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What are the epistemic problems associated with believing in a conspiracy…

- - - - So, if we assume that CTs are like scientific theories, it follows that they ought to be falsifiable. That is, they ought to be able to be disproven in the face of counter evidence
        
        However, conspiracy theories arguably cannot be falsified. Potentially falsifying evidence can be rejected by the CT because they can argue that this can be coverup actions by the conspirators in order to throw people off the trail (Keeley, 120-122)
        
        If a theory isn't falsifiable, then there must be an epistemic problem with believing it, so conspiracy theories are epistemically problematic
        
        Response: conspiracy theories differ from scientific or other theories because there are agents actively acting against the discovery of knowledge
        
        Unlike science, there is ostensibly a group of people, with significant power, working to obstruct the emergence of the conspiracy
        
        therefore, we can justify removing the falsifiability criteria for CTs in particular because they are a special brand of theories
        
        3 more items...
        
        explain here why they can't be falsified, give some examples
        
        links into their ability of explanatory completeness (Keeley, Basham)
        
        a criticism: they overestimate the ability of people to place evidence and manipulate data?
- - - - we simply can't know whether our public institutions really are up to scratch or not, either way. So, this is not a reason to fundamentally distrust CTs
  - - - "major centres of control combine...combine enormous financial and technological resources with extensive mechanisms of secrecy" (Basham, 265)
  - - - does this actually change how we act?