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SUSS POL 203 Study Unit 3 Mixed Systems and Authoritarian Regimes (Mixed…
SUSS POL 203 Study Unit 3 Mixed Systems and Authoritarian
Regimes
Mixed Systems
Merkel: Embedded and Defective Democracies
While it is true that over 100 countries moved away from stronger forms of authoritarian rule between the early-1970s and mid-1990s,
a large number of states did not transition into full-fledged liberal democracies
.
Wolfgang Merkel refer to these as
'flawed democracies'
a similar trend occurred following the Arab Spring
Though democratic political system was ushered,
more democracy did not necessarily mean liberal democracy
(I.e tunisia)
Types of defective democracy
Wolfgang Mekel distinguishes Wolfgang between
four types of defective democracy
.
Domain Democracy
If ‘
veto powers
’ – such as the military, guerrillas, militia, entrepreneurs, landlords or multi-national corporations –
take certain political domains
out of the hands of democratically elected representatives, the result is domain democracy.
Domain democracy is a regionally specific type occurring in Latin America and southeast Asia,
where the military often takes over a political (veto) role
.
Illiberal Democracy
In an illiberal democracy, with its
incomplete and damaged constitutional state
, the executive and legislative control of the state are only
weakly limited by the judiciary
.
Additionally,
constitutional norms have little binding impact on government actions
individual
civil rights
are either partially
suspended
or not yet established
This is the most common type of ‘defective democracy
Exclusive Democracy
one or more segments of all adult citizens are
excluded from
the civil right of
universal suffrage
.
Delegative Democracy
In a delegative democracy, the
legislature and the judiciary have only limited control
over the executive branch.
Actions of government are
seldom committed
to constitutional norms.
Governments, usually led by charismatic presidents,
circumvent parliament,
influence the judiciary,
damage the principle of legality,
undermine checks and balances,
and shift the equilibrium of the balance of power unilaterally in favour of the (presidential) executive
Causes of Defective Democracies
no single outstanding factor
can be sorted out as the primary cause of the formation of these severe defects in young democracies.
Rather,
specific combinations
of causes that lend themselves to special opportunities for certain actors to
usurp power,
suspend constitutional norms or
circumvent checks limiting power
are ultimately responsible
for the emergence of defects.
Such factors include
Path of Modernization
The probability for the occurrence of a defective democracy rises both if the socio-economic
modernization
of a country proceeds along a
semi-modern
path,
producing acute imbalances of power
, and if the property-owning classes regard democracy as a threat to their economic and political interests
Level of Modernization
The probability of the emergence of a defective democracy is higher, the lower the socio-economic level of development in a society and the more unequal the distribution of societal resources.
An
asymmetrical distribution
of economic, cultural and intellectual resources
promotes acute inequality
of political resources of action and power among political actors.
It further
complicates the enforcement of constitutional and democratic standards
against the rational self-interest of the powerful and endangers marginalized groups’ loyalty to the regime, even after democratic institutions are formally established.
Economic Trends
Economic crises
offer situational incentives to institutionalize defects in an unconsolidated democracy.
This is often the ‘hour’ for special emergency legislation and decrees in presidential and semi-presidential systems.
Governing by decree
is often expanded beyond its constitutional limits and often stays in place even after the acute state of emergency has subsided.
Social Capital
The occurrence of defective democracies is closely related to the type and the extent of historically accumulated social capital in a society.
An emergence of (ethnically) exclusive and illiberal democracies is more probable if social capital is accumulated along ethnic and religious lines.
Civil Society
Without these institutions, important
intermediary pillars
for the exercise of political rights and the protection of civil rights are
absent
.
In such a context, charismatic and popular justifications for
defective patterns of democratic
decision making become a
promising alternative
to gain public support.
State and Nation Building
Conditions for the development of a liberal
democracy
without severe defects are especially
unfavourable if
unsolved identity
or
state crises
in the political community burden the transformation.
