Metaethics

General

Naturalism

Intuitionism

Emotivism

Prescriptivism

Hare - Moral words are not emotive in meaning but prescriptive, hence allowing for a greater role for reason in moral discussion. Prescriptive meaning works like imperatives, where someone tells/recommends another person to do something while making it clear that we plan to follow a particular pattern of behaviour ourselves (persuasive) - Ethical language prescribes courses of action that the speaker intends to follow and wants others to adopt as well. Hare argued that if I say 'Eating meat is wrong', I'm saying 'Don't eat meat'. We use the idea of 'right' or 'wrong' to command and ethical statements have a guiding role.

Ayer - Applied his Verification Principle to ethical language. If I say 'murder is wrong', this is not an analytic truth, nor can any empirical investigation show this. We can show that murder causes grief and pain, or that it is often done out of anger. But, we cannot demonstrate in the same way, that it is wrong. Therefore, moral judgements do not state truths or falsehoods, and are therefore literally meaningless if taken to be statements about reality. However, while Ayer argued that these statements are not factually significant and do not talk about objective facts that can be known, he argued that they are emotionally significant and express feelings (Non-Cognitive). Therefore, these statements can only be true or false insofar as it is an accurate or inaccurate reflection of the speaker's feelings and opinions.

Meta-Ethics = Describes the presuppositions and language of morality. E.g what are we doing when we use words like 'Good'? Are we expressing feelings of approval? Recommending a course of action to others? Or are we referring to some real, factual, objective goodness and saying we have found an example of it. Normative Ethics = Making systems to help people know how to behave based on the assumption that good/bad and right/wrong have an objective, absolute meaning. Meta-Ethical philosophers try to work out what we are doing when we use moral language, because of there is no agreement about the meaning of ethical language (some argue it has no real meaning at all), then ethical debate is pointless and will never achieve anything. Therefore, the question of what do we mean when we call an action/person 'right' or say that someone 'ought' to do something is more difficult than it first appears.

Part of the problem is that we use these ethical terms in our ordinary conversation in other contexts, as well as when we are talking about morals. E.g we might say we have a 'good' pair of shoes or the 'right' answer. However, these are amoral/non-moral uses of the words. In a moral context, the meanings are perhaps rather difficult, even though the words themselves are the same and the syntax is similar. Hence, the equivocal nature of ethical language creates semantic ambiguity from which problems arise. E.g 'You ought to wear that colour more often' - Speaker is expressing an opinion that a certain colour suits you and based on the assumption that you like to look your best, he recommends you wear it more often. You are free to disagree with the opinion and can choose to never wear the colour again without behaving immorally. Here, ought is being used in a non-moral context and everyone recognises the speaker is expressing an opinion and recommending that you share it VS 'You ought to be faithful to your wife' - Ought is being used in a moral context and this opens up the question about whether the speaker is expressing an opinion which you need not share or whether the speaker is referencing an objective fact that it is wrong to be unfaithful to your wife and right to be faithful (and where can the evidence be found to support this fact? Does the speaker have any right to condemn you if you do not share this view?)

Morris - 'Have nothing in your house which you do not know to be useful, or believe to be beautiful' - He makes a careful distinction in his choice of words - we know for a fact whether or not something is useful, because we either use it often, or we do not (but even this fact is relative to the individual and the kinds of object they usually use). But whether or not we believe something is beautiful depends on making an evaluation, using our own subjective judgement, which is often a matter of preference and personal opinion. If usefulness is a matter of fact, but beauty is a matter of opinion that is open to disagreement, in which category might we place goodness? Do we know something to be good, or do we believe that something is good while recognising that our belief is subjective? (Is good inherently objective or subjective?) Are we talking about fact or values when we use the language of morals.

Cognitivism = Ethical statements are about facts, things that are true or false. Moral statements are therefore propositions (they make a proposal that some situation is, or is not, the case). We can ask whether these propositions are true or false and the question will make sense. It also claims that ethical language expresses BELIEFS about how the world is. Therefore, to believe that murder is wrong is to believe that the sentence 'Murder is wrong' is objectively true. Therefore, ethical language aims to describe the world and can be true or false. Non-Cognitivism = Moral statements are not propositions at all but are rather the kinds of sayings that are neither true or false and do not propose anything (E.g questions, performative sayings like Happy Birthday!, or giving commands/imperatives). It claims that ethical language does not try to describe the world/express facts and cannot be true or false. It does not express beliefs, but some other, non-cognitive mental state (usually an attitude or feeling). These uses of language still make sense but they are not sayings which can be followed by true or false but rather, their truth value is unknown or not present.

