Theorie (Studien)


keywords:
social information in general (zB auch in dictator games ( Cason and Mui (1998)) oder ultimatum games (Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004))
conditional cooperation "ich helfe mit, wenn andere auch helfen"
social influence
social comparison
public goods
charitable giving, charitable donation, fundraising, crowdfunding, charity, donation

ZÜERCHER STUDIE (frey and meyer, working paper 2003!!!!! = nicht finale Version 2004)


Social Comparisons and Pro-social Behavior - Testing ‘Conditional Cooperation’ in a Field Experiment

FORSCHUNGSFRAGE:


FRAGE A: Wissenschaftlich: Ist die Spende einer Person abhängig von der Information der Häufigkeit von pro-sozialem Verhalten (=Spenden) in einer Population?


Normal: Spenden Personen eher (Frequenz, nicht Betrag), wenn viele andere Spenden vs wenn weniger andere Spenden?


(FRAGE B Korreliert Guess (=expectation about behavour of others) wie viel % in letztem Jahr gespendet mit eigenem Spendeverhalten?)

RESULTAT


FRAGE A: the results show that people behave pro-socially, conditional on others. The more others cooperate, the more one is inclined to do so as well = Gruppe "High" hat öfters gespendet (höhere Beträge konnten sie nicht spenden, da Spendenbeträge fix)
Durch exp Bed. "High" wurde likelihood des spendens erhöht. durch exp bed "low" wurde die likelihood des spendens nicht reduziert (im vgl zu kontroll).


---ACHTUNG EINSCHRÄENKUNG: individuals have heterogeneous thresholds as to when theyare willing to cooperate,given the behavior of others. Some are willing to cooperate if only a small minority do so asEell,
While others cooperate only Ehen a clear mabority do so. In the field eHperimental setting, onlypeople Ehose threshold is betEeen 46 and 64% react to the treatments. Students who have athreshold below 46 contribute to the funds independent of the treatments and students who have thresholds above 64 also do not care about the induced beliefs. This leaves a subgroup ofthe Ehole population who respond to the pro-social behavior of others.


Ob jmnd spendet oder nicht könnte auch stark vom habitus (wie oft in letzten Jahren gespendet) abhängen.


---(((Wer lässt sich beeinflussen?
0=nie in letzten Jahren gespendet; 1 = immer; 0.5 = in 50% der Fälle
Personen von 0-0.5 lassen sich am stärksten beeinflussen, Personen bei 0 und 1 am wenigsten.
(ähnlich aus workspace: social comparisons in the working sphere, suggesting that,due to peer pressure, an induced high productivity norm increases the productivity of the leastproductive subbect, but a low productivity norm does not have much influence on the mostproductive subbects Falk and Ichino, 2003.)))



FRAGE B: A change in the perceived cooperation rate of others by ten percentage points, evaluated at the mean expectation, raises the probability of contributing by more than siHpercentage points

METHOD


field experiment, n=ca. 2000, between-subjects


On the official letter for renewing their registration, the students are asked whether they Eant tovoluntarily donate a specific amount of money 7.-, to a second which offers cheap loans to students in financial difficulties andnor a specific amount of money 5.- to a second supporting foreigners who study for up to three semesters at the University of Zurich. --> spezifische, relativ tiefe Spendenanfrage für 2 Fonds


Gruppe "High" vs Gruppe "Low":
In "official letter" wird entweder gesagt, dass 64% (Ergebnis Jahr 01/02) oder 46% (Durchschnitt letzte 10 Jahre) der Studis gespendet haben.


(wenn min. in in einen von beiden Fonds gespendet wurde --> zählt als Spender)

WEITERFUERENDE STUDIEN

GRUENDE EINBEZUG SOZIALER INFORMATION IN PRO-SOZIALES VERHALTEN


" firstly, people may want to behave in an appropriate way and to conform to a social norm :e.g. messick, 1999)"
--> messick, Tavid (199). Alternative logics for Decision making in Social Settings.


people have some sort of fairness preferences such as inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999)
--> Theory of Fairness, Yompetition, and Yooperation


reciprocity (Rabin, 1993)
--> Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics


contributions by others may serveas a signal for the quality of the public good, or for the organisation which provides the good in the end (zB a charity) (Vesterlund, 2003)
--> . The Informational Value of Seouential Fundraising



--- Why do people do social compariisons?
(((The few studies which try to evaluate in the laboratory whether people undertake social comparison out of conformity or reciprocity mostly
conclude that their results cannot be explained by reciprocity, but rather by conformity (Schroeder et al., 1993] (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2002) (Bardsley and Sausgruber, 2002))))


ACHTUNG: in finaler Versio 2004:
The results of the field experiment do notinform us as to which theoretical approach isthe most appropriate for explaining conditionalcooperation. Results from previous experi-ments that attempt to discriminate among thevarious explanations are ambiguous. Some ex-perimental studies indicate that conformitycan explain conditional cooperation betterthan reciprocal considerations (Iris Bohnet andRichard Zeckhauser, 2004), while others cometo the opposite conclusion (Falk et al., 2003;Robert Kurzban et al., 2001). Yet other la-boratory experiments find evidence support-ing the third mechanism, that cooperativebehavior of others is used as an indication of thequality of the public good (Jan Potters et al.,2001).

