Please enable JavaScript.
Coggle requires JavaScript to display documents.
Govt 322 - US (Strategies for deterrence: complication of nukes and…
Govt 322 - US
Strategies for deterrence: complication of nukes and alliances
Relinquishing Initiative
Relinquishing the initiative - At law there is a doctrine of the "last clear chance." It recognizes that, in the events leading up to an accident, there was some point prior to which either party could avert collision, some point after which neither could, and very likely a period between when one party could still control events but the other was helpless to turn aside or stop. The one that had the "last clear chance" to avert collision is held responsible. In strategy when both parties abhor collision the advantage goes often to the one who arranges the status quo in his favor and leaves to the other the "last clear chance" to stop or turn aside (44-45)
It hardly seems necessary to tell the Russians that we should fight them if they attack us. But we go to great lengths to tell the Russians that they will have America to contend with if they or their satellites attack countries associated with us. Saying so, unfortunately, does not make it true; and if it is true, saying so does not always make it believed. We evidently do not want war and would only fight if we had to. The problem is to demonstrate that we would have to. (35)
But deterrence is about intentions—not just estimating enemy intentions but influencing them (35)
To fight abroad is a military act, but to persuade enemies or allies that one would fight abroad, under circumstances of great cost and risk, requires more than a military capability. It requires projecting intentions. It requires having those intentions, even deliberately acquiring them, and communicating them persuasively to make other countries behave. (36)
Military Involvement
Similar with Japan, one of the largest stations for US military troops in the world, exactly for sending this message to China
How do we maneuver into a position so it is the other side that has to make that decision? Words rarely do it. To have told the Soviets in the late 1940s that, if they attacked, we were obliged to defend Europe might not have been wholly convincing. When the Administration asked Congress for authority to station Army divisions in Europe in peacetime, the argument was explicitly made that these troops were there not to defend against a superior Soviet army but to leave the Soviet Union in no doubt that the United States would be automatically involved in the event of any attack on Europe. (47)
Political involvement
In addition to getting yourself where you cannot retreat, there is a more common way of making a threat. That is to incur a political involvement, to get a nation's honor, obligation, and diplomatic reputation committed to a response. (49)
Diplomatic relations - claiming to a political ally of Japan over China
International organizations - NATO - I think there is
something in this—our commitment to Europe probably diminishes somewhat if the NATO treaty legally goes out of force (52)
Strategies for deterrence: the basics
High costs
Deterrence is achieved not through the ability to defend but through the ability to punish...if you attack we will punish you to an extent that more than cancels your gains (420)
2 factors of deterrence (1) cost of military action, (2) the probability of success of military action. The US wants to make the perceived cost seem high and the probability of their success seem low. (421)
Therefore, the US can keep deterrence but must use its nuclear superiority to make the costs seem extremely high
Low possibility of success
To be effective a deterrent force must meet three requirements. First, a part of the force must appear to be able to survive an attack and launch one of its own. Second, survival of the force must not require early firing in response to what may be false alarms. Third, weapons must not be susceptible to accidental and unauthorized use. (426)
Country's national interests and goals
Deter China from using violence
Why
dissuasion by deterrence operates by frightening a state out of attacking, not because of the difficulty of launching an attack and carrying it home, but because the expected reaction of the attacked will result in one’s own severe punishment. (420)
Requirements for Deterrence: To make clear the cost of action on part of China, to convince the Chinese that the likelihood of their success if very small, and to make our commitment to defending Japan very convincing.
Keep them at rest - easier than coercion, because in this case were trying to keep them at their current state rather than trying to compel them to do something
What the potential pitfalls and risks of your chose strategy are
Risks of trying to keep China at bay - Nuclear deterrence has a chance to fail.
If deterrence fails it is usually because someone thought he saw an "option" that the American government had failed to dispose of, a loophole that it hadn't closed against itself. (44)
The complication of nukes: While China is still weaker than the US in pure military strength, that matters less when nukes are taken into consideration. They can cause much damage to either Japan or US through retaliation despite a weaker position.
Relinquishing the initiative - Deterrence means that the initiative is in the enemy's hands, and it is they who have to make the awful decision to proceed with an attack, not us. In a sense, while deterrence is a way of controlling china from the US perspective, it is also a way of relinquishing control of who initiates the action. (44)