Cognitivism - Needs to explain how moral claims can be objectively true or false. Are there moral properties in the world? What type of properties are these and how can we find out about them. This closely deals with the epistemological debate of empiricism vs rationalism. Non-Cognitivism - Needs to explain why we make a distinction between morality and personal taste. Is Non-Cognitivism going to lead to moral skepticism or nihilism? the view that there is no right or wrong.

Anscombe's Direction of Fit - A man goes shopping with a shopping list of everything that he wants. When shopping, he uses the list to guide what he puts in his basket. At the end of the shop, what's in his basket should 'fit' his list and if not, the basket should be changed to fit the list. Now, the man is being followed by a store detective who makes a list of everything the man puts in his basket. At the end of the shop, her list should 'fit' his basket and if it doesn't, the mistake is with her list and it should be changed to fit the basket. Desires and other Non-Cognitive mental states have a World-to-fit-mind Direction of Fit; we seek to change the world to fit our desires and satisfy them. They are not true or false but represent how we want the world to be. In the story, the shopper demonstrates this direction of fit as he changes his world (the basket) to fit the mind (the desire for particular products in the basket, based on the shopping list). However, beliefs and other Cognitive mental states have a Mind-to-fit-world Direction of Fit. We change our beliefs to fit the facts of the world and hence have true beliefs. They represent how the world is, not how we want the world to be. In the story, the detective demonstrates this direction of fit as she changes her mind (her beliefs about what is in the basket) to fit the world (What is in the basket)

Cognitivism - 1) We often take it for granted that we can make mistakes about right and wrong/good and bod. If there no facts about moral right and wrong, it wouldn't be possible to make such mistakes 2) Morality feels like a demand/obligation external to us (especially when one considers moral duty). We feel answerable to a standard of behaviour which is independent of what we want or feel, suggesting the existence of an objective morality beyond ourselves which we can grasp and comprehend 3) Many people believe in moral progress and see it present throughout history. But how is moral progress possible, unless some views about morality are superior to others and more correct than others? And how is this possible unless there are objective moral facts.

Naturalist approaches to ethical language treat moral statements as propositions, in the same way as other, non-moral statements. It argues that good and other moral qualities are features of the world and natural facts. If we make non-moral statements/assertions such as 'Acid turns litmus paper red' we can empirically verify this by seeing if evidence and experimentation show that litmus paper turns red when in contact with acid. Ethical Naturalism argues that it is equally possible to establish moral facts by looking at evidence (We can derive Normative Ethics from Descriptive Ethics). E.g If we want to establish whether stealing is right or wrong, we look at the evidence of what happens when people do it; stealing causes people unhappiness, therefore, stealing is wrong. The Ethical Naturalist believes that moral statements are verifiable; they can be tested to determine their truth value.

Main Principles = Ethical terms can be defined using non-ethical, natural terms - we can show what we mean by moral terms, using information available to ordinary observation. Therefore, Ethical Naturalism takes a reductionist approach, claiming that things in one domain - moral properties - are identical with things in another domain - natural properties (Moral properties can be discovered and derived from the natural world). This approach is reductionist as moral properties, which may have been thought to be a different type of property, have been reduced to psychological properties AKA there is nothing more to moral properties than certain psychological properties (most plausible reduction) E.g we might say something is right if it makes the majority of people happy (such as in utilitarianism) or if it helps society to exist peacefully/protects life/educates others or fulfils its natural purpose (such as in Natural Law's Synderesis and Primary Precepts - Although it can be argued that Natural Law takes a Moral Realism approach but not Naturalism as goodness/telos is not a natural property but a spiritual/divine one). Ethical conclusions can be drawn from non-ethical statements. E.g we can say Abortion ends the life of a foetus, therefore, abortion is wrong or kindness makes other people happy, therefore, kindness is good.

Bradley - Argued that ethical statements expressed propositions that are either true or false. He uses this to confirm his view that moral judgement necessarily involves a reference to what is real. He further argues that morality rests on certain facts about ourselves, our goals, and our place in society; to be moral is to live in accordance with the moral tradition of one's country. Our place and role in the historical community provides us with a measurable, observable basis for a satisfying life. Our goal is to realise our true self, which we learn, via observation, in the family and community and adapt the values of our society and those of other societies that offer sound criticisms of our society. This places us in the empirical world and offers the best possibility of satisfaction as an individual in society.

