• Historically, Article 40.1 applies only to human persons (this certainly has not changed) and comes into play only where the individual is discriminated against on the basis of certain “essential attributes” or where the “essential attributes” of the human person are affected in a given context. Essential attributes have been held to include race, religion, sex, language, political opinion, marital status, wealth, pregnancy and age. SC has effectively sanctioned a very wide expansive interpretation of Article 40.1 as applying to any situation in which persons are similarly situated but differently treated. To establish discriminatory treatment, the applicant must demonstrate that they have been treated differently to a comparator. Usually, this involves pointing to either a real or hypothetical person who is similarly situated but who does not have the particular characteristic of the applicant and who is treated differently as a result. So, for example, in MR and DR, it was argued that genetic mothers were treated differently to genetic fathers (sex discrimination), genetic mothers with reproductive disabilities were treated differently to other genetic mothers with no such disability (disability discrimination) and children born in non-surrogacy arrangements were treated differently to children born in surrogacy arrangements (birth status discrimination). Murphy v AG: revealed the potential difficulty of choosing an incorrect comparator. The applicant in that case claimed that he was being treated differently to persons who did have a right to a trial by jury because they were not to be tried in the SCC. The applicant claimed that the correct comparator was a person tried with the same offence who would have a right to a trial by jury. SC was not convinced that the applicant was similarly situated to persons tried with the same offence. It was noted that the applicant was not only different but “legally distinct” from those other persons in that the applicant was a person about whom a public officer had determined that the ordinary courts were inadequate to secure the administration of justice and the difference in treatment was precisely related to this difference. Therefore, as the applicant could not point to a suitable comparator who was treated differently, there was no case for the respondent to answer.