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From detente to the end of the Cold War: 1963-1991 - Coggle Diagram

- - - - May 1971: Following stalemate in talks from Oct 1968, discussions resumed. Soon stalled again in November. Main issue was North Vietnamese demand for removal of Thieu. Kissinger feared S Vietnam would collapse into chaos if US betrayed Thieu.
        
        Oct 1972: N Vietnamese used position to remove Thieu from power.
        
        9 July (71?): Kissinger flew to Beijing for secret talks with Zhou Enlai. Obstacles: ideologies, US part in CCW, Chinese mistrust of US detente with USSR. Went to China to use influence to make Hanoi agree to peace, to use an agreement as a level to persuade USSR to cooperate, to win US public opinion for upcoming election.
        
        July 1971//1972: US agreement with China.
        Concluded that:
        
        Neither country to seek dominance of Asia-Pacific region.
        
        Each country opposed to efforts by other countries to seek to establish such dominance (USSR).
        
        US declare it sought peace in Vietnam.
        
        PRC declare it supported Vietnamese people and all oppressed peoples.
        
        US reiterates support for S Korea. PRC backs demands of N Korea for Korean unification.
        
        Chinese terms also include:
        
        PRC sole gov of China and Taiwan a part of China.
        
        Liberation of Taiwan internal Chinese affair.
        
        All US forces to be withdrawn from Taiwan.
        
        US terms also included:
        
        US recognises all Chinese maintain that there is only one China.
        
        US affirms interest in peaceful settlement of Taiwan by Chinese themselves.
        
        Ultimate objective to withdraw troops from Taiwan.
        
        US affirms intention to reduce number of
        
        Nixon was invited to Moscow for first of 4 Summit meetings of 72 to 74.
        
        Nixon successfully opened up diplomacy with the Communist powers but not solved how to withdraw peacefully from Vietnam.
        
        The impact of army morale on negotiations and escalated bombing?
        
        Crisis in morale of troops led to weakened position of the US
        
        1970 Defense Department showed 60% of US soldiers used drugs.
        
        1971 40,000 were using heroin.
        
        Insubordination, racial tensions and attacks on unpopular officials reached a huge level.
        
        1970 there were 250 court martials for murder or attempted murder of officers by their own troops.
        
        570,000 ARVN deserted from 1967-71 whereas N Vietnamese were resolute and ruthless.
        
        Early 1972, Hanoi launched Spring Offensive - wanted to inflict a blow on ARVN to undermine Vietnamisation, have the fall of Thieu and total withdrawal of US troops.
        
        Oct 1972: Prelim agreement reached on terms: cease-fire with armies retaining areas of control, US troop withdrawal within 60 days, exchange of POW, shared control of Saigon gov leading to democratic elections in South/unification of Vietnam and reconstruction including US funding.
        
        Jan 1973: ceasefire announced by Nixon. All US POWS released within 60 days and withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam would be completed within 60 days also.
  - - - SALT I:
        
        Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 26 May 1972:
        
        Limited both USSR and USA to two fields of ABMs each with no more than 100 missiles. One could be set up around capital, other was to protect IBM sits. Restricted strategic value of ABMs. - Meant no significant competition to further develop ABMs. Made race to develop offensive strategic nuclear weapons less critical. ABM Treaty did show that both superpowers recognised the other destructive power and therefore each side had an interest in preventing what would be a mutually destructive conflcit (MAD).
        
        Seen as crucial component in curbing race in strategic offensive weapons. Seen by both US and USSR as fundamental contribution in preventing possibility of nuclear war.
        
        Interim Agreement of the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, 26 May 1972: - Reached between USA and USSR. Linked strategic offensive and defensive arms agreements. Completed ABM Treaty, established freeze on strategic missiles. - Amounted to: 1054 ICBMs for USA and 1618 for SU. 656 Sub-Launched Ballistic Missiles for USA and 740 for USSR. 450 strategic bombers for USA and 140 for USSR. Valid for 5 years. No provision for limitations on new tech such as MIRVs. No defined limits on cruise missile systems. Only interim, due to expire in 1977. SALT talks politically beneficial to Bixon and Brezhnev, reinforced political advantages to be gained by national leaders if they backed policies that created greater stability and the prospects for international peace.
        