Bradley - To be a good person, we must know our station and its duties, features of our reality in society, hence making evident the Cognitivism of Bradley's argument. We can know objectively and empirically test the proposition 'honesty is good' as this means 'honesty helps realise my potential and my place in society' and the statement can be determined true or false by knowing your place and role in society and how honesty impacts you in this role. The good society is about hard work and obedience. Once my position in life is decided, I have a duty to perform the function of that station. Doing wrong is not a case of breaking certain rules (as in normative ethics); rather it is going against your role in society. Hence, Bradley takes a functionalist perspective of morality

Hume - Naturalism makes a leap from certain facts to what we therefore should do. There is always a missing step from a collection of facts to a value judgement about an action to take as facts are grounded in reason but reason cannot be the motivation for a moral action; only emotion can. Therefore, as emotion cannot be derived from reason, Naturalism makes a logical leap from reason to motivation; fact to moral imperative that is unjustified - Is-Ought Fallacy. This undermines moral positions as they cannot be based on evidence about ourselves or the world.

Form of the Good - For Plato, the Form of the Good is the highest level of reality, which makes goodness a single, objective fact. Goodness is known in the natural world via Mimesis and Methexis. The problem, however, is that the forms are beyond the physical world so their existence cannot be empirically verified. Hedonism - Bentham equates pleasure with goodness and pain in contrast, as evil. He sought to locate morality in a fact about ourselves. However, just because we do feel pleasure, and seek it out, does not necessarily mean we should (Hume).

Utilitarianism can be understood within the framework of Ethical Naturalism as it claims that the only good is happiness. This can be interpreted to mean not simply that happiness is the only thing that is good but that happiness is what goodness is. They are the same property understood in different ways. Happiness is a natural, psychological property and therefore, so is goodness. Because happiness is a natural property, so is maximising happiness. Whether an act maximises happiness is a complex natural property. According to Utilitarianism, an act is right if it maximises happiness. Therefore, rightness is also a natural property.

Naturalism argues that it solves some of the issues facing Cognitivism as the metaphysics of moral properties is now understood. If goodness is just happiness, there is no puzzle on what kind of thing goodness is (there is no ontological obscurity related to moral properties) - it is not some weird part of reality that is hard to account for. Furthermore, we can understand what creates happiness empirically (as morality is grounded in the senses and natural world). So we have an answer to the questiion how do we find out what is morally right and wrong: through experience. But does this lead to some kind of absolutism as objective moral properties and facts ought to apply to all people in all times, and hence, results in moral absolutism? If what is good is a fact, then it is fixed + objective and gives us an absolute duty. Bentham seems to believe this when he defends his hedonic calculus and concludes that what is good is what maximises happiness. However, it is easy to see how absolutism can lead to relativism. E.g there might have been a time when the majority were happy keeping a minority of slaves. But then social attitudes changed, and slavery did not promote happiness (natural moral properties are contingent on the changing empirical world. Therefore, as the sources of these moral facts change, so do the facts themselves, hence possibly providing an explanation for moral relativism)

Moore - Naturalism's assumption that moral statements can be verified simply by looking at empirical evidence is false. Moore's criticism is based on the work of Hume, who was keen to show the possibilities and limitation of logical argument. He was able to see with great clarity when a line of argument disobeyed the rules of logic and, instead of moving from one step to the next, made a logical leap in an unacceptable direction and claimed to have proved a point; and he called a halt to the argument. The principle of Hume's which was taken up by Moore is that an 'ought' cannot be derived from an 'is' (a statement of evaluation/value about how things should be cannot be derived from a statement of fact).

In Principia Ethica, Moore argues in his Open Question Argument that no matter how 'good' is defined (greatest happiness for the greatest number or obedience to the will of God etc.), it can be asked 'But is that good?' - The question always remains open, and is not trivial. We can look at examples of people we believe to be good, and say things like 'Mother Theresa rescued abandoned babies' or 'Nelson Mandela spoke out against the Apartheid**; but it is still legitimate to ask 'were those actions good?'. There is still room for people to have different opinions, without there being any logical contradiction. Therefore, moving from objective statements of fact to a subjective statement of value does not work as it leaves open questions which have not been answered - we can always ask why?

Naturalistic Fallacy - Moral properties are ontologically distinct from natural properties. He did not argue there was no relationship between moral properties and natural properties; moral properties may be correlated with certain natural properties but they are not identical as correlation is not identity (Natural properties are empirically verifiable and knowable a posteriori whereas this is not the case for moral properties. Therefore, using Leibniz' Law of the Identity of the Indiscernibles, moral and natural properties are ontologically distinct). E.g size and shape are correlated; everything that has a size has a shape and vice versa. But shape and size are distinct properties. So even if goodness is correlated with happiness, say, that does not show that they are the same property.. Moore called any attempt to equate goodness to a natural property the Naturalistic Fallacy as goodness resists definition

Moore was concerned that it should be possible to make judgements about what things are good as we need, in the end, to be able to make moral judgements. As this could be done with reference to natural properties (as shown in the Open Question Argument), he proposed that goodness must have 'non-natural' properties instead that are available to the intuition rather than the senses, which is how he came to arrive at his Intuitionist approach to meta-ethics. He therefore argued that there are real objective moral truths that are independent of human beings/mind-independent (Moral Realism) but, these truths are not knowable a posteriori or empirically verifiable, These truths are unanalysable and simple, undefinable except in reference to other moral truths.