Efforts to secede or
discrimination against minorities
will damage the indispensable civil rights of freedom and political rights of participation.
Type of Authoritarian, Predecessor Regime
The longer totalitarian,
post-totalitarian, sultanic or neo-patrimonial regimes
have been institutionalized
in a country and have had the chance to influence the political culture of society,
the more probable are defects
in the subsequent democracy.
Tend to
lean to wards delegative democracy
Transitional Mode
the
more elites follow
the new democratic institutions, the
faster
broad popular support legitimizing the
system will grow
.
Therefore, negotiated transitions more effectively avoid severe democratic defects than system changes steered from above or forced from below (i.e. a balanced transition)
Political Institutions
The more ‘informally’ authoritarian
inheritance/features (such as clientelism, patrimonialism and corruption) shapes patterns of interaction between elites and the population at large, the
more difficult it is for the new ‘formal’ institutions to be validated
and standardized
Informal institutions threaten to
crack the functional code of formal, democratically legitimized institutions
, deforming and displacing them.
International and Regional Context
If regional mechanisms
(like the EU and European Council) that secure liberal democratic institutions
are weak
or absent, governments have a broader range of
options for violating international/regional regulation
.
Thomas Carothers: The End of the Transition Paradigm
The transition paradigm was derived principally from
America's interpretation of the patterns of democratic change
taking place, but also to a lesser extent from the early works of the emergent academic field of “transitology,” above all the seminal work of Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter and huntington as well
Core Assumptions
Five core assumptions define the transition paradigm
elections equal democracy
structural” features/modernisation theory
Stages of democratisation
Democracies are built on coherent, functioning states
Political osmosis: Direction of political transition
Observations on the transition paradigm - the grey area
By far the majority of third-wave countries have
not achieved
relatively well-functioning
democracy
or
do not seem to be deepening or advancing
whatever
democratic progress
they have made
Most of the “transitional countries,” however, are
neither dictatorial nor clearly headed toward democracy
. They have entered a political gray zone
Indicators of defective democracy/ gray zoned states
two broad political syndromes can be seen to be common in the gray zone
feckless pluralism
Countries whose political life is marked by feckless pluralism tend to have significant amounts of political freedom, regular elections, and alternation of power between genuinely different political groupings.
Despite these positive features, however, democracy remains shallow and troubled.
Overall,
politics is widely seen as a stale, corrupt, elite-dominated domain
that delivers little good to the country and commands equally little respec
Dominant-Power Politics
Unlike in countries beset with feckless pluralism, a key political problem in dominant-power countries is the
blurring of the line between the state
and th
e ruling party
(or ruling political forces).
The state’s main assets—i.e. source of money, jobs, public information (via state media), and police power—are gradually put in the direct service of the ruling party.
Whereas in feckless pluralism judiciaries are often somewhat independent, the judiciary in dominant power countries is typically cowed, as part of the one-sided grip on power
The Crash of Assumptions
Elections in Mixed Systems. Brancati's political mechanisms
Dawn Brancati argued, that while the adoption of elections has brought former full-fledged authoritarian systems into the realm of hybrid or mixed systems, it has not furthered democratisation.
Rather, such
democratic institutions
(i.e. elections) ironically
help strengthen authoritarian regimes
and forestall democratisation.
authoritarian regimes
adopt nominally democratic institutions in order to protect themselves
against potential threats from both within the regime and within society at large
through five different mechanisms
.
These mechanisms are
signaling,
information acquisition,
patronage distribution,
credible commitment and
monitoring
patronage distribution
All authoritarian regimes and the majority of mixed regimes
rely on keeping individuals with influence
(capital, networks, etc.)
loyal to the ruling group
.
If the ruling group is not able to ensure this, a rival pole of power could emerge, potentially jeopardising the ruling group’s grip on the state.
political parties provide influential individuals with party membership, jobs, connections, and other economic opportunities. These give party members a stake in the system
credible commitment
In this case, the ruling party shows its
commitment towards the country’s business elite
.
