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Case Study of North Korea - Coggle Diagram
Case Study of North Korea
"Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community." (Washington, DC: February 22, 2022): 16-17.
Regional and Global Objectives and Activities: Kim Jong Un will continue to efforts to expand Pyongyang's nuclear and conventional capabilities targeting the US and our allies. (p. 16)
WMD and ICBM's are critical to North Korea's (and Kim's) continued existence and will eventually be accepted as nuclear power.
Current economic hardships from sanctions and pandemic are not bad enough to force change in behavior/objectives.
Kim wants DPRK to be a nuclear power
Kim will continues to use escalation tactics to drive a wedge between US and South Korea as they have different strategies for dealing with DPRK
DPRK is funding regime and weapons via illicit activities (cyber, stealing)
Military Capabilities: Kim will continue to pursue niche threats effective against US and its allies to make up for deficiencies in conventional forces
Kim's weapons priorities: nuclear submarines, hypersonic glide vehicles, long-range self-propelled missiles, MIRV and represent a commitment to expanding arsenal over time
Kim will continue to pursue testing strategy to normalize testing and further advance specific technical objectives,and reinforce deterrence
WMD: Kim is committed to expanding nuclear weapons arsenal and delivery systems (ICBM's, IRBM's, and SLBM's)
Continue to develop plutonium and enriched uranium
Continue testing delivery mechanisms
Cyber: DPRK is good at and poised to conduct surprise cyber attacks against US and allies
Capable of temporarily disrupting critical US infrastructure
Have already conducted many attacks against a host of targets
Sue Mi Terry, "North Korea's Nuclear Family," Foreign Affairs 100, no. 5, (Sep/Oct 2021): 115-120,122.
How the Kim's got the bomb and why they won't give it up p. 1
More capable enemy than decades past; nuclear capability that is growing every year; "pariah state allowed to fester"
See nuclear capability as critical to long term success of regime as much of Kim's bad behavior is only tolerated because of the nuclear threat
Direct nuclear strike is unlikely (but they have the capability), more likely they will support conventional strike, terrorist act, cyber act, sell weapons to other countries. Destabilizing influence on South Korea and Japan if they no longer feel safe in the region and develop their own nuclear capabilities.
How the North won out p. 2-3
Nuclear weapons = military asset, insurance policy, source of prestige
Make up for their deficits at home (with their citizens) and abroad for what they lack in diplomatic, economic, and soft power
1994 was probably the last time we could have intervened (at great cost) stop NK developing nuclear weapons, instead, we settled on the Carter-negotiated Agreed Framework, signed in 1996.
US confronted NK in 2002 (they were still enriching uranium), and the result was NK withdrawal from Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty... but not sure there was a better outcome possible.
US got stuck in a cycle of sanctions and pressure campaigns, followed by overtures and agreements that fell apart.
Sanctions against NK officials' personal assets were most effective, but short lived
Falling in love with rocket man p. 3-4
Obama also ran into the same issues and developed a policy of "strategic patience" to break the cycle of provocation, extortion, and retreat.
Under Trump, used "maximum pressure" through isolation and increased sanctions to ratchet up pressure on NK, but switched to "maximum engagement" when Kim showed signs of wanting to deal.
The "maximum pressure" campaign was very effective, mostly because China supported sanctions and upheld them. Not sure there is appetite for that nowadays. New South Korean president may be more willing though
False Hopes p. 4-5
US has not allowed any one strategy a fair chance at success and lost its opportunity for regime change
North Korea's Kim regime is threatened by its own lack of legitimacy
Beijing has more influence than US and is much more likely to be successful (maybe), but they're afraid of a failed state due to an inflow of refugees
A New Threat.
Biden has inherited a more determined adversary with robust nuclear capability
A pre-emptive strike is not a viable option - the North's weapons are spread out, hidden in bunkers,and easily moved... cannot guarantee all of them will be taken out at once.