Moore believe that it is still possible for us to decide whether a moral statement is true or false, even if we cannot verify this a posteriori or empirically. According to Moore, we cannot use our senses to tell whether something is good, but we can use our moral intuition as although moral properties are non-natural properties, they are accessible and can be known via rational intuition. Although we cannot explain how we know when something is good, we do still recognise goodness when we see it - we just know it through our intuition (Similar to Plato's Argument from Knowledge and Anamnesis - We recognise attributes from the forms without directly experiencing them). Moore called goodness and other moral properties a 'simple notion' and they are unanalysable.

Moore argues it is impossible to define goodness as it is simple and unanalysable via his Open Question Argument. P1) If x is (analytically equivalent to) good, then the question 'Is it true that X is good?' is meaningless as it is a tautology. P2) The question 'Is it true that x is good?' is not meaningless (it is an open question). Conclusion - x is not (analytically equivalent to) good. For x in the argument, we could substitute 'pleasure'. If goodness is just pleasure, it would not make sense to ask 'Is pleasure good'? This would be like asking 'Is pleasure pleasure?', which is not a real question (as the answer has to be yes). However, the question 'is pleasure good' is a real question as the answer can logically be yes or no and so goodness cannot be pleasure, or any other property. 'Is x good?' is always a real question while 'is x x' is a tautology (not a real question) and so goodness cannot be defined as any other property. Now what remains is what has the property of goodness? It makes perfect sense to say that pleasure s good in this sense, but this is to accept that there are two things here not one (pleasure and this additional property, goodness) so goodness cannot be defined as or identified as pleasure.

P1) The property of being water cannot be any property in the world, such as H₂O P2) If this weren't the case (Water is H₂O), then the question 'Is Water H₂O?' would make no sense as it would be like asking 'Is H₂O H₂O?' C) Water cannot be defined as any natural property and is therefore, simple and unanalysable. However, this argument is flawed as this is not the case, water is just H₂O. The reason this argument, and by extension the Open Question Argument, don't work is because it confuses concepts and properties. Two different concepts - water and H₂O - can pick out the same property in the world (be ontologically identical but conceptually distinct). Before the discovery of hydrogen and oxygen, people knew about water. They had the concept of water but did not have the concept of H₂O, so they did not know that water is H₂O. Therefore, 'water is H₂O' is not analytically true however water and H₂O are one in the same thing and identical (they refer to one thing in the world). Likewise, the concept 'goodness' is a different concept from 'happiness'. 'Happiness is good' is not an analytic truth. Therefore, the Open Question Argument merely shows that two properties are conceptually distinct but cannot determine whether the two properties are ontologically distinct; these concepts could refer to the exact same property in the world, so Moore's argument does not show that they are different properties, but rather that they are different concepts.

Like goodness, Yellowness is a simple property - no one can explain what yellowness is to someone who does not know (it does not consist of composite ideas). You have to see/experience it for yourself to understand what it is. Any attempts of description result in merely exemplifying yellow. Good is also unanalysable as like goodness, yellowness cannot be defined - which is part of our visual experience of the world - in terms of something else; such as wavelengths of light. It might be correlated with this, such that seeing yellow is always caused by certain wavelengths of light. But it is a mistake to think that they are one in the same thing. However, unlike colours, goodness is a non-natural property and cannot be investigated empirically. It is part of reality, but it is not part of yhe natural world which can be investigated empirically, it can only be investigated and recognised via our intuition. It cannot be defined or described, but only known and demonstrated to other people.

The Intuition and Intuitive Process is not factually verifiable as it is involved with non-natural properties that cannot be investigated empirically. Therefore, for moral statements from the intuition, it is not appropriate to ask if they are true or false as they are not factually verifiable, hence highlighting the Non-cognitive aspect of Intuitionism

But what is an intuition and how can we tell if it is true? Are we supposed to have some special faculty of moral intuition? These are questions that Moore left open and did not answer however, he has already said that these claims are not analytically true (Evident in his Open Question Argument) but unknowable via empirical means, so therefore, they must be some type of a priori knowledge.

