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Understanding, Interpretation and Criticism (What fixes the meaning of a…

- - - - Davies- intepretation to maximise value of the work while constrained by convention and context
      - Objection- does this make terrible works into masterpieces?
        
        Reply- this can be dealt with with appeals to context, ruling out anachronistic interpretations
    - - The idea is that the intentional 'fallacy' is fallacious because the work itself determines what meaning it has. Biographical data is not relevant.
      - Reaction to biographical criticism which focused heavily on the author's mental states
      - But it's not actually a fallacy. That is actually false. Rests on an ontological assumption. that the aesthetic properties of works of art must be internal to them.
      - "On this view, the artist’s intention at best underdetermines meaning even when operating successfully. This can be seen from the famous argument offered by Wimsatt and Beardsley: either the artist’s intention is successfully realized in the work, or it fails; if the intention is successfully realized in the work, appeal to external evidence of the artist’s intention is not necessary (we can detect the intention from the work); if it fails, such appeal becomes insufficient (the intention turns out to be extraneous to the work). The conclusion is that an appeal to external evidence of the artist’s intention is either unnecessary or insufficient. As the second premise of the argument shows, the artist’s intention is insufficient in determining meaning for the reason that convention alone can do the trick. As a result, the overall argument entails the irrelevance of external evidence of the artist’s intention. " -IEP
    - - Indeterminacy vs. monist theses about meanings constrained by convention
    - - Irony
      - Loss of revolutionary/ innovative character over time while the work stays the same
        
        Can anti-intentionalism accommodate context?
  - - - Extreme intentionalism- the work means whatever its author intended it to mean if this is within a range of acceptable meanings fixed by convention. If not, the work is meaningless.
      - Moderate intentionalism- the work means whatever its author intended it to mean if this is within a range of acceptable meanings fixed by convention. If not, the work's meaning is fixed by convention and context.
        
        Carroll, Stecker, Livingston
        
        Objection- problem of having to accept insignificant intentions. Is Poirot a Martian? (is Dumbledore gay?). In order to avoid having to accept all intentions, we need to qualify compatibility.
        
        How to understand compatibility?
        
        Meshing condition- the intention needs to be sufficiently coherent with the rhetorical form of the work. So Poirot the Martian might not be actually ruled out by the work, but it is highly irrelevant and does not engage the narrative. It fulfils a weak compatibility condition but not the meshing condition.
      - Absolute intentionalism- the work means whatever its author intends it to mean
        
        Argument concerning marks in the sand- intention is necessary for meaning, therefore the meaning is the intention? But this argument does not work- it only establishes that intention is necessary for meaningfulness, not that it (let alone sufficiently) fixes the meaning
      - Objections
        
        Epistemic worry- can we actually know the author's intentions?
        
        Reply- it's weird that we are suddenly freaked out by this when we are not in other communicative contexts. Yes, sure, we can't fully know another's mental states. But in conversation we think we can grasp enough of their intentions to communicate. Why is art interpretation more demanding?