        Significance:
        
        Politically beneficial to Nixon and Brezhnev.
        
        Reinforced political advantages for national leaders if they backed policies that created greater stability and prospects of international peace.
        
        SALT led to foundation of a political achievement that made detente possible.
        
        SALT enabled further negotiation
        
        US accepted nuclear parity between itself and USSR. USSR nuclear dominance had faded and two powers of equal status.
        
        Both sides hence had something to gain from detente.
        
        Balance of power accepted, enabled new non-confrontational relationship.
        
        SALT agreements finalised at Moscow Summit.
    - - Detente
        
        What was Detente:
        
        Period from 1969 throughout 70s where there were improved relations between USA and USSR.
        
        Significant agreements between superpowers were made that seemed too provide stability in their relations.
        
        US motives:
        
        Vietnam forced US to realise that they were not an almighty power, but detente could work to resolve this embarrassment.
        
        Current arms parity acting as deterrent for conflict - western Europe
        
        Role of Nixon and Kissinger
        
        Reducing military spending and focus spending on social reform.
        
        Allow influence of powerful industrial-military conflict to be reduced.
        
        Plans for social reform in US undermined by lack of resources due to continued military spending.
        
        Kennedy had vision for new frontier, LBJ a New Society, both sacrificed for increased armaments.
        
        Urban riots in 68 evidence of social issues within Us needing address.
        
        Moves to detente would allow US to invest resources in own commerce and finance services, areas in which West was rival.
        
        For US, detente a method of adapting to a world where power seemed weaker. US interest could be pursued by negotiation without reducing influence internationally.
        
        Allow influence of powerful industrial-military conflict to be reduced.
        
        Plans for social reform in US undermined by lack of resources due to continued military spending.
        
        Kennedy had vision for new frontier, LBJ a New Society, both sacrificed for increased armaments.
        
        Urban riots in 68 evidence of social issues within Us needing address.
        
        Moves to detente would allow US to invest resources in own commerce and finance services, areas in which West was rival.
        
        For US, detente a method of adapting to a world where power seemed weaker. US interest could be pursued by negotiation without reducing influence internationally.
        
        Role of Kissinger:
        
        Key player of Detente. Nixon's National Security Adviser after 69 before Secretary of State in 73.
        
        When Nixon resigned in 74, Kissinger continued as Secretary of State for Ford until 77.
        
        Born in Germany 1923 of Kewish background. Fled with family to US to escape Nazis.
        
        Studied FP at HArvard, developed rep as expert on foreign affairs.
        
        Studied European diplomacy in 19th cent and was admirer of those such as Austrian Matternich ho was successful by adopting practical approach to international relations termed 'realpolitik'.
        
        USSR motives:
        
        Current arms parity acting as deterrent for conflict.
        
        Eastern Europe
        
        Sino-Soviet Split
        
        Reduce arms expenditure so spending could be focused on consumer goods to aid improvements in Russian living standards.
        
        Access to Western technology.
        
        Brezhnev did not really change Khrushchev's FP all that much. Peaceful coexistence continued as furthered USSR's interests. Although ideological differences pointed towards inevitable conflict, national security interests overriding factor of FP, and pushed USSR towards Detente. Nothing new. Nazi Soviet-Pact 1939 was a prime example of security being placed above ideological differences
        
        Advantage of coming to accommodation with US in late 60s, was perceived weakness of US in later staged of Vietnam. USSR also achieved greater degree of parity in nuclear weapons, allowing it to contemplate arms limitations agreements from position of strength/provoke the US to feel insecure regarding its own defence.
        
        Accommodation with US would stabilise Soviet control of Eastern Europe. USSR hoped for recognition from West for influence and control over Eastern Bloc, giving legitimacy that it failed to gain imposing communism after 1945. Romania's half-independent stance, the Czech Crisis of 68 and strikes on Gdansk in 70 were signs Soviet control on Eastern Europe needed strengthening.
        
        Sino-Soviet Split was another factor that pushed Soviet Union towards an accommodation with West. If conflict to occur with China, USSR wanted to ensure USA would not get involved and that Western Europe was stable.
        
        Domestic forces ec. Politburo facing economic problems and needing to divert resourced from military sector to deal with these.
        
