Please enable JavaScript.
Coggle requires JavaScript to display documents.
Lecture 12: Inter-group behaviour - Coggle Diagram
Lecture 12: Inter-group behaviour
Inter-group behavior
Summer camp studies (Sherif, 1966)
explanation by realistic group conflict theory (Sherif,
1966) (revisit in Lecture 16 prejudice)
Findings:
inter-group competition generates conflict even when there is no prior history of conflict
superordinate goal reduced hostility
Explained by:
realistic group conflict theory (Sherif, 1966)
a real or perceived conflict of inrerest underlies much of the prejudice and hostility between groups (revisit in lecture 16 prejudice)
Pro: Some research show support for theory
Ember's (1981) study of 26 small scale communities found violence to be more common as population pressures, famine or severe food shortage increased.
Con: Competitive intergroup behaviour can arise without conflict of interest (see next section — minimal group paradigm)
Minimal group paradigm (Tajfel et al, 1970)
explanation by social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979)
the effect of social categorisation on behavior
simply being categorised as a group member
in groups any structure (recap lecture I I — nature & key WITHOUT features of groups) is
sufficient to produce ethnocentrism and competitive inter-group behaviour
argued that social categories based on group membership give people the opportunity to develop a social identity
explains in-group favouritism in terms of members' wishes to enhance their social identity and self-esteem
Pros and Cons
Pro: Robust phenomenon — large number of independent studies in different countries using wide range participants
Oaker and Brown (1986) interviewed nurses and found clear in-group bias amongst sub-groups of nurses.
Con: Limited external validity, given that in everyday life group memberships are filled with meaning and content (recap lecture 11)
Social conflicts
Inter-group conflict
What it is
Conflict BETWEEN groups and their members
Arising from their being members of the groups (and not from specific individual qualities).
Types of inter-group conflict
i. Realistic social conflict
Conflict directed towards perceived disparity in possession of or access to real resources between the groups (recap Sherif's summer camp studies)
ii. Symbolic conflict
Conflict directed towards the differences in social or cultural identity or symbolic between the resources groups (refer to Lecture 16 - prejudice)
Ways to resolve inter-group conflict over resources (due to realistic social conflict)
see subject guide and readings as well
Common ground
e.g., via shared goal (recap Sherif's summer camp studies)
Imagining works too
Negotiation / bargaining
Outcomes affected by parties' level of aspiration
Typically a tough bargaining strategy gives more profitable outcome
Mediation
A third party helps to find an agreement
Arbitration
A third party imposes a settlement
social dilemmas
What it is
Specific form of conflictual decision making where one has to decide whether to compete or to cooperate
Types of social dilemma
resource dilemmas
what are they?
Potential conflict between individuals and the group concerning the use or allocation of shared resources.
Individuals can make choices or decisions about these resources which are either selfish (aimed at benefiting themselves) or unselfish/cooperative (aimed at benefiting 'the greater good').
the outcome need NOT sum to zero with competition, both parties could sustain a loss
With co-operation, both parties could gain
public good dilemma
Individuals must contribute to a common pool in order to maintain public good
If everyone chooses to be selfish by being a 'free rider' (i.e., failing to contribute — recap lecture I I free rider), then there will be no resources
tragedy of the commons/commons dilemma
Everyone takes from a common pool of goods that will replenish itself if used moderately but not if overused
Selfish/competitive choice: Taking resources without regard to their replenishment
short-term individual profit but also maximises increases longer-term group loss
Co-operation would not maximise short-term individual profit but would guarantee longer- term group profit
prisoner's dilemma
since it is not always possible to study social dilemmas in real life, researchers have created a variety of games with highly structured rewards and penalties to mimic real world dilemmas - the most famous is the prisoner's dilemma
Simplest form is two-person non-zero sum game. The outcomes depend on whether the two players/prisoners:
compete (i.e., confess) which generates a lose-lose outcome
cooperate (i.e., refuse to confess) which generates a win-win outcome
one chooses to compete and one to co-operate, which benefits the competing individual but generates nothing for the individual who cooperates.
