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How Public Preferences and Political Institutions Shape the Dynamics of…
How Public Preferences and Political Institutions Shape the Dynamics of Social Spending
Immergut, E.
The effect of voter preferences on social spending
First, political institutions such as veto points and electoral systems affect welfare states (because they interact with societal preferences)
Second, within-country variation over time
The results - public opinion affects welfare spending, but when veto points are included
Riker urges scholars: study the interactions between institutions and preferences, not keep one constant while changing the other
High electoral competition increases the responsiveness of the political system to public opinion
First, public opinion, indirectly, through elections affects policy
Second, critically, as the mood swings, politicians change their positions
"In a world of savvy politicians, rational anticipation produces
dynamic representation
without need for actual electoral defeats"
Institutionalists make two critical points:
First, pre-existing policies affect the formation of preferences through a policy feedback
Second, institutions affect the responsiveness of states to different social interests, thus moderating the impact of public opinion
Scholars should focus on the interactions between public opinion and institutions in shaping public policy
First, changes in public opinion lead to changing elections results
Second, politicians anticipate losing office and change their policies accordingly
Even when institutionalists add back the effect of public opinion, it should also take into account the way institutions shape the effects
Also, public policy affects public opinion - thus a dualistic dynamic system is at hand
Moreover the incentives to respond are mediated through political institutions (let's say a niche-party electorate is very dependent on the policy, and the niche-party is a kingmaker)
Institutional Responsiveness: The Moderating Impact of Institutions
Veto points have historically proven to exist
The Dynamics of Institutional Moderation
Three hypotheses:
Changes i public opinion affect social spending less when veto points are open
Changes in public opinion affect social spending more when electoral competition is higher
Changes in public opinion directly affect the level of social expenditure
Conclusions:
Institutions are dynamic
Public opinion has distinct short- and long-term effect over policies mediated by institutions and veto points
Short term shifts in public opinion do affect public expenditure