Since businesses often hold deep suspicions that authoritarian regimes will expropriate their assets,
establishing democratic institutions
such as legislatures within which business interests are represented and protected
ensure powerful business actors remain
.
information acquisition
With this mechanism, authoritarian ruling groups construct and
utilise legislatures
and multiparty elections in order
to pinpoint and then manage areas of discontent
amongst the citizenry as well as other elites.
With this information in hand,
ruling parties can adjust their manner of governance
or their policies, with the end of goal of stabilising the regime.
Information acquisition through elections
As Brancati states, “multiparty elections help regimes identify discontent because
votes for opposition candidates reveal the constituencies in which regimes have weak support
”
This information can then be used by the ruling group to engage in pork-barrel politics and to
punish defectors while rewarding supporters.
monitoring
This is the idea that in a hierarchical chain of command between upper-level and lower-level regime elites, there can often be a
grave disconnect
that could lead to highly negative consequences for the regime itself.
For example, if corruption is endemic at the lower levels, the upper-level regime elites could eventually lose legitimacy and potentially their grip on power.
As a result,
bodies such as legislatures
are put into place to
provide a mid-level monitoring
institution
signaling
signalling, is the notion that authoritarian regimes employ democratic institutions to reveal to potential opponents the material and
coercive strength
of the regime, and to
deter these opponents from challenging the regime
Signaling through elections
In terms of elections,
by engineering large victories
through either fraudulent means or the use of government resources,
ruling parties can signal to the opposition
that their
resistance is fundamentally futile
.
As Brancati argues, even if a large electoral victory does not convince opposition players that the ruling group has been
legitimated by the electorate
, the sense of
futility may still ensue
as a result of the
regime being able to “buy off
, intimidate, threaten, or force the population to vote for it
Traditional Social Structures and the Political System
Patron-Client Relationships and Democracy
The patron-client relationship invovles a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of
higher socioeconomic status
(patron)
uses his own influence
and resources to
provide protection
or benefits, or both, for a person of
lower status
(client) who, for his part,
reciprocates
by
offering general suppor
t and assistance, including personal services to the patron
Patron-Client Relationships a challenge to Democracy
Political scientists understand the predominance of such patron-client ties between politicians and supporters as posing a challenge to liberal democracy for several reasons.
Effects of clientism
First and most importantly, because
support for a politician fundamentally depends
on the gifts he or she is able to secure for his or her clients, politicians are
not evaluated on their ability to govern well
or even follow the democratic rules of the game
As additional effects, clientelism’s
establishment of vertical linkages
between individual citizens (or subjects) and politicians (or patrons) is thought to
impede the development of horizontal linkages between citizens
that are necessary for the growth of opposition political parties and an active civil society.
nationalisation of clientelism
how clientelism at the local level was able to transform itself into a national-level political dynamic?
External resources: A key factor
Scott explains that with the rise of the state in Southeast Asia, clients were given a
choice between traditional local patrons and newer patrons
from the bureaucratic centre that carried with them a whole host of new resources and connections.
These included access to “party connections, development programs and nationalised enterprises.
Many potential clients
quickly discovered that
their needs were best served by a patron
who
had access to
the institutions which controlled the use of these
external resources.
the independence period in Southeast Asia
linked more traditional patronage systems with modern political parties
Why this dynamic has lasted in some regions such as Southeast Asia whereas in other regions it has disappeared
regarding why patron-client relationships have lasted into the modern period in Southeast Asia, Scott explains that
two main features
of Southeast Asian society have not been dramatically transformed since before the onset of the modern state
Inequality
First of all, patron-client relationships
depend upon
the existence of
significant inequality
between patrons and clients.
There is an
imbalance in exchange
between the two partners which expresses and reflects the disparity in their relative wealth, power, and status.
