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эк рост и гос управление в КНР (гос управление в КНР (система стимулов для…
эк рост и гос управление в КНР
гос управление в КНР
система патронажа
Edin M. State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a Township Perspective // China Q. 2003. № 173. С. 35–52.
Chen T., Kung J.K. The Return to Bureaucrats’ Connection: Evidence from China’s Land Market // 2015. С. 1–34.
система стимулов для чиновников
Яковлев А.А. Стимулы В Системе Государственного Управления И Экономический Рост: Опыт CCCР, Китая и России. // Москва, 2014. 1–24 с.
Jia R., Kudamatsu M., Seim D. Political selection in China: The complementary roles of connections and performance // Journal of the European Economic Association 2015. Т. 13. № 4. С. 631–668.
Landry P.F., Lü X., Duan H. Does Performance Matter? Evaluating Political Selection Along the Chinese Administrative Ladder // Comparative Political Studies 2017. Т. 51. № 8. С. 1074–1105.
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Rochlitz M. и др. Performance incentives and economic growth: regional officials in Russia and China // Eurasian Geography and Economics. 2015. Т. 56. № 4. С. 421–445.
performance contracts
Gao J. Governing by Goals and Numbers: a Case Study in the Use of Performance Measurment to Build State Capacity in China // Public Administration and Development. 2009. Т. 29. С. 21–31.
Shirley M.M., Xu L.C. Empirical Effects of Performance Contracts: Evidence from China // Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization. 2001. Т. 17. №1. 168–200 с.
система кланов
Keller F.B. Moving beyond factions: Using social network analysis to uncover patronage networks among Chinese elites // Journal of East Asian Studies 2015. Т. 16. № 1. С. 17–41.
Meyer D., Shih V.C., Lee J. Factions of Different Stripes: Gauging the Recruitment Logics of Faction in the Reform Period // Journal of East Asian Studies. 2016. Т. 16. С. 43–60.
селекторат
Manion M. “Good Types” in Authoritarian Elections: The Selectoral Connection in Chinese Local Congresses // Comparative Political Studies. 2014. Т. 50. № 3. С. 362–394.
КНР и экологические проблемы
загрязнение воды
Kahn M.E., Li P., Zhao D. Water Pollution Progress at Borders: The Role of Changes in China’s Political Promotion // Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 2015. Т. 7. № 4. С. 223–242.
Liang J., Langbein L. Performance Management, High-Powered Incentives, and Environmental Policies in China // International Public Management Journal 2015. Т. 18. № 3. С. 346–385.
авторитарное государство и эк рост
концепция ограниченного доступа
North D.C., Weingast B.R., Wallis J.J. Violence and The Rise of Open-Access Orders //Journal of Democracy 2009. Т. 20. № 1. С. 55–68.
легитимность и эк рост
Landry P.F. The Political Management of Mayors in Post-Deng China // Copenhagen Journal Of Asian Studies. 2002. № 17. С. 31–58.
Xu C. The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Development // Journal of Economic Literature. 2011. Т. 49. № 4. С. 1076–1151.
Zhao D. The Mandate of Heaven and Performance Legitimation in Historical and Contemporary China // American Behavioral Scientist. 2009. Т. 53. С. 416–433.
Zhu Y. "Performance Legitimacy" and China’s Political Adaptation Strategy // Journal of Chinese Political Science. 2011. Т. 16. С. 123–140.
мультидивизионная и унитарная системы управления
Maskin E., Qian Y., Xu C. Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form // The Review of Economic Studies. 2000. Т. 67. № 2. С. 359–378.