Mill’s project is essentially a social metaphysics by extrapolating from regular metaphysics (a branch of philosophy concerned with fundamental questions of reality and explores what is real as well as what kind of being or group of beings particularly have?) In the context of racial identity, the social-metaphysical question becomes what kind of reality or what kind of being does race have? Mills poses the hypothetical quace-case which troubled the ordinary criteria that we have normally adopt for identifying as well as assigning racial identity.Mills observes how ”one's racial category has been taken as saying a great deal about what and who one is, more fundamentally” (46), then, he continues, “to what extent and in what ways, then, is race ‘real,’ and how deep is this reality? Mills gives a taxonomy of different metaphysical positions, yet his particular position for which he advocates for is racial constructivism. Racial constructivism is the antithesis of natural facts (i.e., beliefs taken for granted). There is a scientific consensus that race does have a biological basis, and this is how race becomes socially constructed. So if race is not real, Mills, continues interrogating, why retaining the concept of race then and not getting rid of it? (45) Race, despite having no biological grounds, still holds some kind of (objective) reality, for from the fact that racial realism is false (i.e., the notion that there are no biological essences for racial categorizations, it does not follow that race is not real in other senses. For Mills, race exists in the world as a social normality. In subsequent pages, Mills characterizes race as one having an ontological status, and thus objectivity and not simply a subjective opinion. Objective ontological status emerges from intersubjectivity: “... an objective ontological status is involved which arises out of intersubjectivity, and which, though it is not naturally based, is real for all that (48). Racism is metaphysical in the sense of continually being a “deep reality that structures our particular social universe, having a causal objectivity and causal significance” (48). Thus it takes a collective effort in constructing an objective racial identity. Mill further argues “because people come to think of themselves as ‘raced,’ as black and white, for example, these categories, which correspond to no natural kinds, attain a social reality” (48). In his discussion of personal identity, Mills gives the readers a sort of descriptive taxonomy: bodily appearance, ancestry, self-awareness of ancestry, public awareness of ancestry, culture, experience, and subjective identification (50-53).