A client, in this sense is someone who has entered an unequal exchange relation in which he is unable to reciprocate fully.
A debt of obligation binds him to the patron
Inequality in south-east asia
Since this social inequality has persisted in almost all Southeast Asian countries despite aspects of modernisation, an important condition for the continuation of clientelism has remained
institutional guarantees
The second and more important condition of patron-client politics is the
absence of institutional guarantees
for an individual’s security, status, or wealth
Weak institutions in southeast asia
With many Southeast Asian states being weak, having limited outreach, and being relatively poor,
the state has not successfully provided for the security
of its population to the same extent as developed countries.
when one’s physical security and means of livelihood are problematic, and when recourse to law is unavailable or unreliable, the social value of a personal defender is maximised
Ethnic Conflict and Political Violence
Institutions for Divided Societies
Most experts on divided societies and constitutional engineering broadly agree that
deep societal divisions pose a grave problem for democracy
, and that it is therefore generally more difficult to establish democratic government in divided than in homogeneous societies
Constitutional designs
Lijphart argues in his article that some types of political institutions are more likely to mitigate ethnic conflict than others
Lijphart Argument
the successful establishment of democratic government in divided societies requires two key elements:
power sharing and
group autonomy
Power-sharing
This denotes the participation of
representatives
of all significant communal groups
in political decision making
, especially at the executive level
Effectiveness of Power-sharing
Power-sharing has proven to be
the only democratic model
that appears to have much
chance of being adopted
in divided societies, which in turn makes it unhelpful to ask constitution writers to contemplate alternatives to it
Referenda: Harming
Powersharing Referenda are blunt majoritarian instruments that can be used against minority groups
Adopting the power-sharing model
While the power-sharing model should be adapted according to the particular features of the country at hand, it is not true that everything depends on these individual characteristics.
Lipjhart outline
nine areas of constitutional choice and
provide
recommendations
in each area.
These constitute a “one size” powersharing model that
offers the best fit for most divided societies
regardless of their individual circumstances and characteristics.
Cabinet stability
Selecting the head of state
Power sharing in the executive
Federalism and decentralization
Parliamentary or presidential government.
Nonterritorial autonomy
Guidelines within PR
Power sharing beyond the cabinet and parliament
The legislative electoral system.
Group autonomy
This means that these groups have
authority
to run their
own internal affairs
, especially in the areas of education and culture
Types of Authoritarian Regimes
Three Types of Authoritarian Regimes
Political scientists have used three main categories to classify authoritarian regimes.
These categories are:
(1) monarchs,
(2) military dictators, and
(3) civilian dictators
civilian dictatorships
civilian dictatorships are classified as any type of authoritarian regime that does not rely on hereditary successors or military personnel.
Unlike monarchs and military dictators, civilian rulers
do not have a ready-made organisation on which to rely
.
Most civilian dictators do not have sufficient family and kind networks to establish permanent dynastic succession.
In additional, civilian rulers cannot appeal to the armed forces in the way that a military dictator can
Because they do not have these bodies to rely on, they have
to create their own –
a regime party.
A regime party is an instrument that is
used to penetrate and control the society.
Bargain and mobilise
They
mobilise popular support
and supervise behaviours of
people unwilling to identify themselves with the dictator.
In exchange, the party
offers individuals willing to collaborate with a bargain
i.e. a vehicle for advancing their careers within a stable system of patronage.
One-Party Systems
Dynamics of One-Party Systems
In the political science literature, sometimes these are referred to as “
dominant-party dictatorship
although sometimes they are
contrasted with 'personalistic-party'
a dominant-party dictatorship or one-party system
involves a highly institutionalised
and professionalised
state apparatus to maintain its rule
personalistic or dominant
in attempting to determine whether a country has a personalistic or dominant-party civilian dictatorship, we can ask the question whether
the leader “owns” the party (Personalistic) or
whether the party and its collective power provide the leader with his or her ability to rule (Dominant)
how are one-party systems able to exert such control
According to Magaloni and Kricheli, one-party systems utilise two functions to do so
bargaining function
Dictators use the party to bargain with the elites and
minimise potential threats
to their stability.