Ways to resolve social dilemma
Structural solutions
• Rewarding cooperation and punishing non- cooperation
• Making available information regarding costs and benefits
• Appointing leader to manage resource allocation.
Group and individual-level social psychological solutions
• Campaigns encourage a stronger sense of group or community identity associated with shared resource use, highlighting how individual efforts contribute to the common good.
• Highlight descriptive or prescriptive social norms of co-operation, which others may then follow. (refer to Lecture 14 persuasive communicating and marketing)
When do they occur?
situations in which costs/benefits in the short-term differ from those in long-term
Why do they occur?
long-term consequences are hidden — they may not be well understood or overshadowed by short-term consequences
while longer-term consequences tend to apply at the group level, short-term consequences apply to the individual
Conflict resolution and culture
Cultural differences in cooperativeness
people from collectivistic cultures are more cooperative than those from individualistic cultures in solving dilemmas
May reflect different for sanctions for not cooperating: when same punishment, difference disappears
Cultural differences in styles of conflict resolution / negotiation (Buttery & Leung, 1996) (revisit in lecture 18 communication)
US: Confrontation used, Silence rarely used. Eastern Asia: Confrontation Avoids, Silence used.
Crowd behavior
Other collective behavior
Concerns large numbers of people acting together or in relation to each other's behaviour, even when they are NOT physically co-present
Explanations for collective behaviour:
Emotional contagion (recap Le Bon)
Emotional experience can be shared by observing the experience of others (Hatfield et al., 1993)
Contagion evident in organisations: emotional state of work group. Can be strongly influenced by leader influences group cohesiveness, morale, productivity etc.
Herding
Other behaviours may also be copied so that collectives exhibit a form of herding
When repeated, this can generate an informational cascade, rapidly passing information from one source to another, gaining in credence as it multiplies.
may be connected to heuristics (recap lecture 7 availability heuristic), in which people use the behaviour of someone they can easily observe as a source of information
Herding can be applied to large scale stock-market trends driven by contagious emotions — e.g., greed, fear of missing gains, fear of major losses in crashes etc herding may generate Irrational outcomes (Shiller, 2000).
What causes crowd behavior?
Le Bon (19th century): Release of instinctive non- rational tendencies that are otherwise suppressed
Le Bon emphasised the arousal effect of the presence of other people (recap Lecture 11 Zajonc's drive theory)
such arousal allowed otherwise suppressed instinctual or primitive motivations to be expressed.
Being aroused in a crowd also leads to heightened emotions, which can seem contagious (see later section on collective behavior)
Limitation: Anti-social behaviour may not occur if the crowd has strong pro-social norms which limit the reduction in public self-awareness
Zimbardo's (1969) deindividuation theory of crowd behaviour: Deindividuation leads to crowd behavior
crowd
Higher arousal
Diffusion of responsibility (recap lecture 4 — helping behavior) - Loosening of personal control over behavior
leads to deindividuation
Loss of identity and sense of individuality
reduced public self- awareness (reduced interest in the appraisal of others)
therefore leads to irrational, antisocial behavior
Anonymity
Emergent norm theory: Crowd behavior is governed by norms
crowd behaviour is governed by social norms that emerge from the situation in which the crowd finds itself
Emergent norm may depend on behaviour of significant individuals
Limitation: Given crowds come together in specific contexts or for specific reasons, likely they import relevant group norms rather than create new ones
Reicher and colleagues' (1995) social identity theory of deindividuation (SIDE): Crowd behavior is driven by intergroup conflict and resulting social identities
proposed that people have two types of identity (recap lecture 6 Tajfel and Turner's (1979) social identity theory), activated to different degrees according to context
crowd behaviour arises from changes to (rather than loss of - as suggested by deindividuation theory) social aspects of the self.
In crowd: Behaviors driven by the social driven by crowd and its norms
Alone: identity provided by the personal identity
crowd behaviour is not solely a matter of the qualities of the group itself
but also of how the group understands relations to other groups with which its it might be in real or symbolic competition
individuals in a crowd may carry out a cognitive appraisal of the situation which may involve a conscious reflection on the outcomes and actions which the members would endorse were they acting alone
What are crowds?