For Moore, we know claims about what is good to be true or false by considering the claim itself, Intuitions are therefore self-evident, synthetic propositions AKA the moral value of an act is self-evident. A self-evident judgement rests on the 'evidence' of its own logical plausibility, which is grasped directly. This does not necessarily mean that everyone can immediately see that it is true as 'self-evident' is not the same as 'obvious'. Our ability to make a self-evident judgement needs to develop first, and we need to consider the issue very carefully and clearly. Because moral intuitions are not known empirically, the self-evidence of a moral intuition will be more like the self-evidence of a necessary truth (like maths or claims about what is logically possible) than the self-evidence of a perceptual truth, such as the claim that there is a table in front of me. As for the moral intuition, it could be compared to the feelings that some people have when they meet someone and fall in love and want to spend the rest of their life with that person; they might not be able to justify their choice but will say 'I just knew' that this was the right person and they will be prepared to make important decisions on the basis of this knowledge.

Pritchard - It is not only goodness that is simple and unanalysable, but also the idea of obligation (Pritchard extends the ideas of Intuitionism to cover absolutism and moral duty). In the same way that goodness is recognised by examples, so are your obligations. We will always know when we ought to do a certain act as this is knowable via our intuition (This is very similar to Kant's idea that duty is derived/known via Pure Practical Reason and the A priori faculties of the mind). For Pritchard, Intuitionism was the joining of reason and human intuition to help people decide what to do, based on facts. Therefore, we know what is right/good and also what we ought to do as the motivation to ac morally is also knowable intuitively. He believed however that everyone has a different moral intuition - some more developed and clearer than others (possibly providing an explanation for cultural relativism and providing a defense against the criticism that if a rational intuition is used to derive moral truths, everyone would come to the same conclusion, but this is not the case). In a situation where moral obligations clashed, he simply said examine the situation and intuitively choose the greater obligation (as developed by Ross' idea of Prima Facie Duties)

Ross - Built on the work of Moore and Pritchard and agreed that 'good' and 'obligatory' are intrinsically undefinable. He believed that a basic set of moral principles are apparent Prima Facie intuitively. Our moral obligations are apparent and must be followed unless there is another greater obligation that exists. He saw this as Intuitionism actively at work as our intuition identifies our prima facie duties and we then make our moral decision based on this intuition that we have. Ross' approach tells us to obey the greater Prima Facie duty but he doesn't expand on this to tell us which duties are the greater ones.

There is plenty of evidence to suggest that we do not all recognise goodness via rational intuition in the same way as each other as there is natural variation in the moral truths that people believe. Intelligent, thoughtful people do not all vote the same way, or have the same opinions about ethical issues, even if they are all sincerely trying to follow what is good. They are far more likely to agree about whether or not something is yellow, and so perhaps the analogy cannot be stretched too far for if there were an objective intuition, all would arrive at the same moral conclusions. As a result, it is either that intuition, as the source of moral truths, arrives are moral conclusions that are different for different people, suggesting there are no moral truths and that morality is subjective, dependent on the individual's intuition or the intuitive method is not rational and objective and hence cannot be the source or foundation of absolute moral truths, hence showing the incompatibility of Moral Realism and the intuitive process as a source of moral knowledge, hence showing that Intuitionism is inherently flawed (Can't explain differences in intuition or intuitive process).

If the intuitive process of understanding moral truths is ineffable and experiential, how can we differentiate between something actually being right (a comprehension of the objective moral truth) and something seeming right to that person (the perception of morality that is limited and altered by emotions, beliefs etc.). Therefore, according to Intuitionism there is no way to distinguish between the comprehension of an objective moral truth or the subjective perception of apparent morality, hence resulting in epistemological ambiguity surrounding what moral knowledge truly is moral knowledge (we do know if these 'truths' are truly objective) and how to distinguish between emotions and intuition.

Ockham's Razor - Non-natural properties are undetectable and multiply the reasons by which we explain moral behaviour. If we see an ant carry a heavy object, we do not assume it must have help from a group of invisible ants. We just prefer the simpler explanation, that ants are strong for their size. Similarly, we should not assume non-natural properties explain moral behaviour when a simpler explanation of morality is available.

Warnock - Agrees with Intuitionism that moral judgements are not like other assertions such as; Descriptions of empirical fact (Naturalism), Expressions of taste (Non-cognitivism) or Imperatives (Kantian Ethics). From this, Intuitionism concludes that goodness mus be some non-natural property that is quite different from other properties. But they don't tell us what the main difference is.

