Please enable JavaScript.
Coggle requires JavaScript to display documents.
Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of US-China Relations,” International…
Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of US-China Relations,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005) 12-39.
Liberal Optimists
-
-
Democratization. p. 15
Democracy is a force for peace. The belief is that economic growth opens the door for needing free exchanges of information, stable courts/laws, etc. that support growth. As people become accustomed to those liberties, they expect comparable democratic ideas. p. 15.
Liberal optimists are the most common type of policy maker and believe in the "pacifying effect" of:
-
Realist optimists: there are some optimists who see China's power increasing not as rapidly and their ambitions as not as large as feared.
China's power: limited and likely to remain so. China is not as powerful as realist pessimists give them credit for, the slope of the power curves of US vs. China is not as bad as pessimists believe, and there are economic and non-economic factors that will keep China from reaching maximal power. This model assumes that Chinese leaders are rational.
China's aims: limited. We are in a unipolar world order with US in the center. China has limited territorial expansion goals (Taiwan, some land borders, China Straits/South China Seas). Give them that and will that make them accept the status quo?
The security dilemma: Muted. Not as concerned about a mutual arms race to the bottom... think that we are trending towards a bipolar Asia which will be tense, but has as much to be stable in the way that US/USSR relations were. The fact that both powers have nuclear weapons reinforces the idea that we are more stable, not less in a bipolar Asia.
US and China do not have overlapping spheres of influence, unlike US/USSR during the Cold War. It's possible, both will be content to maintain superiority/control in their sphere.
Liberal pessimists: most liberals are optimists... but they can be pessimistic about domestic US and Chinese situations that could negatively influence each state and their interactions with each other. p. 29.
China: an authoritarian regime in transition? China is neither a totalitarian state nor a democracy, but rather an authoritarian regime of dubious legitimacy with an uncertain grip on power. p. 28
Chinese government is not relying on the promise of communist ideals to stay in power... rather, rely on military, domestic security forces, promises of increase prosperity, and nationalism.
Chinese rulers are likely to use external affairs (Taiwan,US, Japan) as a distraction from discontent with Beijing.
We are at most risk of war during the transition from authoritarian regime to democracy (ironically), as compared to a stable autocracy
The US: A crusading liberal democracy? Democracies do not have to be peaceful; and in fact, are more likely to be bellicose against an autocracy. p. 31.
Human rights violations are not just inherently wrong, they are also a sign that a regime is evil and illegitimate.
We have more in common with Taiwan (democracy) than PRC... that makes it more likely we will come to Taiwan's aid, despite it not being in our realpolitik interest.
Interactive effects: Ideological differences and insecurities may be mutually reinforcing in a negative direction. Impact of "reinforcing hawks" on relations.
-
-