Thus the crux of the matter is whether the special circumstances were within the actual or constructive knowledge of the defaulting party at the time of the contract. This may be illustrated first of all by Pilkington v Wood.216 In April 1950, the plaintiff, desiring to live near his place of business in Surrey, bought a house in Hampshire for £6000, having been advised by the defendant, his solicitor, that the title was good. He raised the purchase money by a bank overdraft and went into occupation. In December 1951, he decided to sell the house as he now wished to reside in Lancashire, where he was about to obtain employment. A purchaser was found who was willing to pay £7500 for the house and for certain additional land recently acquired by the plaintiff, but it was then discovered that the property was not saleable at that price, since the title was bad. The defendant, having admitted that he had been negligent in his investigation of the title, was clearly liable to pay by way of damages the difference between the market value in April of the house with a good title and its market value at that date with the defective title, a difference which the Judge estimated at £2000. The plaintiff claimed, however, that additional damages were payable because his inability to sell the Hampshire house had precluded him from raising the money required for the purchase of a residence in Lancashire. He had been forced, therefore, to reside in a Lancashire hotel during the week and each weekend to visit his wife who had continued to occupy the Hampshire house. Accordingly, he claimed compensation in respect of the cost of the valuation of the Hampshire house, interest on his bank overdraft, and expenses resulting from the mode of living forced upon him after he had obtained work in Lancashire, namely hotel expenses, car journeys and nightly telephone calls to his wife. Harman J held that none of these items was admissible, since at the time of the contract with the solicitor none could be described as likely to result from a breach. The first two items derived from the plaintiff ’s own impecuniosity, a misfortune which, though common enough, was not within the actual or constructive knowledge of the defendant. To attribute to him foresight of the third item would imply a degree of prescience possessed by few. In the words of the learned Judge: The change of place of the plaintiff ’s employment was not one of the chances that could have been known to either of them. It was the voluntary act of the plaintiff, not a result of any contract existing when the bargain was made. The plaintiff chose a new job in Lancashire; he might as well have selected one more remote in Kamschatka or less remote in Hampshire. The defendant cannot be responsible for the expense. The plaintiff might have bought or rented accommodation suitable to his new employment, and there is no evidence that the defendant knew that his financial position might render this impracticable. Still less can the defendant be called upon to pay for the telephone calls, a luxury no doubt exemplary, yet uxorious.
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