Interne Norm / Expectations of behaviour of others


---Expectations about the behavior of others should positively correlate with one's behavior, as found in various studies (Selten and Ockenfels, 1998] Croson, 1998, Dawes et al., 1977), Seite 10 oben)
--> vllt. auch fragen, was Personen denken wie viele Leute in % spenden an Hospiz / an wohltätige Organisationen, falls oben genannte Studien keine Feldstudien.


Kausalität Erwartung --> Verhalten
LABORFischbacher, Schächter and Fehr (2001) solve the causality problem by using the strategy method. Subbects in their laboratory public good game have to decide how much to giveto a public account, given the contributions of others. The study concludes that roughly 50 percent of the people increase their contribution if the others do so as well.
Similar results are found by Falk, Fischbacher and Schächter :2002, who get their subbects to play two separate public good games simultaneously. The authors find two social interaction effectsI firstly, people give more to the group with high cooperation rates, and secondly, the contribution within one group depends positively on others contributions.
A number of other studies in economics do not test the effects of social comparison explicitly, but the results of public good experiments show that individual contribution varies with the mean contribution of the group Keser and van Winden, 2000] Offerman et al., 199U] Sutter and Weck-Hannemann, 2003@


FELD Andreoni and Scholz :1998, who find that ones own donation depends on the donations of ones reference group. Their results show that, if the contribution of those in ones social reference group increases by an average of 10% ,then the expected rise in ones own contribution rises by about 2% to 3%.
ökonomische studie, nur Korrelation, sehr mathematisch --> zum Glück nicht genau, was wir machen https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01723.x

What's the difference between external and internal norm?


An external norm is a norm that is presented/that is outside.


An internal norm is a norm that reflects the expactation of the individual. Internal norm might be understood as 1) what a person would give (her personal norm) or 2) what a person expects the external norm to be. In the Zürcher Studie, this expactation is mostly described as expectation about the behaviour of others
--> if that's the term mostly used in literature, then we should go with that :)

SWEDEN SKI STUDY (ähnlich wie zürcher studie)


Sustainable nature tourism and the nature of tourists’ cooperative behavior: Recreation conflicts, conditional cooperation and the public good problem

Result: Info über die Anzahl an Spendern in Population hat einfluss auf spendewahrsheinlichkeit von individuum

Radio Telefon Spenden 2009


A Field Experiment in Charitable Contribution: The Impact of Social Information on the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods
(Shang & Crosen, 2009)

WEITERFUERENDE STUDIEN:


Analysen vorhandener Daten (correlational): Observational research uses data from donation surveys or actual giving collected from tax returns; for reviews, see Andreoni (2006), Powell and Steinberg (2006), Kolm and Ythier (2006).


LAbor-Experimente find a positive relationship between others’ contributions and one's own (Bardsley, 2000; Croson, 2007; Fischbacher et al., 2001; Keser and van Winden, 2000; Weimann, 1994). However, these studies have important limitations. First, the contributions of others are typically measured rather than manipulated, thus the experiments do not provide a tight test of the theories


Feld-Expeiment (Levitt and List, 2007). This paper addresses both these concerns by manipulating the social information donors receive in a natural (field) setting.


Feld-Experimente - nicht genau unser Thema:
List and Lucking‐Reiley (2002) (seed money), Eckel and Grossman (2005) (rebates and matching), Falk (2005) (gift exchange)


---Gründe für Entscheidung ob und wieviel geben:
Psychological research (Ajzen, 1991; Brooks, 2004) has shown that decisions about whether to act and about how much to act, although positively correlated, may be caused by different psychological motivations. Similarly, Andreoni (2006) suggested that altruism tells people what causes to give to but that warm‐glow tells people how much to give.


---Gründe, wieso social information behaviour beeinflusst (perception change)
In other work, we provide evidence for conformity to social norms as an explanation; we found that social information changes people's perceptions of both what others give to the non‐profit organisation and what the appropriate contribution is. These changed perceptions correlate at the individual level with self‐reported contribution behaviour; individuals whose perceptions change more, give more than individuals whose perceptions change less (Croson et al. 2008).


Importance of social information in economic studies/situations
Others have suggested the importance of norms in actual (Akerlof, 1982) and experimental (Fehr et al., 1998) labour markets, whether to work or live on welfare (Lindbeck et al., 1999), saving and consumption (Lindbeck, 1997) and on profit seeking entitlements (Kahneman et al., 1986).