        Soviet population failed to gain improvement in living standards they had been led to expect by Khrushchev and Brezhnev
        
        Gov found it difficult to transfer production capacity in industry to consumer goods. Detente would provide international background to make this possible.
        
        Improved relations would allow USSR access to Western tech and grain.
        
        Strides made towards competing with US economy, but Soviet successes had been in areas becoming outdated. Soviet production of steel, cement, oil and pig iron exceeded USA. By end of 70s, vital elements of industrial age that was giving way to port-industrial society based on microchips and computers.
        
        Soviet leadership aware it had access to new tech, developing West.
        
        8th Five Year Plan (66-70) tried to address tech weakness in car industry. More of this possible if relations established.
        
        Fear of War:
        
        CMC 1962, highlighted dangers of confrontation resulting in nuclear war. Kennedy's threat to use US nuclear weapons if USSR nuclear bases not withdrawn from Cuba caused world anxiety.
        
        Nuclear arms race led to development of more efficient missiles causing fear of future war to increase.
        
        1969: USSR matched US for MAD.
        
        Each power had enough nukes to destroy each other in event of strike.
        
        Situation posed threat to economy., but also provided power balance acting as deterrent. However, pressure to forge ahead threatened to disrupt delicate balance.
        
        Necessity of reducing risk of war pushed east and west to detente.
        
        Needs of Europe:
        
        1968: events showed instability on both sides of Iron Curtain in Europe, encouraging formation of links between East and West.
        
        Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia highlighted continuing tensions in Eastern Europe.
        
        France = large-scale demonstrations resulted in general strike, threatened authority of de Gaulle and French gov.
        
        Political disorder posed a threat to both East and West.
        
        Willy Brandt led promotion of links across divide. Saw stabilisation of European relations as essential to interests of continent as whole.
        
        By reducing tension and establishing links between East and West, European divisions could be eroded.
        
        His response was to develop 'Eastern Policy', better known as 'Ostpolitik'. By opening channels between East and West, aided impetus towards detente.
        
        Policy encouraged other European countries to establish links across divide, such as French gov's policy of establishing friendly relations with Romania.
        
        1969: range of factors providing considerable pressure for a detente to be reached in international relations.
        
        Did not mark end to Cold War conflict; developed out of recognition that there was more to gain in East-West struggle through cooperation, rather than confrontation.
        
        Represented change in superpower conflict rather than an end to the Cold War.
        
        Ostpolitik:
        
        Invasion of Czech was 'traffic accident on road to detente'.
        
        Following Nixon's election in Nov 1968, and Willy Brandt, West German chancellor in Oct 1969, with a mandate for his Ostpolitik, would soon be fresh impetus.
        
        Ostpolitik was a term used to define a new approach to European East and West relations. Appointment of Willy Brandt as west German chancellor in Oct 1969 triggered new phase for relations. Chose to abandon Hallstein Doctrine 1955.
        
        Overall objectives of Ostpolitik were to recognise East Germany and territorial changes that occurred at the end of WW2, particularly the creation of the Oder- Niesse border between East Germany and Poland and to recognise both East and West as states in their own rights.
        
        To negotiate with the USSR, settle the frontier with Poland and to negotiate with the German Democratic Republic.
        
        Halstein Doctrine 1955: name given to West German policy aimed at not recognising existence of East Germany, therefore not forming diplomatic relations with any state other than the USSR, that did recognise East Germany. Was a fundamental barrier to European detente.
        
        Brandts talks with USSR led to Non-Aggression Pact August 1970. 7 Dec 1970, West Germany sign treaty with Poland recognising post-war Oder-Niesse border. Important steps towards establishing Ostpolitik, and eventual mutual recognition of two Germanies, were furthered May 1971 when Walter Ulbricht (East Germany) resigned and was replaced with Erich Honecker. Been regarded as 'last Stalinist'. With this shift, came shift in relations. Major breakthrough in Dec 1972 when two Germanies signed agreement formally recognising each other. Hallstein Doctrine dead. Kissinger realised USA must develop detente with USSR to prevent West German detente from marginalising US influence in Europe.
        
        Basic Treaty:
        
        Attempt to normalise relations between 2 Germanies.
        
