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oil rig (Event Sequence (In February 2010, a test was conducted on the…
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System Parts
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BP
BP was the leaseholders of the rig. They opted to use single casing which is the cheaper option and going against the recommendation (Hoffman 2010)
The new cement foam require more time in order to stabilize and create seal. BP ignored the timeframe.
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Blow Out Preventer (BOP)
Purpose was to prevent any blow out from the well. it did not activate due to hydraulic leak and the battery was not fully charged (DHSC 2010).
cement foam
was not stable when it was pumped into the well. The purpose was to plug the well or act as a seal. It failed to prevent leakage (National Geographic Documentary 2017).
System Life Cycle
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Design Failure
The use of new nitrogen-based foam cement that was still in a testing phase contributed to the failed integrity of the well.
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BOP designed to activate during a blow out, it fails to operate.
drilling must reach the total
well depth which is about 3,000 ft
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Event Sequence
In February 2010, a test was conducted on the cement foam at the laboratory. 1 test result showed that the cement was unstable (nitrogen escaping). The cement foam was used as a sealed to plug the well. Results of the test were not relayed to BP.
In April 2010, more test was conducted on cement foam that was brought from the oil rig. Results failed (nitrogen still leaking). Cement foam seriously unstable. BP was not alerted.
15 April 2010, 21 centralizers were recommended by Halliburton. Only 6 centralizers were used to secure the casing
3 hours to disaster, the negative pressure test conducted shows that pressure in the well rising.
1 hour to disaster, second pressure test were conducted. two different readings were noted and was not investigated further.
9 minutes to disaster, oil and gas blow out. Emergency Disconnect System (EDS) activated, Blow Out Preventer (BOP) fails to kick in.
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19 April 2010, the unstable nitrification cement was pumped into the well to secure the casing.
workplace
Equipment Design
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cement foam used for plugging the well was unstable, allowing the oil and gas to leak out.
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Workplace Factors
The oil rig were situated 40 miles off the Louisiana coastline (National Geographic Documentary 2017).
Operation was overseen by Government, BP and Transocean Ltd
Transocean Ltd (rig owner) will conduct drilling and plugging of the well using concrete. The extraction of oil and gas will be done by another rig (National Geographic Documentary 2017).
Management
Job Design
Transocean sub sea supervisor - Chris Pleasant called the rig control room three times to alert them of the mud spill. No one answered.
Lack of supervision was the result of the spillage. Had there been adequate supervision, the negative test reading would be thoroughly conducted.
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Information Transfer
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Inadequate enforcement of the law by MMS. The rig must completely shut down operation until BOP is operable again.
Organisational Factors
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BP put pressure on Transocean Ltd. The operation was 43 days behind schedule. The quality, safety and reliability of the operation were compromised. Rushed decision was made during the drilling process.
BP was not alerted when the cement foam failed during the test. The failed cement foam was still used in the well.
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The oil rig disaster started on the 20th April 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico. The explosion killed 11 crewmen and injured 17.
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Borchardt (2011) explains that the equipment is under extremely high pressure of more than 15857.94 Kpa.
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