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The Idea of phenomenology Problem of positive science - Coggle Diagram

- - - - Progres of positive knowledge
        16.6 This is how positive knowledge makes progress. It takes possession of a reality that exists and is given as a matter of course by examining it more closely with respect to its extent, its content, its elements, relations, and laws.
        
        Solving by logic or facts
        16.7 In Every step of this knowledge, difficulties arise and are solved either by pure logic or by an appeal to the facts.
      - Judgments in experience-world
        15.3 Judgements refer to world perceived. We embed things presented into expression. From experience we infer what is not experienced; we generalize. New pieces of knowledge enter into logical relations with each other.
        
        Contradiction of judgments
        15.4 Some information do not agree with each other; they contradict and are expunged by assured knowledge.
        
        Comparison of the grounds
        16.5 When grounds for belief enter into conflict then we proceed to assess the grounds for various possibilities of explaining the matter; the weaker must give way to the stronger as long as the former do not get involved in similar logical battle.
      - Possibility of knowledge taken for granted
        16.8 What is taken for granted in natural thinking is the possibility of knowledge. Natural thinking doesn’t find occasion to raise the question of the possibility of knowledge as such. There is problem of knowledge but in a certain way; it becomes an object of positive research. Knowing is a natural state of affairs; it is a psychological fact. And as such it can be with respect to its kinds and forms of interconnection. Knowledge is, according to its essence, knowledge of objectivity, and it is such by virtue of the sense that is immanent to it, the sense by which it relates itself to objectivity. And natural thinking also deals with such relations. As an object for investigation, it takes, in their formal generality, the a priori connections between meanings and meaning-calidities, the a priori laws that belong to objectivity as such; it gives rise to a pure grammar and, at a higher level, a pure logic and especially to scientific thinking
        
        Problem of the possibility of knowledge
        17.9 Precisely this correlation between epistemic experience, meaning and object that represents the source of problems, which, taken together, comprise the problem of the possibility of knowledge.
        
        Knowledge is psychic object, so how it reaches objects?
        17.10 In all of its manifestations, knowledge is a mental experience; it belongs to knowing subject. The known objects stand over against it. How, then, can knowledge be sure of its agreement with the known objects? How can knowledge go beyond itself and reach its objects reliably? Perception is an experience that belongs to me. Likwise, memory, expectation, all the acts of thought built upon them. How do I, the knowing subject, know - and how can I know for sure – that not only my experiences, these acts of knowing, exist, but also what they know exists? Indeed, how do i know that there is anything at all that can be set over against knowlede as an object?
        
        If so, should i reach solipsism?
        17.11 If I will acknowledge that only phenomena are given to knowing subject and the knowing subject never gets beyond its experiences then should I adopt solipsism? Should I reduce all transcendent objectivity to mere fictions, which can be explained by means of psychology, but not rationally justified?
        
        Even logic can be merely human logic
        18.12 But relating to logic is itself problematic: ‘the real meaning of logical lawfulness, which natural though would not dream of questioning, now becomes questionable and even dubious’. Isn’t knowledge only a human knowledge? Isn’t it just forms of thinking of our species? Couldn’t it be different for other species and in future when evolution will proceed?
        
        Sense of objectivity in question
        21.23 In the skeptical mood which originates in critical epistemological reflection ‘every positive science and every positive scientific method ceases to count as an available possession. (…) What becomes questionable is the possibility of knowledge (…) making contact with an objectivity (…). (…) the sense of its claim to validity or justification, the sense of the distinction between valid knowledge and knowledge that merely makes a pretence to validity, is in question; as is, (…) the sense of objectivity, which is and is what it is whether it is known or not, and yet as an objectivity is an objectivity of a possible knowledge, in principle knowable even if it has as a matter of fact never been known or will be known, in principle perceivable, imaginable, and determinable by predicates in a possible judgement, etc.’
  - - - Philosophy cannot employ exact science
        21.24 If ‘the very sense and value of positive knowledge as such with all its methodological arrangements’ became dubious then how operating within its assumptions can solve problems of the critique of knowledge. Even ‘the most rigorous forms of mathematics and mathematical natural science here have not the slightest advantage over any actual or alleged knowledge belonging to common experience’. ‘(…) There can be no talk of philosophy orienting itself to the exact sciences methodologically, or taking the method of the exact sciences as a model, or that it is the task of philosophy to extend and perfect the work accomplished in the exact sciences according to a method that is essentially the same for all the sciences.’ ‘ Philosophy lies in a new dimension; and to this new dimension there corresponds a fundamentally new method which is to be contrasted with the “natural” method – even if * it has its essential connections to the old dimension’.