S2L5: Theory of Mind
Action understanding develops as early as 9mo
Observe another’s action --. Motor commands for producing 1self - intentions that drive that action in us - same intention drives action in another
Such representation of others’ action may constitute a rudimentary ‘theory of mind’
“Theory of mind refers to an understanding of mental states - such as belief, desire, & knowledge - that enables us to explain & predict others’ behaviour.” (Miller, 2006:142)
ToM is an important component of empathising: Or main component is having appropriate affective reactions to others’ mental states
In adults, ToM may involve medial PFC & posterior superior temporal sulcus (Gallagher & Frith, 2003) as well as right temporal parietal junction (Saxe & Powell, 2006)
Components of ToM develop from young age: 9m: Action understanding, 9-14m: Protodeclarative pointing (pointing make someone look to where pointing to) (Bates et al, 1979), 12m: sensitive to where person is looking, & understand sig of eyes (Brooks & Meltzoff, 2002) – Gaze, 14m: keen to est joint/shared attention, 18m: concern at distress of others
False belief: Understanding others may have representations of world false &/or different from 1’s own. Understanding others act on basis of beliefs, rather than reality. - For many, ‘acid test’ of ToM is false belief task: ‘‘Successful reasoning about false beliefs is only convincing evidence for attribution of mental states to others.’’ (Dennett, 1978) – false belief tests are only evidence of ToM.
Maxi task (Wimmer & Perneer, 1983): Maxi puts chocolate in green box. He goes out to play. Mum moves it to blue box. Maxi comes back in wanting some chocolate. ToM questions: Q: Where will Maxi look for it? Q: Where does Maxi think it is? Memory control questions: Q: Where is it now? Q: Where was it before? Results: ToM questions: 50% 4-5 yr olds said ‘green’ (chance). 92% 5-6 yr olds said ‘green’. Both groups got Control question right. False belief representation may develop btwn 4-6 yrs.
Sally-Anne task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith): typically developed children aged 4-5 pass task.
Smarties task: In Maxi/Sally-Anne tasks, child never holds false belief. Story comprehension also a problem. Smarties task solves se problems (Perner et al., 1987). Method: Child shown a Smarties tube & asked what she thinks is inside: “sweets”. Exper removes top from tube to show it contains a crayon. ToM question: If your friend comes in, what will s/he think is inside? False belief memory question: What did you think was inside when I 1st showed you? Results: children pass task only at 4-5 years
‘Ice cream’ story: 2nd-order/higher-order ToM tests
Problems & criticisms: Children pass these types of task at around 4yo. BUT some say are too easy, & don’t require full ToM - Participants w/ ASD can sometimes pass tasks (e.g. see Baron-Cohen, 1989 for comments). 2nd-order/higher-order ToM tasks solve some of problems & involve beliefs about beliefs. “He thinks that she thinks…”
2nd-order/higher-order ToM tests “Ice cream” story - • Perner & Wimmer (1985): “John & Mary, see an ice-cream van at park where they are playing. Later, each is independently informed that ice-cream van has moved from park to church, but neither knows that or actor has been informed. 6 exps, 5-10yrs asked where John thinks Mary would go to buy an ice-cream. To respond correctly, children must take into account John's ignorance of Mary's knowledge of true whereabouts of ice-cream van.”
Some researchers claim that understanding of false belief develops earlier than 4 years, but that traditional false belief tasks are too hard for younger children to pass. E.g., Issues of lang comprehension & expression. Child can’t pass unless y understand question. Requires relatively complex responses from child. Requires child to remember details of story
Non-verbal messages
Eye-tracking: Onishi & Baillargeon (2005): (1) Actor plays w/ toy, puts in yellow box, (2) Infant (but not actor) then sees toy moved from yellow to green box, (3) Actor reaches into a box. When actor chose green, 15m infants looked longer, indicating that they were surprised. 15m infants understand to some extent that people should act in accordance w/ beliefs.
Using ‘ToM’ abilities to learn lang: We might also be able to see early evidence of ToM in infants’ word-learning abilities. Infants who had better gaze-following skills at 10-11m had higher lang scores at 18m (Brooks & Meltzoff, 2005). By 18m, infants can use both a ‘lis10er’s direction of gaze’ (LDG) strategy & ‘speaker’s direction of gaze’ (SDG) strategy to learn words (Baldwin, 1991, 1993, 1996). Some understanding of intention of speaker.
Follow-in & discrepant trials: Follow-in labelling (‘listener’s direction of gaze’, LDG): exper looked at & labelled a toy at which infants were already looking. (Baldwin, 1991, 1993). Discrepant labelling (‘speaker’s direction of gaze’, SDG): exper looked at & labelled a different toy than 1 occupying infants' focus.
Baldwin conclusion: Infants' responses to subsequent comprehension questions revealed that (a) successfully learned labels introduced during follow-in labelling, & (b) displayed no tendency to make mapping errors after discrepant labelling. Thus, infants of only 16-19 mo understand that a speaker's nonverbal cues are relevant to ref of object labels; already can contribute to social coordination involved in achieving joint reference.
Atypical development of ToM: Impaired ToM: 1 of hallmarks of ASD - Some theories propose ASD = deficit in ToM. Theories by Baron-Cohen: (1) Initial ToM model (2) Empathizing/systemizing theory of ToM & has since moved on from theory too! Children w/ ASD: 80% fail false-belief tasks (Baron-Cohen, 1989). Frequently have lang impairments, thought (by some) to be linked to ToM deficit (Baron-Cohen, Baldwin & Crowson, 1997)
Individual diffs in ToM: (1) Variety of measures developed to assess ToM. (1) eyes task: “Reading mind in eyes” (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997, 2001) “Advanced ToM test” (2) Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980) (3) Empathy Quotient (EQ; Lawrence et al., 2004). (2) Interpersonal reactivity index: Empathy: “Reactions of 1 individual to observed experiences of another” (Davis, 1983). 28 items on 5-point Likert scale. (3) Empathy quotient: 60-item questionnaire – Baron-Cohen (2004)
Attribution of mental states
(Heider & Simmel, 1944): Attributing mental states to “interaction” of inanimate geometric shapes thought to reflect higher order ToM abilities. By attributing mental states to inanimate objects, “making sense” of & explaining behaviour. Studies begun to use types of ‘social attribution tasks’ to examine ToM abilities in Asperger’s & high-functioning ASD.
Abell, Happe & Frith (2000): High-functioning 8 yr children w/ ASD used terms that attributed animacy to shapes less of10 than TD children & used incorrect terms/emotions more of10.
Klin & J1s (2006): Adults w/ high-functioning ASD were impaired on ‘social attribution task’ (SAT), but not on ‘physical attribution task’ (PAT). deficit is domain-specific. Not simply general deficit in reasoning/attribution, but 1 that is specific to social stimuli.
PET/Neuroimaging studies: Compare brain activation when watching geometric shapes move in ‘social’ way vs. shapes moving randomly. Greater activation in superior temporal sulcus, temporo-parietal junction & medial prefrontal cortex when watching social vs. random movements. Typically developed individuals show more activation in areas than ASD. - fMRI study by Schultz et al. (2003) found that SATs activate fusiform face area