        Signed 21 Dec 1972 in East Berlin.
        
        Embedded within treaty was commitment to possible economic relations, recognition of FRG and GDR and territorial inviolability. - Other articles promised to seek peaceful methods of conflict resolution too. Critical moment for European detente. - Provided route for other European nations to establish relations with GDR. - Following treaty, certain nations established diplomatic relations with GDR.
        
        By end of Sept 1973, both FRG and GDR were members of UN - groundwork laid for furthering European detente.
        
        Nations that established diplomatic relations with GDR:
        
        Australia Dec 72
        
        UK Feb 73
        
        France Feb 73
        
        NL Deb 73
        
        FRG Feb 74
        
        USA Dec 74
    - - Arguably the peak of European detente
        
        Helsinki Accords took place at European security conference.
        
        CSCE: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was a security conference by all major Eastern and Western European countries and the USA
        
        CSCE had been meeting since 1972, but final meeting took place in Helsinki in 1975.
        
        CSCE included total of 35 states including US and Canada and the whole of Europe except Albania, each with the power of veto.
        
        Conference reached summit level between 30 July and 1 Aug 1975, outcome known as Helsinki Accords or Helsinki Final Act.
        
        Parts of agreement were divided into what became known as 'baskets'.
        
        Helsinki Final Act not the last step in European detente.
        
        Plans laid to have follow-up meetings to focus on European security and further cooperation.
        
        First of many follow up meetings from Helsinki Accords was planned to take place in Belgrade in 77.
        
        Basket 1: Security in Europe
        
        Led to 'Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States'. This consisted of 10 principles that were to be applied to inter-state relations:
        
        Respect for sovereignty and equality among states.
        
        Rejection of threat or use of force
        
        Peaceful settlement of disputes
        
        Recognition of existing frontiers.
        
        Territorial integrity to be recognised and acknowledged.
        
        Non-intervention in internal affairs of other states.
        
        Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
        
        Equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
        
        Cooperation among states
        
        Fulfilment of international obligations.
        
        Additionally, all signatories agreed to provide advanced notification of large military exercises and other plans, in order to reinforce mutual confidence.
        
        Basket 2: Cooperation in field of economics of science and technology and of the environment. - Addressed trade and industrial cooperation, transportation, science and technology. Promotion of tourism, environment and issues concerning migrant labour.
        
        Basket 3: Focused on cultural and educational exchange and wider issue of contacts among people. Sought to encourage feer movement of people, info and ideas.
        
        Position of USSR and US?
        
        USSR:
        
        Main interests: To expand Ostpolitik. To decrease barriers between states to increase economic activity and trade. To further process of East-West detente.
        
        Soviets less interested in details of human rights, but concerned about interference in internal affairs of USSR and other comm states in East Europe.
        
        Soviets also reluctant to accept provisions on advanced notice of military exercises.
        
        BUT USSR committed to promoting East-West detente, so accepted Helsinki.
        
        USA:
        
        Not fully committed to accepting political status quo in Eastern Europe, which Helsinki Final Act seemed to recognise as permanent reality.
        
        Americans feared that agreeing to Helsinki meant accepting divided Germany and an Eastern Europe subservient to USSR.
        
        US feared possibility that support for military programmes within NATO member states would be reduced.
        
        Regardless, common recognition that East-West confrontation in Europe was relaxing and both sides welcomed this.
    - - Why was Kissinger set on ensuring that SALT II was reached by 1977?
        
        Convinced that if agreement was not reached, there would be expansion of nuclear tech as soon as previous agreement expired.
        
        Also poss that USSR would be in a position to destroy nuclear forces.
        
        Raised poss necessity of the USA having to balance strategic forces against those of USSR.
        
        SALT seen by Kissinger as guarantee that nuclear arms race would not revive and expand.
      - What crisis did Carter face in 1978 and how did he respond to this? - By mid 78, Carter faced with USSR's refusal to end deployment of SS-20 missiles in Europe, or to reduce stocks of heavy missiles. - Accepted that USA had to redress growing strategic imbalance. Activated deployment of new weapons programmes and establishment of new stealth bomber. - Dec 1979. Carter convinced NATO allies to increase military expenditure by 3 per cent and to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles across alliance territory. - USSR continued to deploy SS-20 missiles systems through Warsaw Pact allies. Seen by USA and European allies as fundamental threat to NATO defence strategy. - USSR's invasion of Afghanistan in Dec 1979 that shifted basis for East-West detente.
    - - During 70s, Mao's priority was economic development
        
        Closer link to US would help to achieve this aim.
        
