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Philosophy of Science (Social Epistemology of Science (Social Norms…

- - - - Higher order modality
        
        Mathematical Explanation
        
        Hierarchy of Laws
        
        Modal Epistemology
        
        Conceivability approaches
        
        Counterfactual approaches
      - Abstraction from causal mechanism
      - Counterpossibles
  - - - Analysis of Knowledge
        
        Contextualism
        
        Pragmatic encroachment
        
        Luminosity
        
        Ontology of Knowledge
        
        Primitiveness
- - - - Dilemma: either it only applies to physically possible interventions and its limited or it applies hypothetical counterfactuals and we are back to Lewis-Stalnaker
    - - The problem of counterfactual semantics
        
        Modal realism
      - Preemption
- - - - Foundations of bayesianism
        
        Conditionalization
        
        Probabilism
        
        The principle principle
      - Knowledge Norm of Practical Rationality
        
        The problem of testimony on sexual consent
      - Meta-ethics
      - Assertion
    - - Probability coordination principle (PCP) - our credence should match the probability our hypothesis assigns to it
      - Radical personalism - nothing. C(e, h) is our subjective credence
    - - Logical Probability
        
        Principle of indifference
        
        Paradoxes
        
        Epistemology: rational intuition
        
        Platonism
      - Rational Credence
        
        Metaphysics of credence
        
        Operationalism
        
        Actual
        
        Hypothetical
        
        Representation Theorem
        
        Measure
        
        Money
        
        Utility
        
        Primativism
        
        Principal Principle
        
        Reflection principle
        
        Normativity of probability
        
        Problem of logical omniscience
        
        Dutchbooks
        
        Pragmatic
        
        Epistemic
        
        Diachronic
        
        Problem of naturalism
      - Frequencies
        
        The problem of singular events
        
        No limit
        
        Epistemology of limits
      - Classical Probabiliy
      - Propensities
      - Pluralism
    - - BCT needs auxiliary uniformity of nature hypothesis
      - Uniformity of nature hypotheses is a methodological postulate that our laws are invariant
    - - Only assigning low priors to grueish hypotheses can solve grue
      - Grue hypotheses are less falsifiable
    - - If the conjunct is probabilistically independent of h, e, and h&e, then any e which confirms h does not confirm the conjunct
    - - PCP convergence theorem
      - Open-mindedness - never assign zero prior probability
      - Fair-mindedness - never assign vanishingly low prior probability
      - Contextualism - plausibility of priors should depend on past success of those type of hypotheses
      - Radical personalism - it's not a problem
    - - Rerunning history - imagine you had h first and then calculate a base rate for c(e) before you learned e.
    - - When h&a are falsified by e, the less probable conjunct diminishes more in probability, assuming C(h, e) = C(h, ~ha) and C(a, h) =/= c(a)
  - - - Auxiliaries - our method of observation modifies c(e)
    - - Novel predictions are more confirmatory because their Bayesian multiplier (Ph(e)/C(e)) is higher
    - - Diverse evidence has higher resolving power - it strips more probability for the competitors
      - Diverse evidence has probabilistically independent confirmatory power
  - - - Regress problem - how do you distinguish a causal process from a non-causal one without counterfactuals or regress
      - Mechanisms are unnecessary for causal knowledge
    - - Bayes networks
        
        Simpson's Paradox
        
        Problem of unmeasured confounders
        
        Faithfulness
        
        Cancellation
        
        Minimality
        
        Modularity
        
        Complex Systems
        
        Markov Condition
        
        Non-independent error terms
        
        Mechanical Semantics
        
        Simultaneity of cause & effect
        
        Equillibrum
      - Random controlled trials
        
        Ethics of Randomization
        
        Bayesian No Randomization Theorem
        
        The problem of complexity
        
        Masking
        
        Placebos
        
        Characteristic & Non-characteristic effects
        
        Social values and characteristic effects
        
        Philip's Paradox
        
        Benign & Malicious Unmasking
        
        Requires mechanistic knowledge
        
        Exportability
        
        Analogy approach
        
        Bayes Network Approach
        
        Cognitive Diversity
        
        Random Confounding
- - - - Philosophical Methodology
        
        Conceptual Analysis