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Individual Transferable Quotas (Fishing) - Coggle Diagram
Individual Transferable Quotas (Fishing)
nature of policy instrument
history
30 year history of use in many fishery management strategies ( Chu, 2008)
benefits and implementation of them presently remains controversial ( Chu, 2008)
first countries adopting
Netherlands, Iceland and Canada (late 1970s)
Falkland Islands most recent (2006) (Chu, 2008)
present
at least 18 countries utilise ITQ systems to manage their marine resources (Chu, 2008)
Chu 2008
Several hundred stocks for 249 species managed under ITQ schemes globally
leading countries in ITQ management
Iceland and New Zealand
implemented ITQs for all major commercial species
in terms of no. of species under ITQ management
New Zealand, Canada and Australia
Nature/Function
ITQs are fee-based
fees help fund enforcement, management and scientific research (Grafton et al. 1996; Sutinen 1999 from Chu, 2008)
what?
quotas
in what form?
catch shares of TAC (Chu, 2008) and (Stud 2006)
dedicated access privileges (Chu, 2008) and (Stud 2006)
for who?
individual fishers (Stud 2006)
two forms
1 more item...
fishing communities (Stud 2006)
fisher coopertives (Stud 2006)
work within a wider management scheme in which TAC is set by a regulatory body and then sorted into units that can be bough, sold or leased among participants in the fishery
why
physical limit on harvest (stud 2006)
penalities for non-compliance (stud 2006)
create a market (stud 2006)
incentivises fishers to use TAC efficiently (stud 2006)
where marginal cost of permit equal to expected marginal net beneit from sale of permitted catch (stud, 2006)
global spread of uptake
10% of total marine harvest (several hundred fisheries worldwide) currently managed using some form of TAC-ITQ system (Arnason 2005 from (Chu 2008)
case study
Pacific halibut fishery
Location
Off coast of British Columbia
Before IVQ intervention
managed initially as a limited-entry, derby style system (chu, 2008)
induced impact of 'race to the end'
led to fish days reducing from 65 in 1980 to 10 in 1990 (chu, 2008)
further socio-economic impact (according to Chu, 2008)
endangered health and safety of fishers
difficulty of limited entry approach to keep catch within limits
reduced profitability of pacific halibut market
bc oversupply of halibut (market flooded with halibut in Chu, 2008 words), so had to be sold at cheaper prices
derby style fishery meaning fishing season is only open for a few weeks/months
After IVQ
when
introduced in 1991
socio-economic impact
fisher safety improved
fishing seasons length increased to 245 days
ex-vessel prices rose as market demand for fresh halibut increased
(Herrmann 1996)
benefits
end 'race for fish'
((Grafton 1996; McCay 1996) Chu 2008)
clarification
vessels fish at an ever increasing pace causing fishing season to shorten to just days
improve fleet efficiency
mechanism
quota related fees 'may cause some fishers to leave fishery while other may combine resources and consolidate crew' ((Grafton 1996, Wang and Tang 1996; Eythorsson 2000) from Chu 2008)
reduce over-exploitation
evidence by Chu 2008 showed ITQs can 'decelerate the decline of fish stocks, though it was noted in their research the impacts of ITQs are highly variable)
in 12 of fish stocks studied by Chu 2008, biomass increased after ITQ implementation
mechanism by which ITQ causes such changes
removal of excess harvesting capacity from the fishery
aid conservation of fish stocks by improving harvest conditions and accounting for quota
effectiveness must be looked within a wider context
application of individual transferable quotas alone do not conserve fish stocks
must be looked at within broader context of marine management
2 more items...
establishment of property rights through ITQs exclude fishers withouts rights access to fish stocks (stud 2006)
end of race for fish
occurs in most ITQ fisheries becaus 'fisher can harvest at their own pace, maximisng their resources and optimiszing when the fish goes to market to increase profits ((Grafton 1996, Beddington et al. 2007, Gibbs 2008) from Chu 2008)
prevents overcapitalisation within the fisheries
bc fewer boats (less effort) (Stud 2006)
bc diverts investment away from racing capital (technology which speeds up boats to access fish stocks) (stud, 2006)
fishers have an incentive to use the most efficient fishing gear and fishing methods to enhance net benefits of the quota (R. Arnason)
improvement in harvest compliance
quota fees used to fund on-board and/dockside monitoring and enforcement (National Research Council 1999)
51% decrease in marketable discards of most species in BC groundfishery after ITQs introduced ((Branch et al 2006) from Chu, 2008)
increase ex-vessel prices
establishment of a market provides individual fishers or fishing cooperatives with an incentive to maximise efficiency of the total allowable catch.
value of ITQs determined by the productivity of the fishery
collapsed fishery - ITQ permits worth little
healthy fishery
permit prices worth a lot
wealth to be gained
effect of property rights
See Stud 2016
alternatives to ITQ
marine protected areas
ecosystem-based management plans
drawbacks
relate to
initial allocation of quotas
often based on historical landings and vessel characteristics
problem arises with fishermen being disingenuious regarding catch history to attain extra quota ((Branch 2008) Chu, 2008)
concentration of the quota to fewer participants
because ITQs reduce overcapitalisation
lead to social inequality among fishers groups and between generations ((Eythorsson 2000; Arnason 2005; Hilborn et al. 2005a) Chu, 2008)
socio-economic consequences for fishers within the ITQ managed fishery
practical applications
in fisheries with inadequat monitroign and enforcement, false reporting and quota-busting can be a problem
limited geographical application
not able to be used in marine areas beyond national jurisdiction
initial reasons ITQs adopted
stock depletion
related to overfishing and overcapitalisation in fishery (Chu, 2008)
curb fleet capacity ((Liew 2001) Chu 2008)
safety concerns for fishers (Chu 2008)
political change (Chu, 2008)
local gishing businesses have flexibility to structure their activites to maximise investment
promote investment in long-term research and development of fish resources
moving forward
long-term adaptive management and importance of science, monitoring and enforcement of ITQ systems
effectiveness of ITQs in recovering fish stocks is context-dependant to the fishery
in some places in may not be enough, in others it may have a profound positive effect
in fisheries where biological and environmental factors are not severely limiting ability of fish stocks to recover, science (determining TAC), effective monitoring and enforcement is likely going to contribute to the success of the ITQ
may have little effect on highly migratory species
compliance by all nations is not guaranteed
under-reporting of catches
Southern Bluefish Tuna
in these cases a multi-national ITQ system managed by an international agency may be needed (chu 2008)
illegal harvesting by nations
ecosystem-based management plan may be needed in addition in some cases ((Marasco et al. 2007) Chu 2008)
'the positive changes in 12 of the 20 stocks suggest that ITQs can be a beneficial component of the management for some fisheries while in others, alternative or complementary measures are needed to sustain the fishery. These may combine ITQs with more effective TACs, better enforcement and mon- itoring or ecosystem-based management.' Chu, 2008
overfishing background/context
biomass of top marine predators is now some 10% of what it was half a century a go (ref 1 from Heal 2008)
many species projected to face extinction within decades
bluefin tuna
atlnatic cod
sword fish in atlantic and indian ocean
tragedy of the commons
