, where N takes the ascetic ideal as one of the targets of his polemic
Here the ascetic ideal is understood as the valorization of practices such as chastity, poverty, and humility (lec23).
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Eventually, this tendency of internalizing cruelty reaches its zenith in the maximal Christian god, but this begins to undermine itself
the truth of the ascetic ideal is not contained in the ideal itself, there is no inner meaning to this ideal. Rather, the truth of the ascetic ideal is different according to whose will to power is expressed: in the artist, it becomes a means of sustaining creativity; in the philosopher, it accords status.
To N, truth is motivated: what motivates it is dependent on a particular will to power. That is, every attempt to locate truth is contingent upon a particular will to power, and will shift as underlying intentions and motivations for seeking truth shift.
This is not to say that Nietzsche rejects the existence of truth. Rather, there's no such thing as a single authoritative perspective from which we can access it, as a given truth is merely the expression of a particular will to power.
"we knowers" to be "wary of the tentacles of such contradictory concepts as 'pure reason', 'absolute spirituality', [and] 'knowledge as such'," and instead declaring: "There is only a perspectival seeing, only a perspectival 'knowing.'" (GM:III,89)
In this sense, Nietzsche holds a suspicious outlook on matters of truth, acknowledging its existence and power, but ultimately questioning whose will to power is being expressed within a truth
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