Biden's best bet is containment and then to work on regime change from the bottom up
Capitalize on Beijing irritation with next nuclear test to move forward with hard lines economic sanctions that China will support
Strengthen alliance between SK, Japan,
Must engage in counterproliferation: cannot have more individuals/failed governments with nuclear capabilities
Highlight gap between NK propaganda and what its citizens actually face every day (playbook from dealing with USSR)
Threat of a nuclear North Korea is due to its government, must see a change in regime to feel safe about nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula
Nicholas L. Miller and Vipin Narang, "North Korea Defied the Theoretical Odds: What we can learn from its Successful Nuclearization?" Texas National Security Review; 1, No. 2 (2018): 58-75.
Academic theories on nuclear proliferation failed to predict North Korea; authors call for
reconsideration of the role of threats of military force,
economic development, foreign technological support, and regime type on the ability of proliferators to withstand external pressure.
There are limits to what economic sanctions, export controls can achieve; must have timely policy interventions and inducements to be successful, must also recognize that US domestic political dynamics will impact non-proliferation.
Early Years (1960-1992)
The early years: Signed the non-proliferation treaty... but that meant nothing to North Korea as they continued to pursue nuclear weapons
North Korea felt isolated by loss of ally in USSR and Chinese and Russian pursuit of improved relations with South Korea
First Nuclear Crisis (Feb 1992-May 1994)
THe small victories achieved through 1992 were quickly undone by continued North Korean pursuit of nuclear weapons... despite signing IAEA safeguards, allowing inspections and winning "boons" from US and South Korea
As North Korea backed out of agreements, China indicated it was unwilling to comply with sanctions due to fear of regime collapse and a refugee crisis.... there was no real stick.
Reached crisis point after several back and forth exchanges over joint US/South Korean exercises, US moving patriot missiles back onto the pen, whether North Korea would or would not allow inspections... all of this tit for tat strong arm tactics seemed designed to be "tough guy realism" but just caused anxiety and further determination in North Korea. p. 63
The Agreed Framework and its Demise (June 1994 - Mar 2003)
Former President Carter brokered the "Agreed Framework" which laid a pathway for NK compliance with inspection, NPT, etc. and the US agreed to provide two light water reactors (energy) and eventually normalize diplomatic relations.
The US was not living up to its end of the bargain by the late 1990's (hadn't broken down, less oil, no change in being labeled "state sponsor of terror", etc....
Despite set backs and concerns NK was still pursuing a policy of proliferation, Clinton administration pursued further agreements; ran into the end of their administration
Bush administration favored more sanctions and tougher staff, did a poorl job following through on promises of Agreed Framework while NK continued to violate at least the spirit of the agreement.
Bush administration inclusion of NK as part of the Axis of Evil led to back and forth accusations and ultimately the failure fo the Agreed Framework.
North Kore seems to respond as well to carrots as sticks, if not a little better.
Crossing the finish line (Apr 2003 -Dec 2017)
NK demanded additional economic, diplomatic, and security benefits which the Bush admin did not support. Instead, they worked through the Six Party Talks (Aug 2003-2009)
During Six Party Talks, NK identified many concessions they wanted, but US government did not support and focused on increased sanctions.
Made some progress Feb 2007, but this stalled after US did not live up to its side of the bargain
Obama admin focused on "strategic patience policy"... which meant that there was increased (slowly) pressure on North Korea. They achieved NK resistance to negotiation, but not much else..
After failed Leap Day agreement, NK refused to engage in negoatiations for rlease
Between 2010 and 2017, conducted 4 nuclear tests and demonstrated ICBM capability... a threat to the US homeland. UN has passed a lot of sanctions that don't have much impact when China and Russia don't participate.T
There seems to be no inducement (economic/diplomatic) to give up their nuclear arsenal.
Academic theories
Realist: States will almost never stop pursuing nuclear weapons if the perceived threat is great enough
States seek nuclear weapons for security purposes
Can be "determined" to accomplish
Dictatorships and authoritarian regimes are often unable to manage complexity of a nuclear weapons program and are too paranoid to be successufl.
Regime successfully stymied food growing, but not the nuclear weapons work. North Korea is both strong and weak - willing to develop the systems necessary for nuclear weapons but not to feed its people.
North Korea is pretty immune from sanctions that are only held up (primarily) by the US,