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New compatibilits, Classical compatibilism, Additional Questions, b)…

- - - - Second order desires are desires on what we ought to desire (these make us persons/selves)
      - second order desires = volitions
  - - - Answer: Because at a cettain point it is a decisive commitment (identification). At this point the desire is no longer questioned. (p.69, 4th paragraph)
        
        Problem: This is arbitrary. (Watson)
        
        Answer: Wholehartedness (This is when there are no conflicts ina persons wills and they are not ambivalent about things)
        
        It is not arbirary to identify wiht wholeharted desires, because they are desires we are fully satisfied with (p96 last paragraph ff)
        
        but
        
        People cant seem to get from a place ambivalence to a place of wholehartedness of their own free will (because wholehartedness is needed for free will)
        (p98)
    - - What if the second order desire was fabricated by manipulation?
- - - - But this involves practical reasoning which depends on a distincion between values and desires (p.99 top)
    - - Values often conflict with desires and passions
        
        If passions and desires win out over values this is weakness of will, the opposite is self-control
        
        weakness of will, greek: akrasia (= no power)
        
        If we follow our values we are free
  - - - If these harmonise we have free will, if not we don't
        
        similar to platos cariot (p.99+100)
    - - not: 1st order doesnt conform to 2nd order, rather: the systems are out of synch
  - - - Distingushing between compulsive/addictive and weak willed behaviour is therefor neccesarry
- - - - F. real self = higher-order volitons
      - Wa. real self = values
    - - = the right thing for the right reasons
        
        ="normative compliance"
  - - - They are incapable of normative complance
        
        If we wish to assign moral responsibility only if free will is present, and all people who do not do the right thing for the right reason are not free, is there ever moral responisbility?
        
        P.103, 2nd paragraph: "responsibility depends on the ability to act in accordance witht he True and the Good"
        
        Defence: p.103, 5th paragraph. We praise people for good actions, despite then being a result of their character, but we hesitate to assign blame if bad actions are caused by bad character. (?)
    - - p.103-105