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Expertises dans les communes (Recherche de la littérature (Formen der…

- - - - Nachkriegszeit
      - 1960er: Reformfeindlichkeit
      - 1970er/80er: NPM (Deregulation, Privatization, Marketization)
      - 1990er: Legitimationsansprüche schaffen Netzwerke und Verhandlugnssysteme
  - - - Ladner (2001): : v. a. in Gemeinden mit >5'000 Leuten
      - NMG since 2017 (Chapter 9, making the state work successfully)
    - - politisch weniger heikel
    - - enhances efficiency gains + transaction costs by bundling the different phases of a project
    - - Van Genugten 2020
  - - - uncertainty (Girth et al. 2012; Pouder 1996 in Wicht; Johansson 2008; Wicht 2016) :
        
        Williamson 1991 in Johansson 2008: When asset specificity is high, uncertainty is high, too. TC suggests vertical integration.
      - frequency of transaction (Girth et al. 2012; Williamson 1991 in Johansson 2008)
      - Personality of decision taker (Wicht 2016)
        
        Spiller 2008 in Wicht, saying "politics are essential to understand decision taker"
        
        rent-seeking (Wicht 2016; ibid quotes Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Niskanen, 1971; quotes also Engel et al. 2009; also quotes Levin and Tadelis 2010)
        
        nepotism / cronyism
        clientelism / patronage
        
        connected to political agenda
        
        ideology (Wicht 2016; against but for efficiency considerations as drivers Levin and Tadelis 2010 in Wicht: 60)
      - contract / asset specificity (Van Slyke 2003; Pouder 1996 in Wicht; Brown and Potoski 2003 in Wicht p.56
      - market competition (Borcherding 1977 in Van Slyke 2003, arguing from a public choice perspective; Levin and Tadelis in Wicht subsume difficulty of finding another contractor under contractual difficulty)
      - contract difficulty (Levin and Tadelis 2010 in Wicht 2016: 58 and on ibid: 60, some tested hypotheses; Pouder 1996 as ex-ante determinant in Wicht, but attention: Wicht saying this part is not conclusive; )
        
        e. g. in Levin and Tadelis: the difficulty of performance measurement, the need for flexibility (i.e. the necessity of future renegotiations), and the difficulty in replacing contractors (which increases the potential for a hold-up by an opportunistic contractor)
        
        e. g. Overwatch capacities like accountability, evaluation (Van Slyke 2003);
        
        requires know how; know how shifts typically when outsourcing (Van Genugten et al. 2020) reinforcing the Hollow State (Milward 1994) --> finally more dependance on extern provider
    - - institutional and legal framework (Girth et al. 2012; Wicht 2016; Pouder 1996 as ex-ante determinant in Wicht). CAVE: originally PA-litterature determinant?
        
        e. g. Wicht 2016: saying F speaking cantons contract out less = could be a research limitation
        
        e. g. Pouder 1996 share of unionised employees, the fact that local managers are professionals and the fact that the municipality is member of a Conference of Municipalities
        
        Levin and Tadelis (2010) in Wicht (2016: 60): The negative impact of a merit system contradicts the previous results of Lo ́pez-de-Silanes et al.’s (1997) study
      - political environment / ideology (Girth et al. 2012; Wicht 2016 quotes studies against political influence esp. in small municipalities; ibid. says ideology drives decision taker [ideology a 2nd time in this tree, connected to personality of decision taker; Van Slyke 2003 is pro; ibid. cites Savas 1987) // quality issues are not decisive; tasks need to be done. Impact of temporary experts on quality could max be subject to further research
      - PSM (Wicht 2016 which is a new approach he says)
      - characteristics of municipality (economics of scale; basically everyone) // link with institutional framework?
        
        smaller = less in-house
        
        Levin and Tadelis (2010 in Wicht): small = low access to the market = less contracting with privates --> "less responsive to contracting difficulty"
        
        Van Genugten et al. 2020: small = +difficult to invest
        
        age of city (Wicht 2016: 60)
        
        endettement de la commune (Wicht 2016: 60; see also work LADNER & reform theories)
        
        Levin and Tadelis (2010 in Wicht: 60): Efficiency considerations also appear in the fact that large cities have a big- ger propensity to contract with the private sector (due to a bigger experience) and a smaller propensity to contract with the public sector (as they have less incentives to use such contracts to take profit from economies of scale). // not directly decisive; tasks need to be done. Maybe subject for further research?
      - Quality affinity (Levin and Tadelis 2010 in Wicht 2016, combined with the premiss that contracting out lowers the quality) // quality issues are not decisive; tasks need to be done. Impact of temporary experts on quality could max be subject to further research
      - public procurement: ex ante asymmetric information coupled with moral hazard (in Bajari and Tadelis (2001): "see Laffont and Tirole (1983) for a summary"). "Namely, the seller has information about
        production costs that the buyer does not have"
    - - ex-ante and ex-post
      - public choice
      - cultural
      - transaction cost
    - - outsourcing characteristics
      - poor outsourcing characteristics
- - - - Transaktionskosten
        
        Link zu expertises et communes: raisons et modalités; qu'est-ce qui crée des CdT?
        
        hierarchy
  - - - optimistisch
        
        kybernetische Systemtheorie (Easton)
        
        Systemkonkurrenztheorie
        
        Systemzusammenbruchstheorien
      - pessimistisch
        
        Autopoiesis-These (Luhmann)
        
        Chaostheorien (Landfried 1996)
        
        Policy Inheritance (Rose und Davies 1994)
        
        Globalisierungsthesen mit Betonung des Verlusts staatlicher Steuerungskapazitäten (allerdings kann Globalisierung auch als Chance gesehen werden, etwa Linder 1999)
    - - optimistisch
        
        Elite-Theorien
        
        Parteidifferenztheorien
        
        Public-Choice-Theorien
      - pessimistisch
        
        Korporatismus und Konkordanz
        
        Politikverflechtung
        
        Theorie des Veto-Spielers