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TITANIC DISASTER RMS-Titanic (WHAT HAPPENED - Event Sequences (April 15,…
TITANIC DISASTER
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ISSUES AND FINDINGS
People
Individual Factors
Expectation - Captain wanted to continue full speed regardless of ice warnings. Time pressure to arrive early.
Attention - radio operator didn't prioritise ice viewing warnings, captain more concerned with arriving ahead of schedule and ignoring previous ice warnings. Other crew did not question navigation and speed.
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Stress - to sustain top speed as requested by the captain below deck coal shovelers worked hard and long hours. Iceberg watcher had to rely on own vision as didn't have binoculars
Captain - one of the most experienced shipmasters on the Atlantic ( [Rogers et. el, 1998).
Workplaces
Workplace Factors
Fixed Plant Design - design flaws with sub standard materials used for the building of the hull. Design flaws with the water tight compartments.
Site Design
North Atlantic Sea, Ice fields
Design of Equipment
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Warning Systems - no main alarm system, bell was rung by the iceberg spotter.
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Work Environment
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Visibility - low visibility conditions (Labib and Read, 2013), slight haze.
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References: Battles J 2001, 'Disaster prevention: lessons learned from the Titanic', Baylor University Medical Center Proceedings, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 150-153.Frey, B, Savage, D & Torgler, B 2011, 'Behavior under extreme conditions: the Titanic disaster', Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 209-222.Gannon R, 1995, "What Really Sank the Titanic," Popular Science, vol. 246, no. 2, pp. 49-55. Division of the History of Technology, Transportation Collections, National Museum of American History, in cooperation with the Public Inquiry Mail Service, Smithsonian Institution, "The Titanic," Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution (May 1997), viewed 19 September 2019, http://www.si.edu/resource/faq/nmah/titanic.htmHill S, 1996, "The Mystery of the Titanic: A Case of Brittle Fracture?" Materials World, vol. 4, pp. 334-335. Garzke W, Brown D, and Saniford A, 1994, "The Structural Failure of the Titanic," Oceans Conference Record (IEEE), vol. 3, pp. 138-148. Titanic-Titanic 2019, Titanic's Watertight Compartments, viewed 22 September 2019, http://www.titanic-titanic.com/category/titanics-parts/Labib, A and Read, M 2013, 'Not just rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic: Learning from failures through Risk and Reliability Analysis', Safety Science, vol. 51, pp. 397-413. Havold J 2013, The RMS Titanic disaster seen in the light of risk and safety theories and models, paper presented at Norwegian University of Science and Technology, viewed 17 May 2019, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jon_Havold/publication/269180065_The_RMS_Titanic_disaster_seen_in_the_light_of_risk_and_safety_theories_and_models/links/548403600cf2e5f7ceacca06/The-RMS-Titanic-disaster-seen-in-the-light-of-risk-and-safety-theories-and-models.pdf