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Earning management 2 ((Xuefeng) Jiang, Petroni & Yanyan Wang, 2010)…
Earning management 2
(Xuefeng) Jiang, Petroni & Yanyan Wang, 2010)
aim
examine the association between chief finansial officer (CFO) quity incentives and earning management
rational
CFO wields a lot of influence over financial reporting, The CFOs privet interests modulated by compensation are likely to affect financial decisions ass
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results & conclusions
results
magnitude of accruals and the likelihood of beating analyst forecast are more sensitive to CFO equity incentives than those of the CEO
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(Chen, Chen, Lobo & Wang, 2011)
aim
examine the effects of audit quality on earning management and cost of equity capital for stateowned enterprises and non-stae owned enterprises
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result & conclusions
the effects of audit on earning management and cost of equity capital is more prounounced for NSO than for SOEs
significant lower level of earning management for NSOE audited by top 8 auditors than for NSOEs audited by non-top 8 auditors, no significant difference in the case of SOEs
cost of equity capital is significant lower for NSOEs audited by top 8 than for those audited by non-top 8, the same relatinship is significant smaller for SOE
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(Cohen & Zarowin, 2008)
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results & conclusions
firms use real, as well as accrual-based earning management tools around SEOs
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(GUNNY, 2010)
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theory
Earning management
categories
accruals management
not changing the operating activities of the firm, but through the choice of accounting methods used to represent those activities
the obscuring and masking of true economic performance through accounting choices within generally accounting practices
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a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intention of obtaining som private gain
results & conclusions
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Using RM to meet earning benchmarks is positivly associated with future performance compared to firms who do not use RM and miss the earning benchmark
earning management via RM is not opportunistic, but consistent with managers attaining benefits that allow better future performance and signaling
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