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The Philosopher's View THE PERSONAL IDENTITY DEREK PARFIT'S…

- - - - CHANGES OUR VIEWS
        ON AGING AND DEATH
  - - - WE HAVE SUCCESSIVE SELVES,
        SOMETIMES SO DISTANT THAN
        WORRY ABT THEM = IRRELEVANT, p.91
- - - - CONTRADICTION : AS BOTH LIVES
        COULD GO A DIFFERENT WAY
        (can't be different and at the same time the same)
    - - NOT PLAUSIBLE : ARBITRARY
    - - NOT PLAUSIBLE AS IF WE THREW 1
        HALF AWAY WE WOULD SAY
        REMAINING ONE IS ME (so if both remain
        then I should be both, not none), p.86
    - - BECAUSE S.P.P.I REQUIRES 1-2-1 RELATIONSHIP,
        SO IF SEVERAL CANDIDATES TO BE ME : NO DISCUSSION POSSIBLE
        
        SURVIVAL WITHOUT
        IDENTITY
  - - - WILL THAT PERSON BE ME
        OR ONLY A REPLICATE OF ME?
        
        JUST 2 WAYS OF DESCRIBING
        THE SAME EVENT (audio, Parfit on
        personal identity)
        
        DUALISTS WOULD ANSWER THAT
        NEED ME IS WHICHEVER GOT MY
        SOUL TRANSFERRED, p.87
        
        PPL WHO THINK PHYSICAL CONTINUITY IS SPPI
        THEN DEATH RESULTS IN THE NEW PERSON
        NOT BEING ME, p.87
  - - - IS IT THE SAME CLUB?
        
        NO, THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE.
        SO WHY WOULD IT BE DIFFERENT
        IN THE CASE OF A PERSON?
  - - - IS NEW PERSON ME
        OR NOT?
        
        BODILY OR PSYCHOLOGICAL
        CONTINUITY MAKES S.P.P.I? p.91
        
        ITS AS BAD/GOOD THAN
        ORDINARY SURVIVAL, p.319 SB