        Mao's successor in 76 was Deng Xiaoping who emphasised economics over revolutionary theory.
        
        Nixon's visit to China in 72 brought Sino-US confrontation to an end but formal diplomatic relations did not immediately follow.
        
        Carter took view that China must be central element to US' global strategy and Deng takes similar view.
        
        Taiwan potential obstacle. China saw US support for Taiwan as interference in China's internal affairs.
        
        Dec 1978: China and US reach agreement on Taiwan; Deng concedes that US should cease to aid Taiwan militarily. China assure US that issue with Taiwan be resolved peacefully.
        
        Formal diplomatic relations between China and US would take effect from 1st Jan 1979.
        
        Between Jan 29th and Feb 4th 1979 Deng visited US - China saw positive US relations as way to gain access to US-dominated global markets whereas Carter saw the relationship as a way to strengthen the ability of the US to manage the development of the USSR, which was a growing threat.
    - - Carter's proposals, 28 March 1977:
        
        Reducing strategic systems from 2400 level agreed at Vlad to between 1800 and 2000.
        
        Reducing number of launchers for missiles with MIRVs from 1320 to 1100.
        
        Reducing modern ICBMs to 150 and number of launchers for ICBMs with MIRVs to 550.
        
        Ban on development, testing and deployment of new ICBMs.
        
        Ban on all types of cruise missiles with a range above 2500 km.
        
        Only heavy bombers could have air-launched cruise missiles with a range of 600-2500 km.
        
        USSR's response:
        
        Brezhnev regarded Vlad as binding, and thought Carter was acting in unilateral and unacceptable manner. Proposals demanded disproportionate reduction in Soviet forces compared to those of USA/ Brezhnev rejected them. Increasing feeling on part of USSR that Carter admin was moving away from detente and cooperation on nukes.
    - - Sino-Soviet Split
        
        1970s: Efforts to reconcile USSR and China had failed by this decade. China would always be junior in the alliance and resented this. USSR had no regard for Chinese position.
        
        1978-92: Deng Xiaoping, leader of China, later comments that China felt as though they were not treated as equals to USSR and this made them feel humiliated.
      - Sino-American relations
        
        July 1971: Kissinger makes secret visit to Beijing to make arrangements for visit by Nixon in following year. Soviet retaliate by organising own summit with Nixon. Paved way for triangular relationship between Washington, Beijing and Moscow and so ended the worst period of confrontation between USSR and China.
        
        Oct 1971: Kissinger makes second trip to Beijing in prep for Nixon visit.
        
        Feb 1972: Sino-US summit. Nixon visits Beijing. Sino-American Alliance.
        
        1972-1974: Russo-American summits take place as result of Sino-American summits.
        
        1976: Mao dies. 1977 onwards - Deng Xiaoping.
        
        China important to US 'peace with honour':
        
        April 1971: US ping-pong team invited to Beijing. Symbolic gesture of diplomacy. Followed Cultural Revolution - China need to get in contact with wider world. FP gesture. Before Nixon's visit.
- - - - April 78, coup and overthrow of Khan (former King of Afghan). Khan in power since 73 with support of PDPA (democrats).
        
        The PDPA was responsible for the overthrow of Khan, due to his failure to introduce previously promised socialist policies. - Coup would lead to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in Dec 1979, which would have huge effects on international policies for the 1980s.
        
        The PDPA was allied to the USSR, but began to break down.
        
        A faction in the PDPA led by Hafizullah Amin gained control.
        
        Soviets worried that regime was alienating most Afghans, leading to instability.
        
        Soviets concerned that Amin might realign Afghan with US, Pakistan and China as result. Afghan would become threat right on Soviet border.
        
        To USSR, Amin was unreliable as an ally and unable to control Islamic opposition.
        
        Soviets in danger of losings strategic, ideological political and economic influence in Afghanistan.
        
