Krytyka Russela -- Perhaps the best-known objection to a coherence theory of truth is Bertrand Russell's.[1] He maintained that since both a belief and its negation will, individually, cohere with at least one set of beliefs, this means that contradictory beliefs can be shown to be true according to coherence theory, and therefore that the theory cannot work. However, what most coherence theorists are concerned with is not all possible beliefs, but the set of beliefs that people actually hold. The main problem for a coherence theory of truth, then, is how to specify just this particular set, given that the truth of which beliefs are actually held can only be determined by means of coherence.
Bzdura, koherencja dotyczy metamodelu, spójność nie następuje pomiędzy naukowym a mistycznym a etyką; mogą być niespójne między sobą i np. etyka nakazuje nie postępować tak jak rzeczy się toczą "naturalnie" w modelu fizycznym
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