Warnock - 1) Intuitionism fails to tell us how morality is related to anything else in reality (Intuitionism removes morality from reality despite it being apparent that morality is ingrained in and central to human experience). E.g isn't hurting someone what makes an action wrong? Isn't it showing concern for another person that makes a motive right? Intuitionists provide no explanation for how natural facts contribute or correlate to moral thinking (doesn't establish the relationship between natural facts about the world and moral facts about the world). 2) To say that we know moral judgements to be true or false 'by intuition' is only to say tha we do not know them in any of the usual ways. The theory does not give us a real answer as to how we know truths by intuition, it merely eliminates the possibility of knowing them empirically/a posteriori without providing a clear alternative. This leads to difficulties when people disagree over whether self-evident judgements are true as the judgements are supposed to be self-evident. Any further reasons for believing them will not be as conclusive as considering the claim itself. So how can we establish that the claim is true in the face of much disagreement, seeing as the origin of these claims is unknown and their self-evidence is questionable.

2) Intuitionists can develop their account. Suppose that pleasure is good - is it self-evident that pleasure is good, or can we give a further explanation? Suppose we can (Pleasure is good because it forms part of a flourishing life for human beings), is it, then, self-evident that being part of a flourishing life makes something good? If you give a further explanation, we can ask whether this explanation is self-evident etc. Therefore, through a chain of logical analysis, the self-evidence of a claim can be established and hence, disagreements in the truth value of these claims are merely down to flawed/incomplete analysis of the claim, hence showing that moral claims are self-evident, but not obvious/superficial and that the self-evidence of a claim can be established by examining explanations. REFUTAL - Non-Naturalism may argue that no judgement is self-evident as all moral claims can be supported by other beliefs. When we question those beliefs, we can give reasons for believing them, but must, in turn, assume others. Our reasoning, then, involves a matter of interpreting applying and adjusting a framework of reasons. In our reflections on reasons, we will be guided by trying to make sense of our moral attitudes generally. Reflection itself will be guided by what seems plausible or implausible to us. We justify moral judgements by appealing to the overall coherence, the balanced between our judgements in individual cases and our general moral beliefs, the 'reflective equilibrium' that we reach. Therefore, truths are not self-evident but merely established after an internal casuistic approach of evaluating these judgements in context to the individual case and our own believed moral frameworl.

But not only does moral language express our feelings, it also aims to arouse feelings in others, and so get them to act in certain ways. In developing this theory, Ayer compares it to Moore's Intuitionism - He agrees with Moore that 'x is wrong' cannot mean 'x would cause unhappiness' (or any other proposition substituting a natural property for 'wrong'). The Open Question Argument shows it is never a contradiction to say 'x would cause unhappiness, but it is right to do it nonetheless'. So, Ayer thinks that Ethical Naturalism is wrong

Emotivism is sometimes known as 'Boo-Hurrah theory' as all we are saying when we use ethical language (Such as stealing is wrong) is 'Boo to stealing' or 'Hurrah to respect for other people's property', but these are non-propositional statements; we are not making any factual statement about some objective knowable reality.

Ayer also rejects Ethical Non-Naturalism. As an Ethical Non-Naturalist, Moore believed that moral judgements are about non-natural properties. While they are neither analytic nor empirically verifiable, they are nevertheless true or false as they are self-evident. Ayer responds that Moore's Intuitionism is unsatisfactory as we cannot establish the truth or falsity of a moral claim by appealing to intuition unless we are able to provide some criterion for deciding between conflicting intuitions as intuition itself is no way to verify a claim. Given the Verification Principle, only an empirical criterion will do. But there is no empirical test that will establish which intuition is correct and which is incorrect as empiricism tests natural properties whereas the properties derived via intuition and non-natural. Ayer, therefore, concludes that moral judgements are not genuinely meaningful but merely express our feelings of approval or disapproval and arouse such feelings in others

The relativist position position holds that morality is relative to a culture, and that absolutism is wrong in that there is not just one valid expression of morality. The Relativist therefore claims that there is some truth to moral claims (takes a moral realist approach), but within a culture. The Emotivist claims that there is no truth of the matter and therefore takes a moral anti-realist approach. Relativism is just as meaningless to an Emotivist as Absolutism, just as atheism and theism are meaningless to Ayer's Logical Positivism. Alternatively, it could be argued that relativism may be explained through changes/variations in beliefs or opinions, whether this variation be on an individual or cultural level.

Emotivism seems to end rational discourse on morality. Moral positions are no longer about reasons but just expressions of attitudes. It then becomes impossible to argue which moral position is superior and ethical debate becomes insignificant. If Emotivism is true, the no reasons we give to support or oppose a moral statement matter. E.g Imagine somebody was arguing with you about a moral issue. If the reasons they gave for their positions were racist or homophobic, you would want to say that their position was invalid and that they were just a bigot. However, If Emotivism is true, reasons do not matter, and they do not have any real place in moral arguments. This is an uncomfortable position as it reduces ethics, which often deals with polarising and important issues like abortion and war etc, to a mere debate of opinions of which there is no solution.