        REASONS for Soviet Interest in Afghanistan: SHARED BORDER (2500km along Muslim Central Asian Republics of USSR), SHARED IDEOLOGY (would strengthen geostrategic power of US if allied with them).
        
        USSR needed to protect its own security. B believed if Afghan could be turned into an ally of the US, it could become a threat to the geostrategic position of the USSR.
        
        Afghan needed to remain buffer to protect Soviet security, only secured by military intervention in Afghanistan.Would restore stability and socialism.
        
        Intervention not viewed by USSR as part of process of expansionism but as security necessity.
        
        Soviets viewed own actions as in accordance with basic detente principles in 1972.
        
        Military action was defensive act to prevent Afghanistan from plunging into chaos and becoming victim of hostile external influences.
        
        For Soviets, intended to preserve status quo. Basic Principles as an implicit acceptance that each of superpowers' vital interests had to be guarded. Afghanistan never part of US security system.
        
        USA's reaction to Afghanistan, 1978-79:
        
        Afghanistan assumes greater significance for US when Shah's pro-US regime overthrown by PDPA. Led by Ayatollah Khomeini, under whose regime the US feared Iran would become vulnerable to leftist or communist influences. Might reinforce USSR's regional influence.
        
        Soviet links with Afghanistan proved more important for US. At summit with Brezhnev, Carter highlighted US' growing concerns, stressing that US had not interfered in internal affairs of Afghan so USSR shouldn't either.
        
        Carter referred to intervention as breach of international protocol and threat to peace. Any ratification of SALT II was impossible. 3 Jan 1980, Carter formally asks US to postpone consolidation of SALT II.
        
        In address to nation on 4 Jan 1980, Carter sets out series of measures aimed at USSR. Included: deferral of action on cultural and economic exchanges, major restrictions on Soviet fishing privileges in American waters, ban on sale of high tech and strategic items to Soviets, an embargo on sale of grain to USSR, US military and economic assistance to Pakistan
        
        23 Jan 1980 - Carter Doctrine for defence of Persian Golf. States US fear that USSR invasion of Afghan represents new direction in Soviet global strategy. Concerned that it marked initial step in establishing Soviet presence in Indian Ocean. Developments would then ensure USSR to threaten essential oil shipments for West. Carter's admin spanned era of energy shortage and rising oil prices.
        
        Carter Doctrine translated into US commitment to prevent USSR expansion into Persian Golf and SouthWest Asia. Emphasised military solution, focused on building up US strategic forces. Reinforced need to heal relations with China.
        
        Carter persuades NATO and West to suspend detente. But this was working beneficially in Europe. Trade links with USSR expanded. Europe did not want to become a pawn in US global power strategy.
        
        1981: Carter increases defence budget.
        
        More about US reaction to Afghanistan:
        
        US thought USSR being expansionist, threatening global security and providing significant new geostrategic threat.
        
        USSR thought US were intervening in order to provide an excuse to end detente and revive arms race, and that the Carter Doctrine was unnecessary. International opportunism.
        
        Soviet invasion of Afghan = last blow to detente. Invasion demanded international condemnation and containment.
        
        View taken by US that Soviet invasion of Afghan represented threat to peace, Carter makes it clear US and USSR relations depended on Soviet action in Afghanistan. Makes shift in relations.
        
        Moved from Nixon/Kissinger cooperation to Truman-Eisenhower-Kennedy-esque containment. Enshrined in Carter Doctrine.
- - - - Ethipoia:
        
        WSLF continued insurgency in region, despite withdrawal of Somalia.
        
        Derg implemented reforms to farming methods such as collectivisation.
        
        Reforms, w/ effects of drough, sparked severe food shortage.
        
        1985, est 1 million Ethiopians died.
      - Cuba:
        
        Cuba kept troops in Ethiopia after war to protect socialist gov
        
        Remained until 1989.
        
        Ethiopia, Castro seen as a hero, in Somalia, a villain.
  - - - Background:
        
        Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) founded 1961.
        
        Chamorro Cardenal (editor of only opposition to Somoza regime) assassinated 1978. FSLN outs pres General Somoza 1979.
      - Intervention
      - Communist response
      - Outcomes
    - - El Salvador
        
        Outcomes
        
        Intervention
        
        Communist response