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Derailment of The 'Spirit of Townsville' VCQ5 (The Circumstances…
Derailment of The 'Spirit of Townsville' VCQ5
The Circumstances
There were 157 passengers and crew on board, with 2 drivers
Track was curved, requiring a low speed to navigate safely
Speed in the area was limited to 60km/h. The train was travelling at 112km/h
Derailed north of Berajondo at Cabbage Tree Creek
Train was travelling at 2355 that night
Co-driver was making coffee in a different car, while the driver in control was distracted collecting something from their bag
The trip from start to finish was to take approx. 24hrs and 55min.
Train rolled over due to the centre of gravity shifting too far
Event occurred on November 15, 2004
People, Workplaces, Management
Queensland Rail
Procedures
Speed needed to be reduced in that area
Signage may not have been clear
Operational failure
Rosters and changeover
Late night shifts may cause fatigue
On-board the Train
One driver at a time was allowed to leave the cabin for coffee, toilet, etc.
Both drivers needed to be aware of the train as it travelled
Operational Failure
Drivers
Driver changeover occurred in Bundaberg
May have been fatigued due to time of night
Awareness of the surrounding area was not high
Were occupied by making coffee elsewhere and retrieving something from a bag
Low visibility
Curved track not clearly visible
Late night meant no light source
Possibility of insufficient training
System
Speed indicators placed along the tracks
Strategically placed "passing loops" along the track
Employed a Vigilance Control System (VCS) to test driver alertness
Needed both drivers present
Latent Operational failure
Centralised Train Control (CTC) monitoring train movement and signalling system
Queensland Rail implemented a 2 driver system for all tilt trains
The Findings
Speed was the main factor in the crash
Why the train was speeding is unknown
Operator Error
Fixed infrastructure was damaged in the event
No fatalities, but numerous injuries, some requiring hospitalisation
Possible malfunction of bogies
System Parts
Communication
Train to base radio system
The track
Comprised of a continuous welded track
Speeds of 150km/h posted before the crash site
Speed of 60km/h is recommended for the track consisting of numerous bends, where the crash occurred
Indicators alongside the tracks
Australian Safety Transport Bureau 2005,
Derailment of
Cairns Tilt Train VCQ5
North of Berajondo, Queensland
15 November 2004,
viewed 22 September 2019,
https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/25073/rair2004007_001.pdf
Drivers
2 drivers on board at all times
Design Failures
System design was dependant on human interaction
Signage
No signal for the upcoming bends in the track
Given the time of night, the speed indicators may not have been visible
System Life Cycle
Commissioning
Queensland Rail asked for the passenger trains
Operation and Maintenance
New trains meant minimum maintenance was needed at the time
Made so that 2 drivers could be present and operating the controls
Construction
Indicators made to alert driver of upcoming track
Were built the previous year and still new to the organisation
Tracks made to be sturdy and handle trains at high speeds
Decommissioning
Train could be re-purposed for other uses
Parts taken for use on other trains
Tracks used for new modes of transport
Concept and Design
An easy mode of transportation
A train built to carry multiple passengers and luggage
Fast and efficient travel
Ongley, C 2014, 'Tilt Train crash remembered: lessons learned 10 years on',
NewsMail
, 15th November, viewed 22 September 2019,
https://www.news-mail.com.au/news/tilt-train-crash-remembered-lessons-learned-10-yea/2453643/