Emotivism draws attention to the ways in which moral statement we make depend upon our own attitude, feelings and upbringing. Therefore, Emotivism's arational perspective of ethics grounds ethics within fallible human experience and hence provides a more convincing and realistic interpretation of ethical statements vs the traditional objective and rational perspective that is commonly held amongst ethicists

Ayer's Emotivism depends on the verification principle. But the principle faces objection as according to its own criterion, the principle is meaningless. The claim 'a statement only has meaning if it is analytic or can be empirically verified' is not analytic and can't be verified empirically. But if the verification principle is meaningless, then what it claims cannot be true. So if the principle is true, it is meaningless. Obviously, if it is false, it is false. Either way, it is not true and does not give us any reason to believe that ethical language is meaningless. However, Ayer claims that the principle is intended as a definition of meaning, not an empirical hypothesis about meaning. Therefore, it is intended to reflect and clarify our understanding of meaningful uses of words and is not subject to its own criterion.

Emotivism removes all substance and value from ethical discourse and trivialises it. Our uses of ethical language, according to Emotivism, could change from one day to the next, according to our feelings, and there would be no real reason for us to express one opinion rather than another. A statement such as 'murder is wrong' becomes no more important than children telling each other which sweets they prefer ('I like the red ones' etc.). According to Emotivism, if we say 'the murder of jews during he Holocaust was evil', we are merely expressing our own feelings and not making reference to a fact or aspect of reality. Many would want to argue that moral statements go much further than just expressing our own disapproval or approval; they have a more justifiable basis than this.

Also,in ordinary life, we tend to give moral language more weight than mundane language, whether or not we are right to do so. E.g If there is a difficult decision to be made in medical ethics, such as whether to allow assisted suicide or separate Siamese twins, we expect more of the judge that he or she just expresses personal feelings on the subject. Moreover, if Emotivism is true, then there is no way to gain meaningful guidance from ethical discourse as the statements contain no objective moral truths, hence possibly resulting in moral atavism

Stevenson - He modified Ayer's Emotivist ideas, taking a similar Non-Cognitivist approach and agreed that ethical statements are expressions of attitude or opinion, but he went on to argue that these attitudes are not just arbitrary, based on the mood of the day (refuting the criticism of Emotivism that it results in unstable foundations for morality on a societal level that may prevent societal moral growth and result in moral atavism by providing a more stable foundation for ethical statements and beliefs), but are based on and express beliefs about the world and the way it should work vs trivial emotions (similar to a linguistic form of Hare's Bliks). Stevenson's view leaves the way open for a possible compromise; moral statements can be expressions of emotion, but these emotions could themselves have a firmed basis in reality than mere arbitrariness. Our attitudes are based on experiences of the world and the way we want it to be; we disapprove of the Holocaust murders not just because they are not to our taste but because we have firm, justifiable beliefs about human dignity and worth.

Cognitivism - Hume 1) P1) Moral judgements can motivate actions (If I judge that murder is wrong, this plays a causal role in me avoiding murdering people), P2) Reason cannot motivate action (Reason/Logic is a 'slave to the passions' as it helps us solve problems but doesn't tell us how to behave) C) Moral judgements are not based on reason and as Cognitivism claims that moral judgements express beliefs, which can be true or false, and the faculty that determines the truth value of these statements is reason, Hume's conclusion is a rejection of Cognitivism. 2) P1) There are only two types of judgements of reason; relations of ideas or matters of fact. P2) Moral knowledge is not analytic so it is not a relation of ideas. P3) Moral knowledge motivates one to act whereas matters of fact cannot motivate one to act so moral knowledge is not a matter of fact. C) Moral knowledge is not a judgement of reason and is therefore non-propositional/Non-Cognitive

We use the word 'good' when we want to commend something to someone. There is a difference of emphasis between 'good action' and 'right action'; 'good action' commends the action without necessarily commanding it - we are saying it should be praised, but not necessarily that you have to do it to be a good person (Supererogatory perhaps?). If we say an action is the 'right' action, then we are commanding it - it is a guideline for behaviour that people should follow. E.g we can talk about good chocolate, teachers, and people and in each case, we are saying that the chocolate, teacher or person is praiseworthy in some way and there is a set of standards we are implicitly relying on. Good chocolate has a rich cocoa taste, good teachers explain new ideas clearly and create enthusiasm in their students and a good person is someone who s the way we should try to be as people. When we use 'good' to mean 'morally' good, we are appealing to a set of standards that apply to someone as a person. If we say that an action is a good action or right action, we mean it is an action that complies with the standards for how someone should act to be a good person. So, the prescriptive meaning of good relates to the fact that it commends. (CAN BE SEEN AS DEVELOPMENT OF EMOTIVISM)

The descriptive meaning of a moral property/action such as 'good' comes from the set of standards that is being assumed. Its descriptive meaning picks up on the qualities that something must have to be a good thing. However, the descriptive meaning and prescriptive meanings are distinct. We don't have to prescribe what matches up to the standard 'good'. E.g there is nothing about what it is to be honest (telling the truth = descriptive meaning) that can make me commend honest (telling the truth is how to behave = prescriptive meaning). Rational facts cannot inspire emotions.

