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Theory, observation and scientific realism - Coggle Diagram
Theory, observation and scientific realism
Observation involves relations between us and what's observed. There's a belief-establishment requirement.
The distinction between what theory and observation terms pick out is sharp and permanent, it seems to be reason to deny the reality of what the theory terms refer to.
Epistemic rigidity could be to objects, independent of us, to which our means of establishing such truths are sensitive.
Our observing of things has, generally, four really neat properties:
- What they observe is independent of what they believe about what they'll observe.
- There are means of adjusting and refining observations
- What's observed can be monitored.
- Certain properties of the object observed can be used to explain why, and in what respects, observed things can be observed.
1, 2 and 3 are independent of us
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Norms , why is it true?
An specific instance of thick epistemic access, it might seem that as our background theory about perception increases, the exception clauses increases as well, that bear upon the epistemic status of a perceptual event
The sheer conservativeness of the impact of the theories about perception upon the practice of perception has prevented this outcome
The rationale of these norms are connected to the perception being a real relation to the object perceived, We are entirely justified in how we corrected