Serves to
co-opt elite actors
who could otherwise potentially
mobilise their various independent resources
to challenge the regime.
to appease potential elite challengers.
mobilising function
whereby dictators use the party machine to mobilise
mass support
If the citizenry mostly supports the party,
potential elite defectors do not have a mass base
through which they could oppose the regime.
Role of Coercion
In order to ensure that
those who betray the regime are punished
, strong party organisations are created.
These are used to both
acquire information
on the loyalty of citizens and
implement penalties
for those who are disloyal.
Implications of one-party rule
Accountability
May not display accountability and oversight: without accountability, tyranny thrives
Lack of transparency
No free press
May not distribute information (alternate sources of information especially) to citizens
Lack of checks and balances
(refer to functions of political parties) where there is meaningful pushback from political opponents
Communism/Post-Communism: Regime Survival and Collapse
Cooption and repression
in the Soviet Union
The Soviet ruling elite, the nomenklatura, used both cooption and political repression to encourage loyalty to the communist regime
Loyalty
was critical both
in
defusing internal opposition
to the rule of the nomenklatura and
In either deterring or
defeating foreign enemies
of the Soviet Union.
The decay and breakdown of communist oneparty systems
Party decay and regime decay are related processes.
The
inability
of ruling parties
to respond to challenges
is seen as a major cause of regime decay and breakdown.
Parties (the CPSU in particular) failed to adapt to the political and economic reforms they themselves initiated.
military dictatorship
military dictatorship is an autocracy in which the
executive relies on the armed forces
to come and stay in power
In terms of organisation, military leaders typically
rule as a committee
¬– a “junta” – and select one of its members to be leaders
Motivations for seizing power (coup d’état) are usually of a particular range: i.e. to defend national interest
However, research shows that the military
usually represents particular class or corporate interests
Unique features of Military Rule
More likely to participate in
civil wars
and engage in belligerent international behaviour.
Less likely to survive
: often unable to handle economic matters and issues requiring multipronged negotiations.
High potential for
insubordination
As such, military leaders wish to return to the barracks as they fear fragmentation
Consideration for military rule
Military governments have a higher chance of survival
when
They build a
civilian support base
, often through the creation of a party though sympathetic civilian bureaucrats.
They are able to
share spoils
and policy influence with other officers
who could pose a challenge
to them.
They are in command of a highly disciplined, unified military (
low level of factionalism
– ethnic or otherwise)
Monarchy
The first type of regime, monarchy, although not prevalent in the region, is still commonly found in the Middle East and some parts of Africa
a monarchy is an
autocracy
in which the executive comes to and
maintains power
on the
basis of family kin networks
the
reliance on family kin
networks for determining succession is
even more important than the official rules for succession
that may be in existence
The resource curse
The paradox of the plenty
natural resources may be a burden to the economy because they
fixed the citizens to an exclusive commodities market
and instead open the door to corruption and exploitation,
Result of the resource curse
Many countries with an abundance of high-value natural resources (particularly petroleum) have suffered from a combination of
Political authoritarianism
Economic inefficiency and mismanagement
Michael Ross: Effects of petroleum wealth.
According to Michael Ross petroleum wealth has had three specific effects
It leads to heightened corruption and
lower institutional performance.
prevent
a state from developing
efficient economic policies
(too dependent on rents).
It helps
trigger violent conflict
in low- and middle-income countries, particularly when it is in the territory of marginalised ethnic groups
Cements authoritarianism
It tends to make authoritarian regimes more durable.
Rents
provide a substantial
financial base
through which loyalty and compliance are bought.
High rents allow for a reduction in taxes; this lowers the pressure on the regime to be accountable