Radio Mail Spenden (2008)


The impact of downward social information on contribution decisions’
Shang, J. and Croson, R. (2008). ‘

auch hier ähnlicher effekt wie radio telefon spenden (siehe violette studie rechts)

METHOD


DIFFERENCES TO OUR STUDY


  • self-selecting sample of people involved in study
  • via telephone (and not live at home)
  • social info = ("invented") donation of last person (and not general 90-90th percentile of distribution of donations in past)
  • radio station and not Hospiz

90-95 percentil-Studie (2012)


LIMITS OF THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL INFORMATION ON THE VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS: EVIDENCE FROM FIELD EXPERIMENTS
(CROSON AND SHANG, 2012)


basiert auf Studie Radio Telefon ((Shang & Crosen, 2009)) --> siehe violett unten

BEGRÜNDUNG HOHES PERCENTIL:


Previous work in psychology and goal‐setting suggest that behavioural goals need to be achievable and inspiring in order to change behaviour effectively (Locke and Latham, 1990).

Für ingroup/outgroup = Ähnlichkeit:


Shang, Reed, and Croson (2008)
'I’ Give but ‘We’ Give More: The Impact of Identity and the Mere Information Effect on Donation Behavior.

demonstrate that the social similarity between the other who has made the contribution and the target donor affects the strength of the social information effect.

Wieso Auf- und Abwärtsanpassung an soziale Info?


Croson and Shang (2008)
The Impact of Downward Social Information on Contribution Decisions


basierend auf Studie Radio Telefon????

show that social information can be used to both raise and lower contributions made via mail as well as on the phone
= ich spende mehr als andere? da pass ich mich doch besser mal nach unten an.... Grund? free-riding?

In our setting (Radiostation Spendenmarathon 3mal im Jahr für Radiostation, 300 dollar als social reference war am effektivsten (vs 180, 75 und control)), this internal optimum is achieved at the 90th–95th percentile of contributions (in Shang and Croson forthcoming, the 80th percentile of contributions was too low to show a significant effect, while here the 99th percentile is too high to be effective).

ÜEBERBLICK ÜBER SCHWEIZER SPENDENMARKT 2015


Swissfundraising (Schweizer Fundraising Verband)
Studie durchgeführt von DemoSCOPE


BESSER: STATISTIK VON ZEWO BENUTZEN!!

https://swissfundraising.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/SwissFundraising_Spendenbarometer_deutsch_GzD.pdf


METHODISCHER MANGEL:
Spendenbarometer sind n= 1501 Telefongespräche (Quantitativ CATI)


Problem: Self-selecting sample (man kann vermuten, dass v.a. SpenderInnen antworten) + soziale Erwünschtheit (Spendefrequenz und -beträge nach oben verzerrt)

Gut für Einleitung
Gut für Rechtfertigung des genannten Spendebetrags in unserer Studie (falls die auf meine Mail antworten)

Gesamtbetrag D-CH Median 350.- (höher als Romaandie und I-CH)
Häufigkeit D-CH: 49% > 1 mal gespendet
Gesamt-CH: 25% nie gespendet
Betrag D-CH Median EINZELSPENDE 150.-


!! Sie spenden...
...weil andere Leute in ihrem Umfeld auch spenden.
--> 7% völlig zutreffend, 10% eher zutreffend (5point-Likertskala)

NOCH NICHT ANGESCHAUT

NOCH NICHT ANGESCHAUT

auch movie lens study zeigt auf- und abwärtsanpassungen (2010)

KRITIK


  • Personen könnten mehr gespendet haben, WEIL ANDERE PERSONEN ZUGEHOERT HABEN!!!! --> Grösse Dorf/Stadt und Sendereichweite nachforschen (in kleinem Dorf wäre dieser Effekt wohl stärker, da jeder jeden kennt...)

click to edit

Lokale Normen

Schwedische Uni, ingroup vs outgroup-social norm


Using descriptive social norms to increase charitable giving: the power of local norms (Agerström, 2015)



Weiterführende Studien:


a room with a viewpoint: usind social norms to motivate environmental conservation in hotels


Journal of Consumer Research, 35, 472–482. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/586910.


gleiche Resultate wie Agerström

NOCH NICHT ANGESCHAUT

How Sunday, price, and social norms influence donation behaviour (Richard Martina, John Randalb)

Donation BehaviortowardIn-GroupsandOut-
Groups: TheRoleofGenderandMoralIdentity
(WInterich, Mittal und Ross)

Distinctiveness and influence of subjective norms, personal descriptive and injunctive norms and societal descriptive norms on behavioural intent: a case of two behaviours critical to organ donation

Resultat:


Spendenhäufigkeit: lokale Norm > globale Norm

METHODE:


73% d. (lokale Uniname)-studenten haben gespendet
73% d. (Landname)-studenten haben gespendet
control (einfach nur: willste spenden?)


Spende=fixer Betrag ca 2.1CHF für Uganda (glaub Kinder)

verspätetes Debriefing erwähnt (an Ort und Stelle nach Zahlung) --> niemand wollte Geld zurück oder hat sich beschwert