Nothing about a fact can entail a moral judgement. We are free in the prescriptions that we make, independent from the descriptive meaning of said action (the moral value of an action is not predicated). However, Hare argues that this freedom is rationally constrained. As we saw, prescriptions relate to a set of standards. Whenever, we apply a standard, we are committed to making the same judgement of two things that match the standard in the same way (If I say that chocolate is good but that chocolate is not, there must be some relevant difference between the two). Likewise, we are free to choose what standards we live by, but these standards apply universally. If I think that it is wrong for you to steal from me, because it infringes my rights of ownership (a personal moral belief), then I must think that it is wrong for me to steal from you, because it infringes your rights of ownership - unless I can say that there is some relevant difference between the two cases that changes the set of standards.

Emotivists thought that the only role for reason in ethical discussion is establishing the facts. Hare has developed 3 more ways in which reason is a part of ethical discourse. 1) There is a difference between commanding someone to do something or commending an action to them, and trying to get them to act that way. We saw that Emotivism is open to the objection that it makes ethical discussion a matter of manipulation. Hare's theory sees the 'guiding' aspect of ethics as a matter of prescription, rather than a matter of influencing someone through emotion. This makes ethical discussion more straight forward and rational. 2) We can argue about consistency and relevance. E.g Singer claims there is no relevant difference between the suffering of humans and that of animals. If we are going to say that the causing of suffering of people is wrong, we are committed to saying that the suffering of animals is wrong - unless we can find a relevant difference. Moral disagreements can be about the consistency in applying certain standards, and reason can help resolve this by providing consistency in its objectivity. 3) We can infer prescriptions from other prescriptions via logical analysis. A famous argument against abortion is 'taking an innocent human life is wrong'. Abortion is the taking of an innocent human life and is therefore wrong. This is a valid argument, even if we rephrase it as Hare would understand it; 'Do not take innocent human life. Abortion is the taking of innocent human life. Therefore, do not commit abortion'. To disagree with the conclusion, we must disagree with at least one premise. Therefore, our prescriptions are logically related to one another and we can use reason to discuss these relations

Gewirth - Morality should be looked at differently. The need to behave morally might not be a logical question, but about living and interacting with others (in a form of social contract). Principle of Generic Consistency - Basic position need to adopt because we need other people. We extend others the same rights and duties as we find apply to ourselves (universalisability) in order to exist in the world of social contracts and obligations that define our social existence. It is therefore, not reasons, thoughts and idea that holds our morality together, but actions and social interdependence.

Prescriptivism's Moral Anti-realist approach argues that moral judgements are founded on prescriptions or imperatives and do not claim any objective truth. It denies the possibility of moral knowledge and does not help people to understand why they should follow one person's prescription more than another's, hence reducing moral orthodoxy which could result in moral atavism.

It seems reasonable to challenge the idea that we can scientifically prove moral rightness or wrongness. You cannot test for good/bad in the way you test for acids/alkalis. Moral codes seem to be linked to cultural and religious ideas, which come from ideas that different from scientific fact and are non-empirical. However, people have a sense of what is good and bad and often a common sense about actions such as murder or rape. So perhaps morality is some how ingrained in morality and not within subjective religious and cultural beliefs and that these moral truths are knowable intuitively as suggested by Moore. However, intuition cannot be measured or tested, and people clearly seem to have different levels of intuition as they disagree about moral behaviour.

People expect moral statements to be linked to action and treat them as more than just a feeling. People have principles, which inform their moral opinions, and these principles mean they apply their moral codes in a similar way when similar situations appear, so perhaps Hare is right (his theory most accurately reflects the reality of moral statements and behaviour)

While there is no scientific evidence for morals, there are other dimensions to human existence such as love, friendship and hope, which cannot be empirically verified or tested yet are still meaningful (against the claim of the Verification Principle). However, there is still the question of whether Hare's argument that morality has a rational basis via universalisability of prescriptions is more convincing than Moore's, who is unable to account for the differences of intuition or prove the intuitive process.

Kant's approach is often categorised as Constructivism, distinct from the other metaethical approaches considered here.