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Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind by J.R. Searle, 1998 - Coggle Diagram

- - - - physical, spatial dimension
      - divisible & determined
      - known indirectly
    - - mental, thinking, consciousness
      - indivisible & free
      - known directly: cogito, ergo sum
- - - - :question:problems with behaviourism & functionalism: they do not explain some central feature of mind, e.g. subjectivity, qualia, semantic content
  - - - OBJECTIONS:
        
        :red_cross:circularity, e.g. both beliefs and desired can be analyzed only presupposing the other
        
        :red_cross:overlooks mental-physical causality
        
        :red_cross:superactor-superspartan counterexamples (pain feeling vs pain behaviour)
        
        :red_cross:common sense objection: we have subjective conscious mental states that are different from our behaviour
  - - - Type-Type: every type of mental state is identical with a brain state
        
        WEAKNESSES
        
        :red_cross:mental-physical identity contingence refers to 2 different sets of features to define identity, but this is property dualism
        
        :red_cross:Neuronal Chauvinism. >> leads to Token-Token identity theory
        
        :red_cross:common sense, leaves out the mind
      - Token-Token
        
        :question: what if 2 physical states refer to the same mental state >> leads to functionalism
      - :red_cross: 3 main arguments against any identity theories
        
        Thomas Nagel: What is it like to be a bat
        
        Frank Jackson: What Mary Knew
        
        Saul Kripke: Necessary Identities
- - - - abstract, mathematical notion. practical example: modern computer
      - performs 4 operations
        
        print 0, erase 1
        
        print 1, erase 0
        
        move 1 square left
        
        move 1 square right
- - - - Connectionism is faster, but still computation (fits Church's thesis)
      - the physics of specific architectures = speculative neurobiology, not computation
  - - - not sure. probably involves neurons and synapses
- - - - Held by Fodor, language of thought hypothesis
  - - - e.g. force, mass, gravity, photosynthesis
      - vs observer-relative are: money, property, government, marriage
    - - standard definition / Turing : observer-relative
        
        Multiple Realizability Argument - same computations can be realized in different physical structures
        
        physical structures can be assigned a computational interpretation
        
        then, computation is observer-relative. Computation in nature is assigned, not discovered, and doesn't exist outside of e.g. humans carrying out conscious computation such as 1+1=2
  - - - a) is the brain intrinsically a digital computer? - nothing is intrinsically a digital computer. Something is a computer only relative to a computational interpretation
      - b) can the brain be assigned a computational interpretation? -- Yes, a computational interpretation can be assigned to anything.
    - - CR: semantics is not intrinsic to syntax
      - this argument: syntax is not intrinsic to physics